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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to establish the characteristic 
features of hoteliers and hotels in the main sectors of the 
U.K. hotel industry, and to demonstrate, through case 
studies, patterns of growth, development and performance in 
hotel companies in the period 1945 - 1989. The year 1945, 
which marked the end of the Second World War, is a natural 
start point for such a work whilst by 1989 the U.K. hotel 
industry had established a standard of hospitality combined 
with general management skills at least equal to and in 
many cases superior to that offered on the Continent of 
Europe and throughout the New World.
Subsequent to outlining the economic context of the 
industry in the introductory chapter, the thesis 
demonstrates the growth and development of the industry by 
charting the progress of twelve separate hotel companies. 
These are divided into three groups - hotels in the 
independent sector, hotel companies which operate 
throughout the U.K. and whose basis for growth has been the 
underlying asset value of their property portfolio linked 
to their ability to operate in a specialised retail 
environment and hotel companies which have grown 
principally as a result of international expansion and 
diversification.
The final chapter is directed towards an evaluation of the 
case studies and to factors which have been central to the 
growth and development of each company.
x -
INTRODUCTION
Although hotels and inns have existed for centuries it is 
only in recent times that the hotel industry has come to 
feature as a principal component of the service sector of 
the economy. This is as a result of the growth and
development of the industry in the post-Second World War 
period and it is this expansion which is the subject of the 
thesis. The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is to trace 
and analyse the reasons for the growth and development of 
the U.K. hotel industry since 1945.
Traditionally, the hotel industry in the U.K. was dominated 
by independent hotels, often family controlled, which 
sought to provide accommodation, food, liquor and latterly 
leisure to their various markets (Ch. 2). The post war 
period, however, has seen the emergence of a number of 
large firms which operate groups of hotels and it is these 
firms to which much public attention is now paid, 
particularly those which operate as Public Limited
Companies. Furthermore, other large firms, especially 
national brewers, have sought to diversify into the hotel 
industry and have built up chains of hotels which form 
separate divisions within their organizations (Ch. 3). 
Initially these developments were related principally to 
internal structural changes in the British business sector. 
More recently, the international dimension in the hotel 
business has increased and is considered in Chapter 4.
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Although independent hotels have lost their dominance and 
in recent years have declined in number by at least 10,000, 
they still form an important part of the industry. A study 
of such hotels was deemed, therefore, to be essential. 
One exemplar was chosen from England, Scotland and Wales 
together with one from central London.
Of special importance is the management style adopted by 
typical hoteliers in this sector. This is detailed in each 
instance and the profiles have been constructed in the form 
of case studies which demonstrate not only how successful 
hotels operate but what common factors can be identified.
Turning to larger firms within the U.K. market^ companies 
which have made a major impact on the post war growth and 
development of the U.K. hotel industry were identified. 
Each of these firms recognized the property aspect of hotel 
ownership together with the potential of owning freeholds 
and long leaseholds with regard to their appreciation in 
value. The growth and development of each was recorded, 
attention being paid to the various management techniques 
which were employed in order to improve profitability.
The third group of companies to be studied represented 
those firms whose operations carried an international 
dimension, usually subsequent to building a U.K. portfolio.
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These firms represent the largest in the U.K. industry and, 
by the end of the period under review, some of the largest 
in the world.
There is a total of twelve case studies, each one of which 
not only profiles the growth and development of an 
individual firm but also indicates the common strands which 
help form a successful hotel operation. The conclusion 
identifies the factors which form the basis for success in 
the hotel industry. These include a consideration of the 
importance of property assets, the importance of location, 
the methods and timing of acquisitions together with the 
significance of professional advice.
Clearly, in order to develop such case studies, access at 
proprietor, chairman and senior director level was 
essential. This was achieved in all twelve studies and 
indeed the willing cooperation of those at all levels 
within the industry was most heartening and has resulted in 
a thesis more credible than one conducted merely as a desk 
based study. Interviews usually lasted for about an hour, 
in some cases two hours or more and in the independent over 
a period of three days each. A note of the methodology and 
selected biographical details is contained in Appendix 1.
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In two instances video recordings, each of some 45 minutes 
duration, were made and these are available for inspection 
and study.
An unrivalled commentary of the affairs of the period 
proved to be the library of The Financial Times to whom 
acknowledgement has already been made. The voluminous 
press cuttings files on the individual companies provided 
an accurate backdrop to the text and served as a useful 
cross reference to other sources.
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CHAPTER 1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UK HOTEL INDUSTRY
In the period 1945 to 1989 the U.K. hotel industry changed 
considerably. Change, however, tended to be gradual, 
mirroring the upward trend in disposable incomes and the 
growing use of hotels by businesses and business people in 
general. Apart from the Hotel Proprietors Act of 1956, the 
formation of the Hotel and Catering Economic Development 
Committee and the Hotel and Catering Industry Training 
Board, both established in 1966, there was little 
government legislation which was industry specific.
It is clear, however, that The Development of Tourism Act 
(1969) is a watershed on either side of which the general 
environment for, and consideration of, the UK hotel 
industry changed quite significantly. Before the Act the 
industry attracted little government attention or support, 
and the incentives to hoteliers to improve their facilities 
were limited. After the Act the industry embarked on a 
notable phase of expansion and improvement.
Although this expansion was temporarily slowed by the 
recessions of 1973 - 1975 and 1980 - 1981, the industry
made major strides during the nineteen-eighties and by the 
end of the decade could be considered a mature industry in
- 5 -
which major companies such as Trusthouse Forte, Bass and
Ladbroke each controlled large groups of hotels in
worldwide locations.
1. The Industry at the End of the War
The Second World War, 1939 to 1945, had a dramatic effect 
on the U.K. hotel industry. The majority of hotels were 
requisitioned by the government and even by November 1945, 
2,699 hotels remained under government control. [1] Three 
quarters of these were subsequently released in the 
following nine months, most of them having suffered various 
degrees of dilapidation. Little or no refurbishment of 
buildings and contents had been possible during the war and 
the principal aim of the industry in the period 1945 to 
1950 was a gradual return to normality and the
rehabilitation of buildings and equipment. This had to be
achieved against a background both of large increases in 
allied military personnel stationed in the U.K. and the 
even more formidable problem of severe shortages both in 
goods and building materials essential to the efficient 
operation of hotels. Added to this was an increasing 
tendency for central government intervention in the affairs 
of the industry.
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Indications of the severity of shortages may be seen from 
the following examples. Under a government order of March 
1946 it became an offence for an hotelier to serve bread 
with a main meal except at the specific request of the 
customer. The severity of this restriction was followed, 
in January 1947, by bread rationing, a measure that had not 
been necessary throughout the entire war years. [2]
At the end of the war equipment for accommodation was in 
such short supply that in March 1946 the government 
announced a scheme of allocation of sheets, blankets and 
mattresses which would allow at least some hotels to open 
for the summer season. Furthermore, hotels had to comply 
with rigidly enforced allocations of fuel and power. It 
was not until 1950 that hotels were allowed to display 
illuminated signs overnight. It was not until September 
1950 that soap was de-rationed and food rationing did not 
end until June 1954. [3] These restrictions, which forty
years on seem scarcely credible, give an indication of the 
exigences to which the industry was subjected in the 
immediate post-war period.
It has to be stressed that in the immediate post-war years 
the hotel industry still displayed the heterogeneous nature 
that had prevailed in previous centuries. Hotel groups did 
exist but were very much in their infancy. The three best 
known were the Savoy Hotel Group, Trust Houses and the
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British Transport Hotels. The Savoy Hotel Group was small, 
but owned and operated four of the leading hotels in 
London. It operated at the top end of the market and, 
despite a relatively poor profit performance, was regarded 
almost as a . national institution. In contrast, Trust 
Houses, formed originally in 1903, was well known and had 
grown to operate around 200 hotels throughout the U.K. by 
1949. These, however, tended to be of a relatively modest 
standard without the trappings of affluence common in 
today*s luxury establishments. [4]
The major influence on the development of the industry, and 
especially influential for hotel groups at this time was 
the 1947 Transport Act, which created the British 
Transport Commission. This subsequently brought into 
public ownership 54 hotels which had previously belonged to 
the principal railway companies in the U.K. British 
Transport Hotels came to the forefront of U.K. hotel 
development, and at that time introduced training schemes 
considered to be the best in the industry, which generally 
paid scant heed to training and staff development.
Yet apart from these developments the industry was mainly 
composed of independent hotels, often family controlled, 
which served local communities throughout the year and 
attracted holidaymakers during the summer months. At this 
stage in the development of the U.K. hotel industry
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international firms had yet to penetrate the market. For 
the most part these organisations were at a formative stage 
of development in their country of origin (in most cases 
this being the United States of America). Simultaneously 
the major brewing firms in the U.K. were concentrating 
their efforts on the rehabilitation of their core 
businesses. It was not until the 1960's that they 
perceived the hotel industry as a useful vehicle for 
expansion and diversification.
Consequently the hotel industry, partly because of its 
fragmented and heterogeneous nature, was generally 
perceived by central government as being of peripheral 
importance to the national economy. This was despite 
various reports presented to the Minister of Labour in the 
period 1944 to 1945. These reports, which stemmed from the 
Catering Wages Act of 1943, drew attention to the need for 
the rehabilitation of the hotel and catering industry, the 
development of catering, holiday and tourist services and 
the need for training throughout the industry. It is 
interesting that these highly perceptive reports were 
commissioned and produced, but regrettably there is little 
evidence to suggest that they were implemented with the 
vigour they deserved. [5]
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What the Catering Wages Act did do was to lay down minimum 
rates of pay for a wide range of operative and supervisory 
jobs within the hotel and catering industry. Moreover, 
establishments within the industry were classified 
according to whether they were licensed or non-licensed, 
residential or non-residential with an additional category 
given over to industrial and staff canteens. The main 
objective of this legislation was to prevent unscrupulous 
employers exploiting staff. Staff who lived on the 
premises and who were given full board and lodging were 
particularly vulnerable to such exploitation and statutory 
amounts were laid down for deductions in relation to board 
and lodging. [6]
All the evidence of the late 1940's and early 1950's point 
to an industry trapped in apparent inertia, lacking a 
public profile, and failing to attract interest and 
support from government. Not surprisingly, the evidence 
also suggests rapid turnover in ownership of establishments 
and probably some decline in total hotel stock.
One indication of the decline in the stock of hotels, and 
therefore bedrooms, may be judged from the fact that in 
1955 The Daily Telegraph suggested that only 11 London 
hotels survived from the 110 listed in Baedeker 1900. [7]
Moreover, it is clear that there was little new building 
activity and the nineteen-fifties was a bleak decade for
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hotel construction in the U.K. Indeed, practically the 
only new hotels of note that were built in the post war 
period to 1960 were The Leofric in Coventry and The 
Westbury in Mayfair, London. [8]
2. Trends in the Market to 1969
There are four main elements in the growth of demand for 
hotel services; domestic holidays, foreign visitors, 
business usage and the catering for functions such as 
lunches and dinners for social occasions for U.K. 
residents. At the end of the war hoteliers naturally had to 
rely mainly on domestic usage, and this sector remained the 
core business, expanding by 22% in volume by 1969, but 
virtually doubling in value from £320M to E600M (Tables 1 
- 1 and 2).
In regard to catering we have no direct evidence but 
between 1966 and 1969 (Table 1 - 3) the data suggest
expenditure on catering and accommodation represented 
£1,427M, some 4.9% of total consumer expenditure. Since 
we have already seen from Table 2 that £600M of this was 
spent on U.K. holidays, the balance of £827M must give some 
approximation of the size of the catering industry in the
- 11 -
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U.K. In turn much of this £827M must represent business as 
opposed to private expenditure on accommodation and 
catering.
The other major segment is that of foreign visitors where 
the growth is shown in Table 1 - 4. There was a very
vigorous recovery of such visitors in the first 10 years 
after the war with expansion being more than fivefold in 
the period 1946 to 1956. The level of growth slowed 
somewhat towards the end of the 1950*s but accelerated 
during the 1960's when total numbers grew from 1.6 million 
in 1960 to 5.8 million in 1969 - an increase of some 350%. 
Expenditure in the same period moved from E169M to £359M - 
an increase of some 220%. It will be noted that the £359M 
is some 25% of the total expenditure of £1,427M by U.K. 
residents shown in Table 1 - 3  and compares with the £600M 
which was spent on holidays by U.K. residents.
Whilst the foregoing data are neither as accurate nor as 
sector specific as one might wish, (problems relating to 
data are outlined in the statistical note at the end of 
this chapter) it would seem that total expenditure on hotel 
and catering services in the U.K. in 1969 was in the order 
of £1,786M; £1,427 by U.K residents and £359 by foreign
visitors.
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TABLE 1 - 4
OVERSEAS VISITORS TO BRITAIN (LEISURE AND BUSINESS) 
NUMBERS AND EXPENDITURE 1946 TO 1970
YEAR NUMBER OF TOTAL YEAR NUMBER OF TOTAL
VISITORS EXPENDITURE VISITORS EXPENDITURE
(’000) (Emillion) (’000) (Emillion)
1946 203 12 1959 1,395 143
1947 396 21 1960 1,669 169
1948 504 33 1961 1,824 176
1949 563 43 1962 1,956 183
1950 618 61 1963 2,159 188
1951 712 75 1964 3,257 190
1952 733 80 • 1965 3,597 193
1953 819 88 1966 3,967 219
1954 902 95 1967 4,289 236
1955 1,037 111 1968 4,828 282
1956 1,107 121 1969 5,821 359
1957 1,180 129
1958 1,259 134
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
Britain and International Tourism
i
i
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3. Overview: The Industry at the end of the I960*s.
The period 1945 to 1969 saw many changes in the UK hotel 
industry, but none of them had a major impact on its 
structure, conduct or performance. Rather, these changes 
may be viewed as factors which gradually saw the industry 
emerge from the ravages of the Second World War and 
latterly, from 1960 onwards, saw the emergence of an 
industry in which well organised, professionally managed 
groups began to have a considerable influence. These 
groups, such as Grand Metropolitan, had a different 
perception of the industry compared with the more old 
fashioned organisations such as The Savoy Group. The new 
groups marketed their properties with specific regard to 
the differences between accommodation, food and drink; they 
sought economies of scale in purchasing; they targeted 
additional properties for acquisition and they responded 
more quickly to the changing demands of their customers - 
in particular, their business customers, who formed an 
increasing share of the market.
For its part, the U.K. government gradually came to realise 
the potential of the U.K. hotel and related industries both 
in terms of employment opportunities and foreign exchange 
earnings. The increasing interest of government led both 
to the formation of the Hotel and Catering Industry 
Training Board in 1966 and latterly, to The Development of
- 17 -
Tourism Act 1969. Few, however, at that time, could have 
forecast the very rapid growth of the following twenty 
years or the increasing importance of the industry to 
the national economy.
B. The Industry in the 1970fs and 1980's
1. (i) The Significance of The Development of Tourism Act
1969
During the 1960's the U.K. government came to realise both 
the growing importance and economic potential of activities 
associated with leisure, recreation and tourism. In an 
effort to increase tourist capacity the labour 
administration, led by Harold Wilson, brought in The 
Development of Tourism Act 1969, which came into effect on 
1st January 1970. In turn this led to the Hotel
Development Incentive Scheme which provided for grants and 
loans from public funds for buildings and fixed equipment 
for work commenced before April 1971 and completed by April 
1973. The maximum grant was £1,000 per bedroom which, at 
at that time, represented approximately 25% of the capital 
cost. During the life of the scheme grants marginally in 
excess of £50M were awarded to the industry.
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The scheme was administered by the three statutory Tourist 
Boards in England, Scotland and Wales. Although no precise 
figures are available, it has been reliably estimated that 
prior to the Hotel Development Incentive Scheme the number 
of bedrooms added to the total stock was in the order of 
2,000 per annum. Investment during the period 1970 to 
1973, however, showed a sixfold increase. [9]
(ii) Problems and Opportunities Caused By The Development 
of Tourism Act 1969
The Act provided a much needed shot in the arm^or the 
industry, and in particular encouraged companies to proceed 
with schemes of renewal and refurbishment which had 
hitherto been classed as marginal. Indeed, such was the 
number and variety of schemes initiated by both operators 
and property developers that there was a temporary over 
supply of accommodation, even in London. One short term 
problem that emerged was that inexperienced property 
developers, financiers and hoteliers tried to cash in. In 
London especially, properties were built that were neither 
soundly financed nor operated. This temporary over supply 
was exacerbated by the quadrupling of oil prices late in 
1973 and by the subsequent recession which lasted until mid 
1975.
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2. The Changing Market
(i) Income, Expenditure and the Standard of Living
As a major service industry the hotel sector is heavily 
dependent on growth in real income and consumer expenditure 
and equally on an increase in disposable income being 
directed to consuming its services. Between 1945 and 1990 
income per head increased about threefold, as did total 
consumer expenditure, an average of about 2% per year.
[10] Most of the gains came after 1970, with 60% of the 
increase in real consumer expenditure occurring in the 
period 1970 to 1989 and two thirds of that concentrated in 
the 1980's. Consequently, the gains in real consumer 
expenditure did not favour a rapid expansion of usage of 
hotel facilities before 1970. Nevertheless, expenditure on 
services did increase from about 16% of all consumer 
spending in 1948 to 23% in 1970 (Tables 5 and 6). [11]
Thereafter the growth was more rapid, and by 1988 some 31% 
went on services, about twice the level prevailing 
immediately after the war. Perhaps even more striking was 
the fact that food attracted about 24% of all consumer 
spending in 1948 but only 20% in 1970 and a mere 12% in 
1988. [12] These changes and the huge growth in such
spending reflect the growth in affluence and the
- 20 -
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expenditure on leisure, a critical feature underlying the 
expansion of the hotel industry since the Development of 
Tourism Act 1969.
(ii) The Domestic Holiday Market
One indication of increasing affluence in the nineteen- 
seventies was the increase in expenditure on meals and 
accommodation. Between 1970 and 1975 this increased by 80% 
(Table 1 - 7), while expenditure on extended holidays grew 
by 60% (Table 1-8).  This was a very vigorous growth of 
the domestic market, even though the trend to holidays 
abroad was beginning to rival domestic holidays in total 
expenditure (Table 1 - 8). Even in the 1980*s when the
overseas holiday market effectively doubled in scale, the
domestic holiday market continued to provide a sizeable
core business for the hotel sector (Table 1 - 10). While 
this market held relatively steady, that for overseas
visitors to the U.K. displayed a very substantial gain.
(iii) Overseas Visitors
In 1970 6.7 million overseas visitors spent £434 million in 
Britain. That was about half the value of British
residents' expenditure on holidays at that time. By 1980, 
the number of overseas visitors had nearly doubled to 12.4 
million, while expenditure rose to £2.9 billion. By 1988
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TABLE 1 - 1 0
Trends in Holidays by UK Residents
LEVEL OF HOLIDAY TAKING BY UK RESIDENTS 1965 - 1989
YEAR
All Taking 
Holidays in:
1965 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989
GB Only 
GB and Abroad 
Abroad Only
48
9
46 42 
4 6 
10 15
34
6
17
28
8
21
29
8
22
HOLIDAYS TAKEN BY GB RESIDENTS LASTING 4+ NIGHTS 
1980 - 1989
YEAR
(Number in Millions)
TREND 1980 1983 1985 1987 1989 CHANGE
In Britain 36.5 33.5 33.0 28.5 31.5 - 14%
Abroad 12.0 14.5 15.75 20.0 21.0 + 43%
Source: British National Travel Survey
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foreign visitors reached 15.6 million, a further gain of 
about one third and expenditure more than doubled to £6.2 
billion (Table 1 - 11).
By the end -of the 1980's this tidal flow of visitors was 
impacting significantly on the available accommodation. 
The British Tourist Authority estimated that Britain could 
absorb a maximum of 20 million overseas visitors per year. 
[13] With such visitors by this time being in excess of 15 
million, the capacity margin available was not large. 
Even so, there is little or no evidence to suggest that 
the British hotel industry responded by seeking to build 
new hotel capacity specifically for the overseas market. 
Given the high capital cost of hotels, such a course of 
action would have carried excessive risks. Consequently, 
the hotel sector plans its development to cater 
simultaneously for overseas visitors, domestic customers 
and business users. Seasonally, of course, the market 
segments differ in importance - between spring and autumn 
there is a significant expansion of overseas clients, 
while in the winter months the business and domestic 
markets provide most of the business.
- 28 -
TABLE 1 - 1 1
OVERSEAS VISITORS TO BRITAIN: (LEISURE AND BUSINESS) 
NUMBERS AND EXPENDITURE 1970 TO 1988
YEAR NUMBER OF VISITORS 
(*000)
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
(Emillion)
1970 6,730 434
1971 7,131 500
1972 7,459 576
1973 8,167 726
1974 8,543 898
1975 9,490 1,218
1976 10,808 1,768
1977 12,281 2,352
1978 12,646 2,507
1979 12,493 2,764
1980 12,400 2,961
1981 11,400 2,970
1982 11,600 3,188
1983 12,400 4,003
1984 13,600 4,614
1985 14,400 5,442
1986 13,800 5,553
1987 15,500 6,260
1988 15,600 6,215
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
British Tourist Authority
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(iv) Business Usage
The available data on the hotel industry does not readily 
or systematically disaggregate the business user. Table 1 
- 12, however, provides some insight to the importance of 
this sector. The domestic and overseas business market 
segments display quite different patterns. As far as U.K 
residents are concerned, four fifths of all bed nights in 
British hotels are taken up by the business user. In 
contrast, business usage represents only 40% of bed nights 
taken up by overseas visitors. Taken together, the 
business market now represents two thirds of all bednights 
in the U.K. hotel industry, this suggesting that either the 
tourist has to be satisfied with the standard of provision 
for the business market or has to seek facilities that have 
been developed in niche markets.
The growth in consumer expenditure and the expansion of the 
market segments indicate a very large growth in demand for 
hotel services. The obvious question is how effectively 
did the industry respond?
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3. The Response of the Industry
(i) Hotel Capacity in the mid 1970's
As there is no system of state registration of hotels in 
the U.K. it has always been difficult to ascertain 
accurately the number of units operating at any one time. 
Best estimates of units in operation in the immediate post 
war period are put at around 30,000 - licensed and
unlicensed. [15]
What would appear to be an accurate picture of hotel 
capacity in the U.K. is shown in Tables 1 - 13 to 15 which 
formed part of a report commissioned by the National 
Economic Development Office for the Hotels and Catering 
Economic Development Committee. The tables show the total 
number of hotels in the U.K. in 1974 to be 33,659. This 
total is broadly in line with other estimates. The tables 
also show that of this total only 384 hotels had more than 
100 bedrooms, while no fewer than 27,405 had 15 or fewer 
rooms. These figures are a clear illustration of the 
fragmented, and small scale nature of the industry. A 
similar pattern emerges when licensed and unlicensed hotels 
are considered separately.
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TOTAL 
6199 
2474 
2029 
1762 
836 
368 
13668 
44367 
31609 
40751 
61823 
57952 
74351 
310853
Source: 
Based 
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information 
supplied 
by 
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Bull 
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As may be seen from Table 1 - 1 3  licensed hotels in 1974 
numbered 13,668. Of this figure over 6,000 were hotels 
with 10 or fewer bedrooms. Equally relevant is that more 
than 12,000 hotels had fifty or fewer bedrooms whilst 1,204 
had more than fifty and only 368 had more than 100 
bedrooms. These hotels, however, provided 74,351 (24%) out 
of a total of 310,583 bedrooms.
As might be expected the total number of unlicensed hotels, 
19,991, as shown in Table 1-14, is greater than the 
total of licensed hotels. As also might be expected, by 
far the greatest proportion is made up of small units, 
14,508, having between 4 and 10 bedrooms. Only 60 
unlicensed hotels have more than fifty rooms and only 16 
more than 100. Again these figures demonstrate the highly 
fragmented nature of the industry. In addition, the total 
number of bedrooms in this sector is 186,649, indicating 
an average of only 9 rooms per unit. Small wonder that 
statistics for the industry in general tend to be 
unreliable, since they have to be supplied by such a large 
number of small businesses.
Tables 1 - 13 to 15 also show the preponderance of hotels
in London compared with the rest of the U.K. This is 
particularly noticeable for large hotels where 145 out of a 
total of 384 hotels are located in the capital. These 
figures may be compared to those shown in Table 1 - 16.
- 36 -
From these it will be noted that the number of 
establishments with fewer than 15 rooms fell from 20,700 in 
1971 to 9,500 in 1981, a principal contributory factor 
being the implementation of the Fire Precautions Act which 
led to the closure of many hotels whose proprietors could 
not afford to implement the requirements of the Act.
It will also be noted that in the period 1971 to 1981 the 
number of hotels with more than 200 bedrooms increased from 
115 to 190. Essentially, this represents the building 
programme of the main companies within the industry, a 
programme sparked by the Development of Tourism Act 1969.
Whilst the structure and distribution of hotel capacity 
throughout the U.K. remained fairly stable in the period 
under review, the number of units and number of bedrooms 
fell markedly. The Fire Precautions Act was the trigger 
for the decline in the number of small hotels the changing 
pattern of holidaymaking, in particular the progressive 
move towards foreign holidays, was a further major cause.
The outline changes in the provision of hotel services are 
summarised in Table 1 - 16. Generally speaking the most
significant changes occurred at the extreme ends of the 
business. The biggest loss of roomstock was concentrated 
in very small private hotels with fewer than fifteen rooms, 
while the greatest increase came in large hotels with more
- 37 -
TABLE 1 - 1 6
1. U.K. HOTEL ROOMSTOCK 1971 - 1981
ROOMS
Size of Unit 1971 % 1981 % % Change
>15 Rooms 191,800 33.1 96,100 18.9 -49.90
15-50 Rooms 223,600 38.6 200,000 39.4 -10.55
50-200 Rooms 124,200 21.4 141,000 27.8 13.53
<200 Rooms 39,200 6.8 70,000 13.8 80.87
TOTAL 578,800 508,000 -12.23
2. U.K. HOTELS 
Size of Unit
1971 - 1981 
1971
UNITS
% 1981 % % Change
>15 Rooms 20,700 64.7 9,500 48.1 -54.11
15-50 Rooms 9,600 30.0 8,400 42.5 -12.50
50-200 Rooms 1,550 4.8 1,650 8.3 6.45
<200 Rooms 115 0.4 190 1.0 65.22
TOTAL 31,965 19,740 -38.24
3. AVERAGE UNIT SIZE 1971 - 1981
AVERAGE UNIT SIZE
Size of Unit 1971 1981 % Change
>15 Rooms 9.27 10.12 9.17
15-50 Rooms 23.29 23.81 2.22
50-200 Rooms 80.13 85.45 6.65
<200 Rooms 340.87 373.16 9.47
TOTAL 18.11 25.73 42.12
Source: The Management of Hospitality Operations, Chapter 1. 
Jones P and Lockwood A - Cassell (1990).
- 38 -
than 200 rooms. This change reflects a growing
concentration of quality and capital in the hands of large 
hotel groups who are better placed to respond assertively 
and flexibly to market change. This concentration of scale 
is also reflected in the increasing emphasis placed on 
property values from the mid 1970's.
(ii) Property Values in the U.K. Hotel Industry - 1976 
to 1988
The almost continuous rise in property values has enabled 
hotel groups to become more financially secure from an
asset viewpoint but has had a detrimental effect on the
rate of return on capital invested. Examples from the 
1980's would include The Dorchester in Park Lane, London 
W1 which was sold to an Arab consortium in 1976 for £10M, 
resold eight years later to the far eastern group Regent 
International for £45M, only to be sold in 1985 to the
Sultan of Brunei for a reputed £60M. This sum was all the 
more surprising as the property was in need of major 
refurbishment. A further example was The Churchill Hotel 
in Portman Square, London W1 which was sold in 1987 to a 
Hong Kong consortium for £110M, with a further £15M to be 
spent on refurbishment. Whilst the operating profits of 
each hotel increased in absolute terms in the period 1975 
to 1985, they did not increase in proportion to the
purchase price. [15]
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Clearly, if the value of an hotel doubles it does not 
follow that the operating profit of the property will do 
likewise. What will happen is that the increased value 
will result in a lower rate of return on capital investment 
especially where, subsequent to the sale of the property, 
the operation becomes more highly geared. These examples 
highlight some of the problems associated with hotel 
valuation.
There was a significant increase in hotel property values 
in the period 1985 to 1988 which mirrored the rise in house 
prices generally, and in the south of England in 
particular. Prices for top quality hotel property in 
central London by the middle of 1988 exceeded £250,000 per 
bedroom, as was shown by the acquisition of a medium sized 
west end hotel, The Londonderry by Kennedy Brookes 
(subsequently taken over by Trusthouse Forte) for £45M. One 
course of action considered by Trusthouse Forte subsequent 
to acquisition was to put the hotel on the market with an 
asking price of £60M. Whilst the increases in the 
provinces were not so marked, many well run properties 
doubled in value in the period 1982 to 1988. Although this 
state of affairs clearly suits vendors, it makes entry
into the industry that much more difficult, especially for 
first time buyers. Also, it makes it more difficult to
- 40 -
trade up as moderate sized properties generally rose at a 
faster rate than smaller properties throughout the 1980*s.
[16]
The high level of prices paid for existing properties also 
made matters difficult for property developers who included 
an hotel in a major property development. As a result of 
land and construction costs, it is now becoming
increasingly difficult to build hotels at a cost which will 
attract hotel operators. The projected capital costs can 
result in potential operators withdrawing from developments 
when they realise that the prices they would have to charge 
for accommodation in order to earn a satisfactory rate of 
return on capital invested would be beyond the budgets of 
their business, let alone tourist clients.
The Nature of the Hotel Business
It may be seen, therefore, that essentially an hotel has 
two values:
i) as a going concern based upon its level of turnover and 
operating profit
ii) as a purely property asset based upon its rental value 
which in turn will be affected by its location and its 
profitability.
- 41 -
It has been a feature of the groups which have been 
successful in the post war period that they have recognised 
this dual nature of hotel property. They have purchased 
hotels in good locations (or have purchased property that 
has been capable of conversion into hotels) at a time when 
turnover, profitability and therefore asking prices have 
been modest. Thereafter via improved management, 
particularly in the marketing of accommodation, they have 
greatly increased the turnover of such properties. This
has had the effect of increasing the profitability and 
thereby the capital value on a going concern basis. The 
major bonus, typified by the years 1985 to 1988, has been 
the steady appreciation of property values. This 
combination has made established hotel companies that much 
more secure with the result that the industry is viewed
more favourably by the investment community than
heretofore.
Major groups that benefited in this way were Grand
Metropolitan thoughout the post war period and from 1977, 
Mount Charlotte, Norfolk Capital and Queens Moat Houses.
[17]
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(iii) Position of Major Groups in Period Under Review
The growth of new firms and groups in the U.K. hospitality 
industry in the period 1960 - 1980 was, to a significant 
extent, initiated by the formation of Grand Metropolitan 
Hotels Ltd in July 1962. This company represented the bulk 
of an extensive hotel portfolio controlled by the chairman 
Maxwell Joseph. This was followed in the mid 1960's by the 
formation of the Crest Hotel Group, at that time a 
subsidiary of Bass Charrington. Around this time other 
major breweries started to diversify into hotels - Scottish 
and Newcastle with its Thistle Group (initially formed in 
1965 and expanded steadily throughout the decade) and Vaux 
Breweries, based in Sunderland, with its Swallow hotel 
division. In all three cases the rationale was to provide 
additional retail outlets for food and liquor, together 
with a desire to enter the related retail field of 
accommodation.
In 1970 came the important merger of Trust Houses with 
Forte Holdings. The marriage of an old established hotel 
company and a relatively recently formed catering company 
is later described in some detail. The stated rationale 
for the merger was to form a group which could successfully 
and simultaneously retail accommodation, food and liquor. 
The early 1970's and the recession of 1973 - 75 saw general 
retrenchment throughout the industry, but the latter half
- 43 -
of that decade witnessed the emergence of two important 
groups, Queens Moat Houses and Mount Charlotte, each built 
on the basis of clever property transactions. The latter 
company eventually bought the Thistle Group in 1989. Queens 
Moat Houses was to enjoy rapid growth both in the U.K. and 
on the Continent of Europe during the nineteen-eighties. 
In the same period Mount Charlotte grew to become the 
second largest operator, by bedrooms, in the U.K. with a 
particularly strong emphasis on the London market. Other 
groups such as Stakis, Norfolk Capital, Gleneagles and 
Friendly also grew during the nineteen-eighties, but were 
significantly smaller, by sales and market capitalisation, 
than the larger groups.
Table 1 - 17 shows the major operators in the U.K. in
1976, the year in which Trust Houses merged with Forte 
Holdings to form the largest company in the industry. This 
company was still the largest in 1989- Table 1 - 1 8 .  In 
fact, there
- 44 -
TABLE 1 - 1 7
Leading Hotel Operators in Britain 1976
Organisation Bedrooms Hotels Location Notes
1 Trust Houses Forte 16,600 199 National Includes Ireland, also 
hotels abroad
2 Grand Metropolitan 9,500 81 National 24 in London,
31 County Hotels 
26 Steak House division
3 J Lyons 7,900 38 National Strand Hotels and Falcon 
Inns, also hotels abroad
4 Bass Charrington 7,000 104 England 
& Wales
Crest Hotels including 
Europe and some smaller 
hotels
5 Centre Hotels 5,300 24 National Includes Holland
6 Scottish & Newcastle 
Breweries
3,600 66 National 41 Thistle Hotels and 
25 Ofer House Inns
7 British Transport 3,500 28 National British Rail
8 Rank Organisation 3,000 12 National Also hotels abroad
9 Imperial London 
Hotels
2,400 6 London Private company
10 Allied Breweries 2,200 42 England 
& Wales
Ind Coope Hotels
also some smaller hotels
11 Norfolk Capital 
Hotels
2,200 18 London & 
provinces
12 De Vere Hotels 
and Restaurants
1,800 16 England
13 Whitbread 1,800 98 England 
& Wales
Includes tenanted and 
leased hotels
14 Cunard 1,700 4 London & 
Cambridge
15 Reo Stakis 
Organisation
1,700 26 National
16 Vaux Breweries 1,700 48 N England Includes Lowlands of 
& Scotland Scotland hotels
17 Adda International 1,600 7 London Also one in Amsterdam 
and one in Paris
18 EMI Hotels and 
Restaurants
1,600 17 London, Royal London Hotels
Birmingham
St Scotland
19 Mount Charlotte 
Investments
1,500 22 England Nuthall and Ocean 
Hotels
20 North Hotels 1,300 12 London 
St South
Unlicensed
Source: S. Medlik (1978) Profile of Hotel and Catering Industry
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is relatively little difference in the two tables, the 
major feature being the No 2 position of Mount Charlotte 
Thistle, which came about as a result of the sale of 
Thistle to Mount Charlotte by Scottish & Newcastle 
Breweries in the autumn of 1989, for £645 million.
It may be seen from the latter table that the top twenty 
operators owned/operated a total of 900 hotels out of an 
estimated total of some 20,000 (5%), but these units
accommodated 98,964 bedrooms, nearly 20% of the estimated 
U.K. total. From these calculations it may be seen that the 
average size of hotel operated by the major groups was some 
110 rooms. At the end of the 1980fs it was estimated that 
nearly half the hotels in the country still had less than 
15 rooms, and nearly 40% had less than 50 rooms.
These figures show that although some powerful hotel groups 
have emerged in the post war period, the industry is still 
dominated by small units and therefore highly fragmented. 
The major groups wield an influence disproportionate to 
their percentage of the total of units, and of bedrooms. 
This is especially true in the area of marketing.
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4. The Shape of the Hotel Industry in the 1980s
a. The Growth of Business Travel
The structural theory of international business travel was 
promulgated by Paul Slattery of Kleinwort Benson Securities 
in "1990 UK Hotels pic: The Decade Review". In this,
Slattery sought to show that the demand for business travel 
internationally is determined by the structure of an 
economy, rather than simply by the growth in the GDP.
[18]
The structural theory identifies three distinct phases or 
stages of growth in an economy. The first relates to 
developing economies dominated by single site companies in 
extractive and manufacturing industries. In such economies 
there is little local demand for hotel services and the 
demands of international travellers may well be serviced by 
a few international hotel groups such as Hilton or Holiday 
Inn.
According to Slattery economies will sooner or later enter 
a second phase of expansion where there is growth in 
companies serving national and international markets, 
rather than local and regional markets. In addition, there 
is a concurrent growth in multi-site companies as the 
economy moves from primary to secondary to tertiary
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industries. As a consequence there tends to be a marked 
growth in the number of corporate jobs and in peripatetic 
employees, both of whom require hotel accommodation and 
hotel services. Slattery suggests that the U.K. economy 
was generating this type of hotel business need from the 
1960's and this syndrome encouraged the growth of larger 
hotel groups specifically targeted at the business market.
Slattery then identifies a third and final phase of the 
structural theory of business travel as being one where 
there is only a marginal increase in demand for hotel 
services as a result of the bulk of the business having 
been satisfied by the stockbuilding of hotels which 
characterised Phase 2. Slattery suggests that the majority 
of advanced economies will enter Phase 3 in the 1990's. In 
turn this will mean that in the U.K., for example, owing to 
the highly capital intensive nature of the hotel industry, 
existing hotels will be refurbished, sometimes extensively, 
rather than new hotels being constructed from scratch.
The U.S.A. is a further example of a Phase 3 economy where 
not only is there a wide range of service industries and 
strong indigenous demand for hotel services but only 
marginal growth available in terms of achieved daily rates 
and occupancy levels. Tangible indications of this mature 
market are the vigorous introduction of sales promotion 
strategies such as frequent user programmes and high-
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specification hotel facilities like suites, executive 
floors and hotel clubs at prices marginally above standard 
rooms.
To a large extent the theory may be considered valid. One 
addition not mentioned is the replacement of old hotel 
stock - pre 1960 - by modern stock. This is already
happening in London in a manner not dissimilar to the 
replacement of office accommodation.
An important link between business travel on the one hand 
and domestic and overseas visitors on the other is 
incentive travel, whereby business executives are rewarded 
for superior performance by foreign holidays. For the U.K. 
the markets of the U.S.A. and Japan have particular 
significance in this respect.
b. Growth of Employment in Service Industries in Post 
War Period
The greatest single change in the composition of labour 
markets in advanced industrial nations in the post war 
period has been the rise in employment in the service 
industries.
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Writing on the growth of employment in service industries 
some writers, notably Gershuny and Miles in the U.K., 
together with James Heskett in the U.S.A. have drawn 
attention to the underlying reasons for such changes and 
have highlighted the future employment prospects of various 
sectors within the service industries. [13] Clearly the 
hotel and catering industry is an important component
within the service sector and has been identified as one 
which is likely to increase further both by volume and by
standards.
c. Composition of Labour Force of U.K. Hotel and Catering 
Industry
In the U.K., in common with other major industrial
countries, the large increase in employment in the hotel 
and catering industry has to be treated with a degree of 
caution. A very high proportion of jobs, typically between 
60% and 70%, at the operative and supervisory level are 
part time with the hours worked being less than 20 per 
week. The majority of these jobs, such as waiters and 
waitresses, chambermaids, barmen and barmaids are filled by 
females and, as such, despite the Sex Discrimination and 
Equal Pay Acts, tend to offer low rates of pay. Currently 
(1989) these vary from as little as £1.20 per hour to 
around £3.00 per hour. [20]
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As a consequence of the fragmented nature of the industry 
with a preponderance of small retail businesses - public 
houses, restaurants, cafes and family run hotels - there is 
markedly little trade unionism and with approximately 2.5 
million unemployed, upward pressure on wage rates tends to 
be minimal.
The single craft category in which rates of pay have risen 
significantly is that of chefs. Although the rates of pay 
during and immediately after training tend to be low, once 
a chef has more than three years' post qualification 
experience rates of pay tend to show a marked increase. 
This will be particularly so if a major part of his 
training and post qualification experience has been in the 
kitchen of one of the growing number of "celebrity” chefs, 
of which the Roux brothers, who own among others Le 
Gavroche in Mayfair, London W.l and The Waterside Inn at 
Bray in Berkshire, are typical. Subsequent to such 
tutelage a young chef in his mid twenties can command a 
premium on his salary, taking it to £15,000 to £20,000 and 
significantly further in later years.
Pay levels for managerial staff within the industry in the 
U.K. vary considerably. Even bearing in mind that to a 
significant extent the industry has been dominated by 
relatively young staff - under forty - the rates of pay 
tend to be modest. In 1989 2% of managers earned below
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£5,000 per annum, 27% between £5,000 and £10,000, 32%
between £10,000 and £15,000, 20% between £15,000 and
£20,000, 10% between £20,000 and £25,000, 4% between
£25,000 and £30,000, with the remaining 4% in excess of 
£30,000. [2J.]
It may be seen, therefore, that the hotel industry in the 
U.K. is not particularly well paid. Indeed, it often faces 
charges of exploitation of labour, in some cases with 
considerable justification, especially with regard to 
operative and supervisory staff. Only two groups earn 
really substantial amounts i.e. in excess of £50,000 per 
annum. One is established owner managers who may have had 
to struggle many years to achieve a position of relative 
financial security - the other is directors and senior
executives of large companies who, in many cases, are not 
hoteliers in the technical sense of the word, but
professionally qualified accountants, lawyers or surveyors.
d. Developments In The 1980's
Table 1 - 1 9  shows a summary of Overseas Travel and Tourism 
statistics for the period 1980 to 1989. By the latter date 
17.3 million visitors came to the U.K. and spent £6.9 
billion. Against this, however, U.K. residents made 31 
million visits overseas and spent £9.3 billion. The
highest favourable balance, £1.2 billion was in Jubilee
- 53 -
MA 
6 
1989
Statistical 
Office 
- 
Published 
HMSO 
1991
(0
0 vovovOtOtOtOtOtOtOtO
d  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
HI « 0 0 > J ( M n « k U I O H O
© < G
P a nft n h-
n a P
a 9 9h an
a a
SSo* p 
< H* 
a ft H 0 tj
a
a
§ 
p
H* a 
B
P* M M P* M P» P* P» M M
'J tn tn oo «h OJ to P* M to> *>
OJ tn 00 •th ot •t* Ot •U •U
00 to ot to •fh Ot 00 tn to
00 to ot to •u ot to M
tO M
P»
to
1
0J UI to M
1 1
o• • • « » • • • • •
UI o 00 to UI P* Ot 00 tn
0J to to to to to to to P» P*
P* 00 ■*0 P* to o O to
o 00 to ot O to ot o UI
to to £> «h P* ■o to P* «h o
o 00 •o to O to £h M Ot
«o UI
P»
O
P*
UI
1
to UI P* 00 00
P»
Ui
• • • • « • • • • •
ot o o tn P* P* tO to 00 to
H
P*
0
C
CD013aa
a n
♦a 
a 
n o 
a 
p (+
h- a a 
o a vq 
c a 
a
p- po 
p
a a a n < a
Hi
p *
oc
a
a
pa
a
P
p o 
n
a a a 
<P
o 
c 
a
»o 
a
h o 
a
pa rt o a 
a «q a
0
< 0
a
K rta pr
a a
aa G
5*
<
P* tra ps
P-
ft
0
M
a•
•
•
•
,
•
•
•
G o* <a
P
a aa a
p- aa aa
p tr
ft *<
a
2
C
&an
o
Hi
<
P*
a
p*
rt
a
tn•Oh atoto tL n tn .u . fhO Jto to
tOP‘ I O U l i ^ O t O P 1 tOtO^©c^ui^Moro^©UljkOUM^UmOM
P* I P* M  H  to 
top‘ t o t o c o m u i - o o u i
UIO>JOOU©UU)a
►< >0 
a n
P< 
P o 
na a a 
<
P 
0 c 
a
►a 
a 
n o 
a
pa ft 
a a 
a iQ 
a
w
a
n
p
P*
P
a
«0©vl©^>>^UJUN}
OJ ( O I O O © © 0 © W s J
U l P » C O O O ' - J O t t O i U ' O O J
s l f f t O U J M U O O I O O O
a a 
a iq 
a
»
x
*0a
p
a
P-rt
d
P
P» P» M to M M M P* to ►< *0 o o a
0J to tO •u •fh to P* to to a n tl a •
• • • • • • • • • • a a a p •
to to to UI o •th to UI 00 n <s a rt •
I I I 
tO tO M I + 11 +
O  O  tn tn I I f» to to 
t-*u>tooj-j.pooui0 to
l O t O O O H t O v J I O t O U
P-
O
P
OVERSEAS 
TRAVEL 
AND 
TOURISM: 
SUMMARY
year, 1977. The period 1986 to 1989, which coincided with 
a phase of unrestrained economic expansion in the U.K., saw 
the unfavourable balance nearly double from £530 million in 
1986 to £1.02 billion in 1987, double again to £2.03 
billion in 1988 with a further increase to £2.4 billion in 
1989.
There is no doubt that the U.K. hotel industry made 
significant progress in the 1980's to the point where, by 
1989, it was generally regarded as a mature industry. 
Among the principal developments of the decade, two 
unrelated events sparked a major series of property
transactions which had a marked effect on the composition 
of property portfolios of the main groups within the 
industry. The first was the acquisition in 1981 by Grand
Metropolitan of the Intercontinental Group from Pan 
American World Airways for U.S. $500 million (£260 
million). In turn this led Grand Metropolitan to dispose
of all but four of its U.K. properties. The majority was 
sold to Queens Moat Houses in 1982 for £26 million. This 
transaction transformed the latter company and paved the 
way for its further expansion. Other sales by Grand 
Metropolitan had important effects on those 
companies. [22] The Mount Royal was sold to Mount 
Charlotte, the Piccadilly to Gleneagles and St Ermin's to
Stakis.
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The second was the sale, at the instigation of the 
government in one of its initial forays into privatization, 
of the 29 hotels which had been in state control since the 
Transport Act of 1947. The sale of these hotels started in 
1981 with the setting up of Gleneagles Hotels PLC and ended 
some four years later with the sale of The Queen's Hotel in 
Leeds to Trusthouse Forte. In all, these sales realized 
the target figure of £40 million. [23]
The growing strength of the U.K. hotel industry was best 
demonstrated a few years later when, in the autumn of 1987 
Bass acquired Holiday Inn International in a deal worth 
U.S. $575 million. This gave Bass control, via a mixture 
of ownership, leases, management contracts and franchises 
of 13 hotels outwith the U.S.A. and 13 further hotels in 
the southern states of that country. [24]
This was followed in September 1987 by Ladbroke who, in a 
deal valued at no less than U.S. $1.07 billion, acquired 
the 91 properties that formed Hilton International. 
Together with the Grand Metropolitan acquisition of 
Intercontinental six years earlier, this resulted in three 
of the leading international brand names in the industry 
coming under British ownership and control. For the 
industry in general this represented growth to the point of 
maturity. [25]
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Each acquisition was a carefully planned opportunistic 
strike. Pan American Airways were in considerable 
financial difficulty when approached by Grand Metropolitan. 
Holiday Corporation was in a vulnerable position consequent 
to a somewhat dubious scheme of capital reconstruction 
which resulted in a heavy level of debt on its balance 
sheet and the company exposed to predators. [26] Hilton 
International had only been owned by the vendor United 
Airlines for six months when it was put on the market, 
having been previously owned by Trans World Airlines. [27]
Each acquisition benefited the British purchasers in 
different ways. Grand Metropolitan sold Intercontinental 
in 1988 for £1.35 billion, thus realising a profit after 
all expenses and taxes in excess of £500 million - a 
handsome return for seven years' ownership. The deal 
allowed the company to develop its corporate strategy as 
specialist manufacturers and retailers of food and liquor. 
[28]
For Bass the Holiday Inn deal put it squarely in the 
forefront of the international hotel industry. With a 
worldwide roomstock of 57,000, backed by the goodwill 
inherent in the Holiday Inn brand and its marketing 
expertise, Bass was well placed for further advances both 
in the U.K. and overseas.
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The Ladbroke deal was widely regarded as the deal of the 
decade and a personal triumph for Cyril Stein, the Ladbroke 
chairman. His company came as a late player to the hotel 
business but the impressive strides since made may well be 
a sign of greater things to come. In the short time that 
Ladbroke has been in control of Hilton International the 
profitability of the operation has significantly improved 
which, taken with the increase in property values in the 
period 1987 to 1989, indicates an increase in the value of 
assets acquired of at least £250 million. [29]
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5. CONCLUSION
The U.K. hotel industry has undergone radical change in 
the post war era. In particular, the emergence of large 
companies within the industry has paved the way for major 
improvements in the quality of management throughout the 
industry. This professionalisation of management has 
enabled companies large and small to adopt a much more 
businesslike and profit oriented approach to the operation 
of hotels. Aided by specialists in finance, marketing and 
personnel, hotel operators have been able to bring a wide 
variety of management techniques to their businesses and in 
so doing have simultaneously improved the quality of 
service and facilities to clients, as well as returns to 
shareholders through improved profitability. The
combination of improved management, operational
profitability and substantial appreciation in value of 
hotel property has resulted latterly.in investors, both 
institutional and private, taking a more positive attitude 
towards investment in the U.K. hotel industry. This 
syndrome has been clearly in evidence since the recession 
of 1980-1981.
As a result of progress made it is reasonable to suggest 
that the hotel industry in the U.K. has come of age. As 
service industries continue as the main employers of labour 
compared with manufacturing industry, it would appear that
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the hotel and catering industry may gradually move towards 
the forefront of the nation*s economy, and that by its own 
efforts its status and importance will win increasing 
recognition.
It is in the light of the foregoing economic context that 
the growth and development of the U.K. hotel industry is 
reflected in a series of 12 case studies which form the 
principal part of the thesis. The case studies are divided 
into three distinct groups. The first deals with 
independent hotels which, as shown, still account for the 
major part of the roomstock of the industry. The second 
deals with U.K. groups which Identified the property 
aspects of the hotel industry as being those which 
represent the optimum route to growth and increased 
profitability. The third group reflects the efforts of U.K 
hotel groups who have expanded abroad.
The case studies also show the contribution made by the 
founders of each organisation - in most cases the chairman 
or managing director, or both, in each company. Especially 
in the case of the independent hotels, the success of the 
operation is clearly linked to the personality of the 
proprietor. Equally the large groups would not have grown 
but for the ability of the founder directors to act in an 
entrepreneurial and acquisitive fashion.
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Problems Relating to the Compilation of Statistics of the 
U.K. Hotel Industry
1.
Cogent statements of the difficulties surrounding the 
accurate compilation, interpretation and evaluation of 
statistics dealing with hotels and catering in the U.K. is 
contained in a document published by the reference division 
of the Central Office of Information in January 1972. The 
document states that
a) "Because no national system of hotel registration or 
grading exists in Britain there are no official figures 
in existence of the number and capacity of 
establishments offering accommodation."
b) "Accurate statistics of the total number of people 
employed in the tourist industry (including hotels) are 
impossible to obtain for the same reasons which make 
figures of the number of accommodation establishments 
difficult to assess. Additionally, the work-force in 
the tourist industry is split up into different 
categories of employment by the Department of 
Employment so that workers in travel agencies, for
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example, are placed in the category of "other services" 
in the "miscellaneous services". Workers from other 
industries, and employees engaged in both internal and 
international tourist transport, are placed in the 
"transport and communications" section. The separate 
category of employees in catering and hotels includes 
many employees in this field not involved with the 
tourist industry, such as workers in industrial 
canteens, schools and hospitals.
These problems and inconsistencies in classification, and 
the very general and fragmented nature of the industry, 
the high proportion of part time staff employed in the 
various sectors, plus the seasonality, volatility and very 
nature of the industry mean that statistical material
(certainly up to 1972) should be viewed with extreme
caution. In addition, so long as there is no
comprehensive system of registration, such issues are 
likely to be clouded in obscurity and the present
difficulties are likely to remain for the foreseeable 
future.
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2.
The situation had improved but little by 1992. Twenty 
years on from the C.O.I. statement, estimates of the size 
of the U.K. hotel industry ranged from 27,000 (British 
Tourist Authority) to 14,000 (Central Statistical Office). 
On the former, broader definition, about 70% of all hotel 
rooms (as distinct from hotels) were independently 
operated. The major hotels (with 100 plus rooms) 
constituted only 2% of hotel stock but 23% of all hotel 
rooms.
Quoted in Hospitality, October 1992
The Medium Term Outlook for the U.K. Hotel 
Industry.
Nigel Healey. Leicester University Management 
Centre.
3.
Cairncross also reminds us of the fallibility of 
statistics.
'Readers should be warned that statistics 
are not, in principle, any more accurate 
and reliable than other 'facts' about the 
past and that official statistics may be
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changed, sometimes quite radically, both 
shortly after and long after 
publication.'
A. Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945. Institute of 
Contemporary British History (1992, Blackwell, Oxford), 
p316.
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Note to Preface Chapter 2 
Video Recordings
A video recording of some 45 minutes duration was made with 
the co-operation of Arthur Neil, The Open Arms, Dirleton. 
The dialogue is indicative of the role of the individual 
proprietor and his contribution to the effective management 
of an independent operation and to profitability.
A further video recording, again of some 45 minutes 
duration, was made with the co-operation of Peter Tyrie, 
managing director of Gleneagles Hotels PLC. In this case 
the dialogue vividly illustrates the importance of the dual 
perception of the industry as an investment in property as 
well as a retail operation.
Regrettably, cost and distance precluded a third video 
recording to illustrate aspects of the growth and 
development of international groups.
Nevertheless, the recordings made, and which are 
available, represent a most useful insight to the operation 
of the independent and property sectors.
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CHAPTER 2 THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR
Introduction
Despite the many changes that have taken place in the U.K. 
hotel industry since 1945, independent hotels still form by 
far the largest single sector. In 1971 it was estimated 
that there was a total of 31,965 hotels in the U.K. of 
which 9,600 had less than 50 rooms and 20,700 had less than 
15 rooms. By 1981 the total had fallen to 19,740 of which 
8,400 had less than 50 rooms and 9,500 had less than 15 
rooms. [1]
The vast majority of these independent hotels are family 
controlled and operated, as in the case of The Goring in 
London and The Metropole in Llandrindod Wells in Wales each 
of which was purpose built. The Lygon Arms in Broadway, 
Worcestershire is a very old building which was extensively 
refurbished and enlarged throughout the post war era. As 
the standard of the property improved the operation of the 
hotel moved up market until it became one of the best known 
tourist hotels outside London.
The success in marketing the property abroad, especially in 
the United States of America, was one of the principal 
achievements of the proprietor. Many independent hotel 
buildings were originally private houses which were
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extended to provide additional facilities for the retailing 
of accommodation, food, liquor and latterly, leisure. 
The Open Arms at Dirleton, near Edinburgh is a good 
example of this syndrome and the particular skill of the 
proprietor has been to operate an outside catering business 
in conjunction with the hotel.
The examples chosen, reflecting differing geographical 
areas of the U.K., all display the principal 
characteristics of independent hotels and in particular 
demonstrate many of the criteria necessary for commercial 
success.
The examples selected for detailed study from the 
independent sector are:-
1. The Goring Hotel, London
Proprietor George Goring
2 . The Lygon Arms, Broadway, Worcs.
Proprietor Douglas Barrington
3. The Metropole, Llandrindod Wells, Powys
Proprietor David Baird-Murray
4. The Open Arms, Dirleton, East Lothian
Proprietor Arthur Neil
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Examples 1 to 4 also illustrate typical ways in which 
independent hotels have developed in the post war era 
through the personality of the respective proprietor.
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1. The Gorin? Hotel, London
Proprietor George Goring
The Goring Hotel, a privately owned and operated freehold 
property, is located in London SW1 being midway between 
Buckingham Palace and Victoria Station. Mr. O.R. Goring 
(1869-1948) , the grandfather of the present proprietor, 
financed and had constructed to his personal specification 
the original building which opened on 1st March 1910. By 
that time O.R. Goring had had nearly twenty years 
experience of the hotel industry in England and was a 
prosperous man.
The hotel was the first in England to have a private 
bathroom for each bedroom, a trend which was not followed 
by other major London hotels until the 1920*s. Original and 
innovative, O.R. Goring brought his understanding of 
engineering to good use. The hotel featured central 
heating throughout, together with systems of ventilation 
and centralised vacuum cleaning which were well in advance 
of their time.
During World War 1 the hotel was requisitioned for the army 
of the United States of America shortly after their entry 
into the war in 1917. It was one of the first hotels to be 
de-requisitioned in 1919 and generous compensation was 
paid. In 1922 and 1926 the hotel was extended to its
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present size of 88 letting bedrooms with a sleeping 
capacity of 135. The hotel was not requisitioned by the 
services throughout World War 2 and adapted to the rigours 
and restrictions of those times with both alacrity and 
ingenuity. .[2]
During the immediate post-war period demand for hotel 
accommodation in central London greatly exceeded supply. 
Provisions and materials of all kinds were, however, 
desperately short. O.G. Goring (1901 - 1974), the father 
of the present proprietor, alleviated the problem of the 
shortfall of provisions in an entrepreneurial yet stylish 
fashion. He purchased a large country house in Kent. 
Although the building was in very poor condition the 
property included a large walled garden with mature fruit 
trees and soil ideal for growing a wide variety of 
vegetables. The hotel was thus assured of a steady supply 
of fruit and vegetables at a time when competing 
establishments were not able to offer such produce on their 
menus. Moreover the excess fruit was canned and used 
during the winter months. The garden also yielded a fine 
range of flowers which helped brighten the hotel. In 
addition O.G. Goring successfully raised Rhode Island 
chickens on the property to ensure a plentiful supply of 
poultry and eggs for the hotel. Such were the stratagems
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employed to surmount the problems of the day. The 
alternative would have been to resort to the black market - 
a course of action fraught with risk. 0
Furnishing and equipment were also in very short supply 
during the immediate post-war years and O.G. Goring was 
forced to adopt many economies which went against the grain 
of hoteliers keen to please their clients e.g. replacing 
worn areas of bedroom carpeting with carpeting from the 
area under the bed. Such economies persisted for the 
decade after the war and might have continued but for the 
intervention of his wife, Mrs. E. Goring. She was
instrumental in implementing the interior refurbishment of
the hotel in the period 1955/1965. It was her insistence 
on top quality linen, curtaining, carpeting and upholstery 
that enabled the hotel to recapture the elegance it enjoyed 
in pre-war days. These factors, added to the upgrading of 
china, glass and cutlery, resulted in the hotel being able 
to offer genuine value for money to the rising demands of a 
widening yet discerning clientele.
In 1948 O.G. Goring acquired the Coburg Court Hotel in 
Bayswater, London W2. It had approximately 150 bedrooms, 
only a small minority of which had private bathrooms. The 
fabric of the building was in a very poor state of repair, 
the hotel had but a very modest income from the sale of
food and beverages and was able to let the majority of
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bedrooms only because of the excess of demand over supply 
of accommodation. During the next few years considerable 
amounts of expenditure were applied to the hotel in an 
effort to upgrade it to a standard comparable with the 
Goring. Similar efforts were made to improve the quality 
of management throughout the hotel. To a certain extent 
this course of action proved successful but the 
profitability of the Coburg Court could not rival that of 
the Goring, the principal reason being the undeniably 
superior location of the latter. In 1958 O.G. Goring sold 
the property to Myddleton Hotels consequent to their 
attractive offer. [3]
Realising that it would be virtually impossible to create 
another hotel of the same standard and style as the Goring 
in London, O.G. Goring determined to find a country 
property that would complement his metropolitan operation. 
Subsequent to a four year search the 90 bedroom Spa Hotel 
at Tunbridge Wells "fell into his lap" in 1962. He was 
easily able to finance this acquisition with the proceeds 
of sale from the Coburg Court together with the profits of 
a transaction on a house in Victoria. [4]
As with the Coburg Court extensive schemes of refurbishment 
and modernisation were necessary. These proceeded rapidly
and culminated in the construction of a health and leisure 
centre together with additional bedrooms at a combined cost
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of nearly Elm in 1985. By that time the number of original 
bedrooms had been reduced significantly as a result of the 
installation of private bathrooms. The hotel is now mainly 
geared to conference business and overseas visitors 
together with the local trade. The financial performance 
of the hotel is shown in Table 2 - 1 .  As with all long- 
established hotels - the original building dates from 1776 
with major additions during the Victorian era (the property 
commenced trading as an hotel in 1880) - very large sums of 
money are required to maintain the fabric, furnishings and 
equipment. In years where the expenditure has been 
particularly heavy the hotel has operated at a loss; when 
such expenditure has been less severe the hotel has 
produced useful trading profits - the figures from 1984 and 
1985 illustrate this clearly. The hotel is constituted as 
a subsidiary of the London hotel and, as such, has been 
financed by the parent company.
Subsequent to the purchase of the Spa, O.G. Goring 
arranged for nearly all of his assets to be placed in 
family trusts. He took a less active part in the running 
of the hotels and spent an increasing amount of his time 
either travelling abroad, mainly on the Continent of 
Europe, in connection with his activities in the 
International Hotel Association, or within the UK serving 
on the numerous committees of the hotel and catering 
industry and related bodies of which he was a member. His
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health subsequently deteriorated and after a long illness 
he died in 1974 at the age of 73.
Undoubtedly one of the leading figures within the UK hotel 
industry in the immediate post-war period, he had a notable 
career not only with regard to the success of his own 
operations but more importantly from an historical
viewpoint in his role, together with very few others, of 
gaining professional recognition for the industry in the 
eyes of both the public and the government. An extract 
from the obituary in the Caterer and Hotelkeeper is worth 
recall.
"The Goring has been described as an 
unofficial annexe to Buckingham Palace 
and over the years has housed many 
distinguished guests who were
accompanying official state visitors."
An hotelier who has the wit to operate an hotel in such a 
location deserves recognition in the annals of the
industry. It was indeed sad that severe ill health and
lack of mobility prevented him from enjoying a well-earned 
retirement. [5]
The present proprietor George E. Goring was born in 1938. 
He commenced work at the family hotel in December 1961 
having had a classical training at the Lausanne hotel
school followed by extensive experience on the Continent of
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Europe culminating in a sojourn at the family owned yet 
internationally renowned Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten in 
Hamburg. [6]
Gradually he took over the running of the hotel from his 
father and evolved his own management style, primarily with 
regard to the provision of accommodation, food and drink 
then latterly to the specialist areas of personnel, 
marketing and finance. This management style evolved over 
a considerable number of years and is worth examining is 
some detail.
Accommodation
Over the years the Goring has enjoyed a sound reputation 
for value for money especially with regard to 
accommodation. In an average year just over 60% of total 
turnover comes from this area and is the key to the 
profitability of the hotel. The strategy adopted by George 
Goring has been concerned therefore with maintaining the 
standard of accommodation offered to guests, simultaneously 
ensuring that the room rates represent good value for money 
compared with competing London hotels.
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The Goring is fortunate in owning property, both freehold 
and long leasehold, near the hotel. This allows nearly 40 
out of the total staff complement of 125 (full and part 
time) to "live in”. The "live in" staff are mainly 
chambermaids, receptionists, cashiers and secretaries. 
Having these staff on call is a considerable advantage and 
helps ensure that the maintenance and cleanliness 
throughout the hotel are of a consistently high standard. 
Nothing is more likely to upset guests than dirt or 
untidiness in bedrooms for which they are paying 
considerable amounts of money. A further aid to
consistently high standards in bedrooms and public areas is 
the maintenance staff whose remit is to keep all the 
mechanical and electrical services in good working order. 
Having one's own staff to carry out this function also 
carries significant advantages when compared to reliance on 
outside contractors, particularly when they are required at 
short notice.
Linked to the servicing of the rooms is the work of the 
receptionists and the advance reservations office. Long 
practice over the years allied to long-serving and 
experienced staff has resulted in the letting of bedroom 
space being brought to a fine art. The proof of the 
expertise may be seen in the high proportion of hotel 
turnover attributable to rooms, allied to the annual number 
of sleepers and the bed occupancy figures.
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Food and Drink
The principal points of sale for food and liquor are the 
five banqueting rooms and the hotel dining room.
Banqueting, especially liquor, is an important contributor
to food and beverage turnover and profitability. The hotel 
dining room, although busy, shows but a small margin of
operating profit. Unlike accommodation there are
substantial direct material costs for food and beverage. 
The labour costs are also significantly higher (often 
accounting for 40% of turnover) and once additional 
departmental expenses such as laundry are taken into 
account the margin of operating profit tends to be less 
than 10%. Nevertheless it is a vital part of the hotel 
operation. Usually a client's first dealing with the hotel 
will be a meal in the dining room. Satisfaction in this 
area will often lead to enquiries and bookings for 
accommodation. In addition to the cuisine, which is 
essentially French with an emphasis on fish and seafood, a 
major attraction for the discerning guest is an extensive 
wine list particularly strong on claret. The Goring is now 
one of only a very few hotels that are in the enviable 
position of being able to buy wines to lay down for future 
consumption five to ten years hence. Even allowing for the 
opportunity costs involved and the costs of stockholding 
this practice can pay handsome dividends and allows the
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hotel to present a list which offers the client 
significantly better value for money than other leading 
London hotels.
Personnel
Whilst it is a truism that no hotel can be better than its 
staff the Goring has again been fortunate over the years in 
the quality of its management and staff. A family run 
business in a service industry will naturally have a 
greater ability to attract and retain staff over a long 
number of years. Whilst hotels belonging to major chains 
may have special attractions these tend to be ephemeral 
especially as staff within large groups tend to be moved 
around to a greater or lesser extent. The policy at the 
Goring has been to carefully interview, induct and train 
staff with the result that a large proportion remain with 
the hotel for many years. In 1980 there were 8 who had 
more than thirty years service, 15 who had more than 
twenty, while no fewer than 24 had been with the hotel for 
more than ten years. When one considers that there are 
only 125 full and part time staff the length of service 
becomes all the more remarkable in an industry where staff 
turnover of 100% or more in one year is not uncommon.
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During the last twenty years in particular the hotel has 
been able to build strong links between management and
staff. In a relatively small hotel most staff tend to know 
one another. Essentially the management team comprises
three people - the proprietor, the general manager and his
deputy. In addition there are three posts at assistant 
manager level together with six posts at head of department 
level. The remainder are at either supervisory or 
operative level. Under such conditions i.e. a working 
proprietor, a straightforward management structure and
clear lines of communication for supervisory and operative 
staff, it is not difficult to enable all grades of staff to 
participate in the decision making processes within the 
hotel and to promote motivation and morale at all levels. 
The outward manifestation of this situation are various 
staff and management meetings which take place on a monthly 
basis and represent a forum for discussion. George Goring 
freely admits that some of the most productive suggestions 
for improving the operation of the hotel have emanated from 
these meetings - often at the instigation of supervisory 
and operative staff.
Among the major benefits of a low rate of staff turnover is 
that the guests and staff can get to know one another. One 
of the particular attractions of hotels such as the Goring 
is that the guests can return on numerous occasions 
reasonably certain that they will receive a warm welcome,
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have their car hire and theatre tickets arranged, their 
favourite table in the dining-room and the same bedroom as 
before and all of this carried out by staff whom they know 
and trust. Taken together these attractions add 
considerably to the goodwill generated by the hotel. 
Furthermore they are extremely difficult to emulate in 
hotels that are merely part of a chain or group. There can 
be little doubt that the success of the Goring over the 
years is attributable to the abilities of the staff.
A profit participation scheme has been in force since the 
1960's and although the rates of pay throughout the hotel 
tend to be above not only the Catering Wages Act but also 
the average for competing London hotels, substantial sums 
are distributed to all grades of staff via the scheme - to 
the extent of £70,000 in 1985. In essence George Goring's 
approach to staff management is one of enlightened 
paternalism. Although to many this may seem somewhat 
old-fashioned the profitability of the hotel is sufficient 
vindication. [7]
Marketing
It is not easy to evaluate the marketing function within 
the hotel. Prior to World War 2 the marketing was linked 
to two factors - the personality of the proprietor O.G. 
Goring and the location. There was relatively little
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marketing as we understand the meaning of the word today 
other than bookings made through travel agents, the 
commission on which was a bone of contention even in those 
days. In the immediate post war period the excess of 
demand over supply ensured upsurge in world tourism and the 
gradually increasing disposable income of the British 
clients maintained the status quo. It was not until the 
implementation of the Development of Tourism Act 1969, 
which brought in its wake the various development 
incentives, that independent hoteliers perceived that in 
order to retain their share of the market more time and 
effort would have to be deployed in the marketing of their 
products.
The Goring still retained the inbuilt advantages of an 
exceptionally good location, a strong following in the
United States of America dating back to World War 1 when
the hotel had been requisitioned for the American army, and 
the unique connection with Buckingham Palace and the
Comptroller of the Royal Household. Furthermore, the hotel 
enjoyed a loyal following in the UK for accommodation, 
functions, weddings and restaurant business. Nevertheless 
the hotel building boom of the early 1970's and the
recession of 1973-1975 caused the balance between supply 
and demand for hotel accommodation of all grades throughout 
central London to undergo radical change. Discounting of 
room rates was rife, group and tour business was accepted
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by even the most prestigious hotels and hoteliers in the 
capital became desperate to fill rooms which were empty 
even in the traditionally peak times of the year.
Against this background George Goring resolutely refused to 
join in the practice of discounting room rates. He 
preferred to let the room at the rack rate, which he 
correctly saw as offering sound value for money vis a vis 
his competitors, or not let it at all. In the long run he 
was able to maintain this policy, although the period 1974 
to 1976 saw a significant fall in the number of sleepers as 
was the case later on in the period 1981 to 1983.
Like his father and grandfather before him he had fought a 
long-running battle with travel agents over the matter of 
commission. For many years he refused to pay the travel 
agents their customary 10% commission on room sales. 
Likewise he would not accept credit cards. The events of 
the 1970's, however, caused him to rethink his policies. 
Eventually the major credit cards were accepted in 1978 and 
commission to travel agents was paid from 1981. 
Nevertheless he was able to make a considerable marketing 
ploy out of the latter and was able to attract nationwide 
attention throughout the United States of America via the 
columns of the New York Times. [8]
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The hotel is now serviced by an extensive network of travel 
agents throughout the United States and regular personal 
contact is maintained with them in order to secure a steady 
stream of clients. Overall the approach to marketing is 
conducted insofar as is possible on a person to person 
basis with the Goring name and the personality of George 
Goring projected to the full. This, however, does not imply 
a high profile technique, but more of a widening of the 
circle and the ripple effect of the Goring name in the many 
locations in which it is recognised throughout the 
Continent of Europe and the New World.
Finance
Although not overtly interested in financial matters, as is 
the case with many genuine hoteliers, George Goring is 
sufficiently aware of the financial necessity of hotel 
profitability. To a certain extent his apparent lack of 
interest may be attributed to the strong financial position 
from which he operates. This happy state of affairs is 
neatly encapsulated in the family motto - e viribus servi - 
serve from strength. As shown in Table 2 - 1  and 2 the 
combined turnover of the two hotels is approximately £4 
million per annum. With both properties freehold this 
would indicate a conservative combined valuation in the
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region of £7 million. Even this figure does not mean very 
much as it is highly unlikely that either hotel will ever 
be put on the market.
The year to year profitability is linked primarily to room 
occupancy and room rate and secondly to the level of
repairs and renewals written off against revenue and 
charged to the profit and loss account. As may be seen 
this latter amount tends to be significant and is the
principal reason for the pre-tax profits being restricted 
to their present levels. In George Goring1s words "old 
hotels tend to be thirsty brutes”. The room rates in the
period under review have been determined by a combination
of competition and inflation. In 1960 a single room with 
bathroom per night was £2.25, in 1970 £4.50, in 1980 £40 
and in 1985 £60. In the recession of 1981 to 1983 there
was again a marked decrease in turnover as Table 2 - 1  
shows and it was not until 1985 that business returned to 
its previous levels. These figures clearly illustrate the 
cyclical nature of the hotel industry. Usually it is 
linked to business cycles in general and to specific 
external factors such as the strength of sterling against 
the major foreign currencies.
- 87 -
The sales mix is especially favourable with the marginal 
profitability of the food and beverage operations being 
more than offset by the volume of accommodation business. 
Indeed the figures for 1978 and 1985 indicate a bed 
occupancy of 85%, a high figure even by London standards. 
It may be seen therefore that the Spa and especially the 
Goring are in an enviable financial position compared to 
the vast majority of independent hotels in the U.K. The 
combination of long established freehold properties in 
sound location enjoying a considerable degree of goodwill 
is a potent recipe for success.
Wisely George Goring allows himself sufficient time for 
leisure and recreation. Having been a keen horseman since 
his youth he has maintained a keen interest in this field 
and over the years his success has grown considerably. 
Generously he ascribes this more to the quality of the 
horses than his prowess as a rider. Although he originally 
intended his riding to act as a diversion from the hotel, 
events have paradoxically resulted in the recreation 
becoming a marketing tool. His three-day eventing team 
which is known as the Boring Gorings is sponsored by the 
hotel. The "Boring" epithet was given to him by travel 
agents in the United States, tired of his one time 
insistence not to grant them commission.
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In essence his management style could be termed that of a 
professional amateur. With 75 years and three generations 
to assist him he can make the hotel portray the style and 
appearance of a private house rather than the highly 
profitable business it is. One small example may serve to 
typify this style and contrast it to that generally found 
in large group hotels. In such establishments the guests' 
hearing is often assailed by discordant piped music. When 
guests dine at the Goring it is to the accompanient of, for 
example, a Chopin polonaise played on a Zimmerman grand by 
students from the Royal College of Music. Small touches 
such as this are indicative of the advantages that 
independent hotels can generate to their benefit.
During this century the Goring has carved for itself an 
unique niche in the U.K. hotel industry and after 75 years 
of service is genuinely regarded with considerable 
affection by generations of guests and. staff alike.
FINANCIAL COMMENTARY
The schedules of The Goring Hotel Limited and The Spa Hotel 
(Goring) Limited illustrate two principal features of hotel 
profitability - the importance of a high level of 
accommodation in the sales mix and the impact of revenue 
repairs and renewals on operating profit levels. In these 
areas the Goring is especially fortunate in having such a
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large proportion of its turnover in accommodation, which in 
turn allows the property, externally and internally, to be 
maintained in sound condition. It may be noted that by 
1985 the expenditure on repairs and renewals for the Goring 
alone was running at the rate of £1,000 per day.
Nevertheless the Goring and the Spa attest to the principal 
determinant of success in the hotel industry, insofar as 
they display the dual nature of the business as an 
investment in property, linked to a retail business with 
inherent added value characteristics. The expert matching 
by professional management of the inherent and potential 
value of the property to the retailing of accommodation, 
food, liquor and leisure results in a situation where near 
optimum profitability can be achieved.
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2. The Lygon Arms, Broadway, Worcester
Proprietor Douglas Barrington
The Lygon Arms is situated in the picturesque village of 
Broadway, Worchestershire, some 90 miles from London. The 
original buildings date from the 14th century. From as 
early as 1532 it was known as the White Hart Inn. Both 
Charles 1 and Cromwell were guests of the inn which was the 
property of the Trevis family from 1620 until 1770. In 
1830 a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, General Lygon, 
acquired the buildings and surrounding land. His butler 
took over the inn and renamed it The Lygon Arms.
At the beginning of the twentieth century inns and hotels 
throughout England tended to be in a poor state and The 
Lygon Arms was no exception. In 1903 Sydney Bolton Russell 
(1866-1938) acquired the property and set about restoring 
it to its former glory. When one of the principal function 
rooms, The Russell Room was opened on 28th June 1957 the 
then chairman of the British Travel and Holidays 
Association Sir Arthur Morse said of the founder of the 
modern Lygon
"Sydney Russell was a man of vision with a 
knowledge and love of architecture and a 
passion to create the perfect English inn 
and his two interests have borne splendid 
fruit in The Lygon Arms". [9]
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Sydney Russell had three sons - Sir Gordon Russell and 
Professor Richard Russell were both prominent industrial 
designers and owned a furniture factory which they operated 
from Broadway. The middle son Don Russell (1894 - 1970) 
was, together with his father, responsible for greatly 
improving the standards of the inn before and after World 
War 2.
In the period 1939 to 1945 the hotel was frequented by many 
groups of servicemen. In one was a young Australian naval 
gunnery officer by the name of Douglas Barrington. An 
accountant in his native Perth he had come to the U.K. in 
1941 as a naval recruit. Towards the end of the war Don 
Russell offered him the job of manager at the Lygon Arms 
and subsequent to obtaining his discharge in England he 
accepted the challenge, became a director in the following 
year, managing director in 1956 and chairman in 1983. The 
continuing success of the hotel in .the post war era is 
inextricably linked with his name.
When Douglas Barrington came to the hotel it had only 26 
bedrooms. Subsequent to an initial decade when the 
property underwent rehabilitation to restore the fabric and 
furnishing to pre war standard a series of extensions was 
planned and executed. The first major extension was in 
1957 when completely new kitchens were built. The area 
formerly occupied by the kitchens and the ancilliary
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premises was converted to form The Russell Room which is 
now used as a relaxation area for residents and
occasionally for private functions.
In 1960 the land adjoining The Russell Room was utilised to 
create a bedroom extension of 14 rooms, all with private 
bathrooms, overlooking the hotel gardens. Consequently this 
area was named the Garden Wing. A second wing was 
completed in 1968. This comprised a further 19 rooms,
again all with private bathrooms. In addition a
comprehensively equipped conference room, The Edinburgh 
Room, was incorporated into what was named the Orchard 
Wing. These two modern wings attracted much architectural
acclaim - Sir Nikolaus Pevsner remarking in his Buildings
of England
"A perfect twentieth century extension 
just to show that such a thing can be 
done and should be done." [10]
Additional refurbishment then took place in some of the
older parts of the building. The number of rooms declined
from a peak of 72 to the current 63 as a result of the
provision of private bathrooms in all the original
bedrooms. The principal function/conference area, the
Torrington Suite, was incorporated into this phase of
development.
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Whilst the series of extensions and accompanying 
renovations produced an enlarged hotel offering superior 
facilities to discerning guests it must not be assumed that 
these improvements represented a passport to profitability.
The Lygon Arms does in fact serve as an excellent 
illustration of the principal economic problems that 
confront innkeepers and hoteliers. It will have been 
perceived that the bulk of hotel investment is of a capital 
nature, being tied up in land, stone, bricks and mortar, 
together with fixtures, fittings and equipment. As a 
consequence there is a high incidence of fixed costs, 
particularly in establishments where standards are as high 
as those at The Lygon Arms. Not only are the costs 
(repairs and renewals, rates, insurance and depreciation) 
of maintaining the fabric and furnishing considerable but 
the single greatest cost - that of labour - is essentially 
fixed and therefore has to be borne irrespective of the 
level of turnover.
The result is that the break-even point of the operation, 
in terms of room and bed occupancy, as well as food and 
beverage turnover, is high. Because of the fixed location 
of the premises and the perishability of the principal 
product, accommodation, and to a lesser extent food and 
liquor - allied to seasonality and a propensity towards 
volatile patterns of turnover, it is difficult for
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proprietors to earn significant levels of profit or 
satisfactory rates of return on capital investment. It is 
against this economic background that the importance of 
marketing becomes crucial. The latter day success of The 
Lygon Arms can be largely attributed to the marketing 
expertise that the management of the hotel has acquired and 
consolidated during the period under review.
It has already been noted that the major post-war expansion 
of the U.K. hotel industry dates from the early 1960*s. 
At that time Douglas Barrington anticipated the upsurge 
that was about to take place. Simultaneously he realised 
that in order to attain satisfactory levels of turnover in 
the three principal revenue producing areas of the hotel - 
accommodation, food and drink - it would be necessary to 
widen his market and to attract a substantially greater 
number of visitors from overseas. He identified the United 
States of America as a prime marketing target and made his 
first foray there in 1964. This visit was to prove a great 
success and the following year saw a 30% increase in the 
business from the U.S.A. Such is the importance of this 
market to the Lygon Arms that Douglas Barrington visits it 
every other year in order to consolidate his relationships 
with the many travel agents who send him valued clients. 
[11]
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At the time it was made, it was very much a pioneering trip 
for an independent hotelier to undertake. Very few 
independent hotels had direct relationships with travel 
agents outwith the Continent of Europe and of the major 
groups only Grand Metropolitan had by that time an 
established sales and marketing team.
Since that initial visit Douglas Barrington has made 
numerous other overseas trips principally to Australia and 
Japan. By 1985 only 46% of the hotelfs turnover came from 
U.K. residents, an equal percentage from clients from the 
United States of America together with 2% each from 
Australia and Japan. Effectively this means that the hotel 
now earns more than Elm in foreign currency. The outward 
manifestation of this considerable marketing success was 
marked both in 1971 and 1985 by the Queen's Award to 
Industry for export achievement, the first independent 
hotel to gain this honour.
Douglas Barrington also foresaw the need for independent 
hoteliers to act together in the field of marketing and 
sales promotion. The Lygon Arms was one of the founder 
members of Prestige hotels, a marketing consortium which 
now numbers some 30 hotels in the U.K. all of which are 
independent and the vast majority of which are in the 
country house style. Membership of Prestige has brought 
useful benefits to all members of the consortium and has
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enabled them to tap markets which otherwise would have been 
prohibitively expensive. Furthermore they have been able to 
extend their activities into the field of purchasing
thereby making additional savings. The success of the
Prestige venture encouraged Douglas Barrington to 
participate in another international consortium, that of 
Relais & Chateaux. This is an organisation founded in 
France some thirty years ago with the aim of promoting 
hotels of excellence, situated in tranquil rural areas and 
dedicated to providing relaxation, comfort and fine cuisine 
for guests. It is now a worldwide organisation with some
17 members in the U.K. and the standard is perhaps even
higher than that of Prestige.
Because the marketing of the hotel projects an image of 
exceptional comfort and fine cuisine, located in an area of 
outstanding natural beauty surrounded by historical and 
cultural attractions, it is imperative that the operational 
standards are maintained at a consistently high level. The 
higher the standard of an hotel the greater attention must 
be paid to ensuring that the expectations of the guests are 
satisfied. A guest will tend to remember one or two small 
matters that were not exactly to his or her liking rather 
than the majority which may have been faultless.
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The key to high standards is a management structure that 
enables a high degree of customer contact and direct staff 
supervision. Allied to this is the high degree of social 
and technical skills of staff at all levels. Ideally a 
chambermaid, porter or waiter should be able to converse 
with guests with a degree of fluency similar to that of the 
proprietor. To facilitate all this the management 
structure comprises the proprietor, the managing director 
and the general manager as the top tier supported by a 
conference manager, a food and beverage manager and an 
accommodation manager as a second tier. Thereafter 120 
staff of whom 100 are full time exist to fulfil the 
expectations of the guests. In addition and somewhat 
unusually for an independent hotel there is a wide range of 
consultants in such fields as wine, interior decor, fire 
precautions and energy conservation whose specialist 
expertise complements the technical skills of the 
management team.
As has been indicated the proprietor is essentially 
concerned with the external projection of the hotel both 
through his own efforts and via the many committees on 
which he serves related to tourism, hotels and catering. 
The managing director Kirk Ritchie has been with the hotel 
since 1975.
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Having had a classical five year training with the Savoy 
Hotel Company, preceded by a year in France in the wine 
trade and the post Savoy training with an international 
group in London, he is ideally placed to evaluate the 
requirements* of an increasingly discerning clientele. In 
practice this means that all guest accommodation must be 
constantly maintained in impeccable condition. When guests 
may be paying in excess of £100 for a twin room for one 
night (which approximates to London West End prices) there 
has to be unceasing attention to detail allied to the 
provision of accommodation that is simultaneously 
aesthetically pleasing, comfortable yet functional. [12]
In the case of an essentially old building such as The 
Lygon Arms this can be achieved only by a high level of 
skill and significant, often heavy, expenditure on repairs 
and renewals to the fabric and furnishings. Indeed, the 
cost of repairs and renewals is one of the main limiting 
factors in the determination of profitability. The 
aesthetic standards of the Lygon Arms accommodation are 
greatly enhanced by the wide use of numerous pieces of 
antique furniture which are to be found in the individual 
guest bedrooms as well as public areas. It is a pleasant 
surprise, especially for overseas visitors, to find the 
modern fittings of their room such as a hairdrier and 
colour television set complemented by, for example, a
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Georgian bow fronted chest of drawers or a Victorian 
writing table.
Arriving in the middle of the 1973 - 1975 recession as Food 
and Beverage Manager Kirk Ritchie immediately had a 
challenge on his hands to improve levels of turnover and 
profitability. Of particular concern was the food and 
beverage area which although satisfactory until the early 
nineteen seventies was having to come to terms with serious 
competition. A number of country house style hotels had 
recently opened and it was imperative that the Lygon Arms 
retain its share of the market. As a result of Kirk
Ritchie*s endeavours a number of changes was instigated. 
The aim of the food and beverage area is now to produce 
quality menus of a consistently high standard without
indulging in spectacular cuisine which tends to be not only 
costly but also much more difficult to achieve consistent 
standards. The virtues of this approach may be seen in the 
relatively short 'a la carte menu and in the table d'hote 
menu which is of a standard sufficient to satisfy the 
majority of guests.
The significant proportion of function and conference 
business enables the hotel to achieve an overall gross 
profit percentage on food in excess of 60 and a similar
profit percentage on drink in excess of 50. This is both
necessary and important in an area which attracts a high
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labour cost, typically 30 to 35% of turnover, in addition 
to a considerable number of overheads e.g. laundry. The 
hotel operates a full system of management accounting and 
budgetary control which enables individual managers to 
assess performance on a monthly basis and thereafter remedy 
adverse variances and capitalise upon trends that are 
favourable. The system is under the control of the company 
secretary who reports to the chairman and managing 
director.
During the summer months the Lygon Arms employs 120 staff 
of whom 70 are female and 50 male. It may seem extravagant 
to employ 100 full time and 20 part time staff in an hotel 
which has only 63 bedrooms but the layout and the age of 
the buildings combined with the high standard of personal 
service which is available to guests necessitate these 
generous staffing levels. Considerable attention is paid to 
staff training and development with the result that the 
rate of staff turnover compares very favourably with the 
average for this type of hotel. For example 24 members of 
staff have more than 15 years service and their combined 
service extends to more than 1000 years. This attracts 
considerable benefits both to the hotel and for regular 
guests who can be assured of continuity of service by 
people whom they get to know well.
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An indication of the importance that the management attach 
to staff was evident in the early 1980's. At that time 
consideration was being given to the provision of a health 
and leisure facility for the guests within the hotel 
grounds. Although very fashionable at the time there were 
opposing views as to the merits of such a course of action. 
Simultaneously it was recognised that the land available 
could be utilised for the provision of a purpose built 
staff accommodation wing. The hotel owned a number of old 
properties in the village and surrounding area and whilst 
these served a useful purpose their scattered location made 
it difficult to maintain and supervise their upkeep. 
Furthermore it was, on occasion, difficult to contact 
staff. A decision was made to opt for the staff 
accommodation wing which was built at a cost of £400,000, a 
substantial proportion of the investment being met by the 
sale of the village properties. The superior accommodation 
is a definite attraction for staff and gives the Lygon an 
advantage in engaging skilled staff with London or 
equivalent experience.
In the period November to March a financial evaluation of 
the hotel must take into account turnover, profitability 
and the rate of return on capital investment. Over the 
years the turnover has risen steadily to the point where it 
is now some £2.25m per annum. In the period October to 
March, however, the hotel operates at a loss mainly because
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of the high level of fixed costs which have to be borne 
irrespective of the level of turnover. It would be quite 
impracticable for an hotel of the standard of the Lygon 
Arms to close during the winter months - the main aim 
during this period is to minimize losses. The summer 
months produce a substantial profit except in years where 
the U.S. dollar is weak vis a vis sterling as was the case 
in 1980/81. Also, in years where the revenue charge for 
repairs and renewals is heavy, little or no operating
profit is generated. In years where this charge is less 
than average a useful level of operating profit is 
produced.
In the case of the Lygon Arms the rate of return on capital 
investment is somewhat nebulous. On the basis of annual 
turnover of £2.25m and taking into account goodwill and the 
especial attractions of the hotel, a conservative valuation 
of the property as a going concern might be in the order of 
£3.5m. The hotel, however, has a valuable capital reserve 
in the form of 13 acres of prime land on the outskirts of 
the village. It is a prime site for private housebuilding 
and were planning permission obtained a value of a least 
£1.5m would be indicated. On the basis of a combined 
valuation of some £5m the rate of return is very low. In 
view of the capital structure of the company, however, this 
figure does not give cause for concern. The majority of 
the equity was formerly in the hands of the Russell family
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with Douglas Barrington having a minority interest. 
Subsequent to Don Russell gifting shares to Douglas 
Barrington control of the business passed to the family of 
the latter, Kirk Ritchie subsequently acquiring a minority 
interest.
In 1986 Douglas Barrington, by now in his mid-sixties, 
decided to sell The Lygon Arms. Not surprisingly the 
proposed sale received numerous enquiries from prospective 
purchasers but after careful consideration he decided to 
accept the offer of E4.75M from The Savoy Hotel PLC. 
Negotiations, which were concluded in the summer of that 
year, resulted in Douglas Barrington joining the board of 
the management company of the Savoy group. [13]
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The Barrington era, spanning forty years, thus came to a 
successful conclusion: the operation of the hotel was
transferred to capable hands with Douglas Barrington being 
available to ensure that the standards he had built were 
maintained and enhanced.
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3. The Metropole, Llandrindod Wells, Powys
Proprietor David Baird-Murray
The Metropole Hotel is located in the centre of Llandrindod 
Wells, Powys (formerly Radnor) Wales. Cardiff and Swansea 
are some 70 miles distant, Birmingham 80, Manchester and 
Liverpool 125 and London 170 - approximately 3 hours by
car. The town is also served by the mid Wales railway line 
running from Swansea to Shrewsbury. The town has a 
population of 4,200 and within a radius of 25 miles there 
are only some 20,000 people.
Powys covers more than 1.25 million acres, nearly a quarter 
of Wales, with the smallest population of any county in 
England and Wales. Llandrindod Wells was built mainly 
between 1860 and 1870 as a Victorian Spa town. By 1910 
there were at least 6 major hotels, each with 100 or more 
rooms together with numerous smaller establishments giving 
a total capacity in excess of 3,000 beds.
The great-grandmother of the present proprietor purchased 
the original buildings in 1897 for the sum of £7,850. Mrs. 
Elizabeth Miles (nee Spencer, born 1847 and died 1930) was 
married at 20 and left a widow with two sons at 24. Of 
dynamic disposition and formidable personality Elizabeth 
Miles ultimately became the licensee of ten properties in
- 109 -
South Wales. In the period 1897 to 1923 a series of major 
extensions was carried out with the result that at one time 
the hotel was the largest in Wales. [14]
Mrs. Elizabeth Miles engaged a manager and manageress to 
run the hotel. From 1906 Mr. A. Sims held this position 
until his death in 1929, his wife continuing throughout the 
Second World War until her retirement in 1947. Another 
couple, Mr. and Mrs. Finlay McEwan then took over the 
management until 1954 when the present proprietor David 
Spencer Baird-Murray, great-grandson of the founder, took 
over the operation. [15]
At the beginning of the Second World War the hotel was 
requisitioned, at a fortnight's notice, by the army 
authorities. The contents of the hotel were sold, 
unfortunately at a considerable loss. During the war years 
the building was used as an artillery officer training 
depot. Relatively minor damage was sustained during this 
period but, in the summer months of 1945 following the end 
of the war the hotel was used as a main demobilization 
centre and in this short period extensive damage was done 
to the fabric. The army reparations committee allowed only 
£8,000 in compensation which, as it turned out, was barely 
sufficient to eradicate the dry rot that had infested the 
building.
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Consequently the immediate post-war years were hazardous in 
the extreme. The hotel was in very poor shape, there was 
little or no furniture and what there was had been bought 
at second hand sales, rationing and shortages still being 
the order of the day. There were hardly any carpets, no 
central heating, obsolete kitchen equipment and little 
prospect of an upturn in the low volume of business. The 
bulk of what turnover there was came from the public bar 
which the authorities had allowed to remain open throughout 
the war years.
Furthermore, mainly as a result of the war, the 
considerable family fortune was in marked decline. An 
attempt was made to sell the hotel at an asking price of 
£20,000 compared with a 1925 valuation of £32,000. There 
were no offers. In what was virtually a last resort the 
family sold most of their remaining property in Pontypridd 
for £19,000 and loaned this sum to the hotel company in 
order that it might effect essential repairs.
David Baird-Murray left Harrow in 1948 and spent two years 
National Service commissioned in the Royal Marine 
Commandos. As a result of this he had to forego the 
opportunity of attending the prestigious Lausanne Hotel 
School. Instead he spent a year in hotels in Paris and 
Cannes thereby gaining a useful insight into the operation 
of high class hotels on the Continent of Europe.
Ill -
Subsequent to a year in the shipping business in North 
Africa he was then invited by his family to take over the 
running of the Metropole. Realizing that the future 
fortunes of his widely spread family were being placed in 
his hands he responded to the challenge more out of a sense 
of family duty than personal predilections or ambition. He 
became the licensee in 1954 and was at that time, aged 23, 
the youngest in Wales. [16]
In the early and mid 1950's when the annual turnover was 
little more than £30,000 only 54 out of the 150 rooms were 
available for letting. The season was short and the Spa 
attractions of Llandrindod, which were at their peak in the 
late Victorian era, had long since faded. The season 
usually commenced around Easter with the meeting of the 
Governing Body of the Church of Wales and finished in late 
September with the autumn meeting of that body. In between 
there were various theme weeks which tended to meet with 
varying degrees of success. These difficult problems were 
intensified by the extremely sparse local population, few 
of whom could afford to patronise anything other than the 
public bar. There was little cultural activity, the Welsh 
identity having been suppressed during the war years. Trade 
was equally depressed at the three other surviving hotels 
of note in the town.
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Against this background David Baird-Murray commenced a 
three pronged assault on the market in order to revive the 
fortunes of the hotel. First of all he promoted the sale 
of liquor in the bars. This generated much needed cash 
with which to slowly set about the massive task of the 
refurbishment of the fabric, furniture, fittings and 
equipment. Secondly he set about attracting coach business 
throughout the season. In this he was mainly successful 
and after a number of years was dealing with no fewer than 
17 separate coach operators from Thomas Cook downwards. 
This business helped fill the hotel and was a major 
contributor to eradicating losses and moving tenaciously 
towards a modest operating profit for the summer months. 
The final part of the strategy was designed to promote a 
cultural awareness of all things Welsh and to engender a 
nationalist spirit throughout the region so that Welsh 
people could perceive the advantages of tourism and 
increase the utilization of the natural and physical 
resources at their immediate disposal.
The implementation of these plans was successful to the 
extent that by 1956 the hotel was opened throughout the 
year, coach business continued to improve and the result of 
David Baird-Murray's appeal to the local people led to his 
being elected as district councillor in 1957. His 
financial rewards, however, were of a much more modest 
nature. For the first two years he had no salary from the
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hotel. From 1956 he was paid £250 per annum but this was 
doubled on his marriage in 1958 and doubled again on the 
birth of the first of his four children. Even then £1,000
per annum was not a great reward for six years' hard 
labour.
In addition the hotel was still starved of capital 
investment. In 1959 the hotel company was fortunate in 
being able to raise £30,000 via a first mortgage with the 
Eagle Star Insurance Company and Lombard Banking. This 
enabled central heating to be installed on the ground floor 
(but not as yet in the bedrooms) together with general 
improvements to the food and beverage areas.
In the period 1957 to 1962 David Baird-Murray widened his 
horizons by becoming involved in a number of organizations 
connected with the hotel industry. All of these helped him 
promote the hotel and the essence of his marketing strategy 
over the years has been the range of external influence he 
has been able to bring to bear on committees and 
organizations involved with the administration of the 
hotel, catering and tourism industries within Wales. He 
involved himself in the West Midlands and South Wales 
division of the British Hotels and Restaurants Association 
and with the then voluntary tourist board of Wales. He 
then attracted national attention throughout Wales as a 
result of the moves towards the relaxation of licensing
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laws in the country with regard to Sunday opening. He 
achieved an initial success in the 1961 campaign which saw 
hotels in Radnor being allowed to open on Sundays. This 
was followed by further successful campaigns in other Welsh 
counties in 1968, 1975 and 1983 by which time only two
districts remained "dry" on Sundays. As chairman of the 
council that supported seven day opening he became well 
known in the country and this publicity was of considerable 
benefit to the Metropole.
The period 1965/1966 saw him obtain a controlling interest 
in the ordinary share capital of the company subsequent to 
the restructuring of the share capital for the benefit of 
some older members of the family. At the same time the 
director of the insurance company that provided the 
mortgage six years earlier now became the chairman of the 
hotel company. In addition a senior executive from the 
brewing firm Whitbread joined the board and from this grew 
a close trading relationship. As well as supplying the 
hotel with beers, wines and spirits they have been 
significant lenders to the company, enabling additional 
refurbishments to be carried out, with the added advantage 
of such loans carrying minimal rates of interest. In spite 
of this, substantial bank loans became a permanent feature 
on the balance sheet as the hotel struggled to overcome its 
economic disadvantages.
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The combined problems of an isolated location with a sparse 
local population allied to seasonality and volatility in 
patterns of turnover were particularly severe for a large
old hotel with heavy fixed costs, a continuing need for
repairs and renewals and 100 bedrooms to fill. Whilst 
modest operating profits could be made during the summer 
months these were more than offset by the losses of the 
winter months exacerbated by increasingly heavy bank 
interest charges. Expenditure on refurbishments, expensive 
as they were, was essential to meet the now rising 
expectations of the guests. It was clear that further 
marketing ploys would have to be adopted in order to 
increase turnover and thereby profitability.
A major advance was made when the Metropole became the 
first Welsh hotel to join the Interchange consortium. In 
1969 there were only seven members. David Baird-Murray was 
able to play a leading part in the development of 
Interchange and was instrumental in bringing the group to 
the attention of the largest marketing consortium for 
independent hotels in the world - Best Western which is
headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, U.S.A. Its Board of
Management was eager to expand into Europe and in 
particular into the U.K. They saw a ready vehicle in 
Interchange and the deal was rapidly put together.
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Best Western U.K., of which David Baird-Murray was chairman 
in 1976, has gone from strength to strength and by 1985 
numbered 197 independent hotels. It has extended its 
activities to bulk purchasing whereby members can obtain 
substantial discounts on a wide range of goods and 
services. The links with Best Western International have 
been retained and it is interesting to note that Best 
Western U.K. actually refers, via a global computerised 
reservations system, more business to Best Western U.S.A. 
than vice versa. Despite this the advantages of membership 
are considerable and its popularity is reflected in the 
growing number of participants.
David Baird-Murray was appointed chairman of the Mid Wales 
Tourism Council in 1964. When the Wales Tourist Board was 
formed in 1969 he supported the appointment of the first 
chief executive Harold Naylor and worked closely with Sir 
David Davies throughout the formative stages of the board's 
development.
The hotel celebrated its centenary in 1972 with a 
spectacular buffet reception attended by many of the 
leading figures in Wales, the guest of honour being the 
Minister of State for Wales, David Gibson-Watt, who later 
became a life peer. The centenary celebrations were
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essentially a further marketing stratagem designed to bring 
the hotel to the attention of a wide circle of influential 
people.
In the centenary year Roberto Marchesi was appointed 
General Manager and he has remained at the hotel to this 
day. This allowed the proprietor to delegate much of the 
day to day administration of the property, freeing him to 
develop the marketing function and to explore the 
possibilities of an improved financial structure. 
Substantial bank loans were still outstanding, the 
financial position being made worse by the installation of 
many private bathrooms in guest bedrooms and further 
central heating, including the installation of the new 
boilers. [17]
The recession of 1973 to 1975 had considerable impact on 
the Metropole especially in 1974 when 10,000 bed nights 
were lost as a result of the cancellation of coach parties. 
In an effort to recoup this, contracts were entered into 
with SAGA and these became an important but not very 
profitable part of the business of the hotel for the 
following ten years. Effectively they enabled the hotel to 
improve its room and bed occupancy and materially improved 
the profitability of the hotel in April and October where 
formerly the hotel had either just broken even or traded at 
small loss. Nevertheless it is worth noting that in 1974
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the charge per person for a week's full board was only £23.
An additional problem during this period was the cost of
implementing the provisions of Fire Precautions Act 1971. 
By the time that all the requirements of the authorities 
had been satisfied the cost of fire detection systems, fire 
doors, external flights of stairs and the like ran to 
£110,000.
Consequent to the economy pulling out of the recession the
Metropole enjoyed its most stable period since the war in
the latter half of the decade. From 1976 to 1979 the hotel 
was able to operate at a modest annual profit having 
benefited from the continuing schemes of refurbishment 
which resulted in clients being given sound value for 
money. During this time the Powys conference suite with a 
maximum capacity for 400 delegates was constructed and 
fitted out at a total cost of nearly £200,000, £40,000 of 
which was financed via a grant under section 4 of the 
Tourism Development Act 1969.
In 1979 David Baird-Murray purchased two hotels, the 
Bellevue Royal in Aberystwyth and the Haford Arms at 
Devil's Bridge, at a combined cost of £300,000, all 
financed by bank loans. At the time both hotels were 
showing satisfactory profits and it was forecast that the 
combined turnover of the three hotels would exceed Elm and 
that net pre-tax profits would be at least £135,000.
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Unfortunately, shortly after the purchase of the two hotels 
trade became badly affected by the recession of 1979 to 
1981. It soon became clear that the optimum course of 
action was to sell the two hotels and this was eventually 
accomplished via a piecemeal realization by early 1982. 
The proceeds of sale were just sufficient to recoup the 
investment, meet the bank interest and cover the trading 
losses that had been incurred. It was an unlucky 
experience. In other circumstances the investment might 
well have produced a satisfactory rate of return on the 
capital investment and the nucleus of a small group of 
hotels would have been formed. In the event the timing was 
wrong but at least the total investment was recouped 
without serious loss. [18]
In 1975 the chairman of the company Mr. E. G. Spater died 
and was succeeded by Lord Gibson-Watt. In the early 1980's 
it became clear to the directors that there were basically 
but two options open to further improve the standing of the 
hotel. One was to expand by purchasing the nearby 
Commodore Hotel at a cost of some £300,000 and then to 
refurbish it to three star standard. This would then 
attract the upper end of the market leaving the Metropole 
to continue to aim for the volume tour business at the 
lower end of the market. The other option was to spend
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heavily on the Metropole, regain the three star status it 
had relinquished and then move up-market, dispensing both 
with SAGA and the lower end of the coach business.
After considerable discussion it was agreed that the second 
option was the better way forward. As a result, over a 
period of three years from 1983-1985, further refurbishment 
totalling close on £500,000 was implemented. The major
costs were a complete re-equipping of the kitchens, 
£100,000; the creation of a new all day food and beverage 
operation, £70,000; furniture and fittings, £100,000 with 
the balance of £130,000 attributed to the provision of
further private bathrooms which resulted in all guestrooms 
enjoying private facilities. A significant proportion of 
the work was carried out by the full-time maintenance staff 
of the hotel resulting in considerable savings.
Although the volume of business increased by the time these 
major refurbishments were complete it was clear that in 
order to recoup the investment and move up-market it would 
be wise to terminate the various SAGA contracts and 
dispense with the majority of coach business.
The hotel had a large outdoor swimming pool which
originally opened in 1935. It was felt that the increased 
demand for health and leisure facilities should be met by 
the provision of a health and leisure complex which would
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serve to complete the modernization of the hotel and would 
be a powerful attraction to conference organizers. In 
order to secure finance for this project David Baird-Murray 
instructed Christie's to prepare a valuation of the hotel 
policies. These were valued on a going concern basis at 
£1.4m. Several proposals were considered in the range of 
£400,000 to £900,000. In the event a proposal carrying a 
capital investment of £420,000 was implemented and opened 
in March 1988.
The investment proved itself by generating incremental 
income to the extent that the proprietor could budget for 
the hotel, for the first time in his career, to produce an 
operating profit in the winter months. In turn this would 
justify additional investment with the strategic aim of 
achieving a sound three star standard in all areas of hotel 
operation.
The management structure of the hotel is such that the 
proprietor is mainly involved with matters relating to 
administration and finance, the general manager is
responsible for the day to day running of the hotel and is 
heavily involved in sales and marketing, whilst the deputy 
manager assumes much of the responsibility for the smooth 
running of the food and beverage operations. This team is 
backed by the various heads of department all of whom are 
given as much freedom of operation as possible. In the
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season from Easter to October there can be as many as 80 
staff of whom only 10 will be part-time. As the majority 
of the staff are local few live in the hotel. During the
winter months this will fall to 50-60 but this still 
represents a major fixed cost. In the 1980's the situation 
has been alleviated via the employment of students from a 
number of catering colleges in Wales and the West Midlands 
with whom the hotel maintains a close working relationship.
FINANCIAL COMMENTARY
In the period 1978 to 1985 it will be noted that although 
there was a steady increase in turnover, after taking 
inflation into account, the volume increase was marginal. 
Furthermore the sales mix, showing a high proportion of 
food, strikingly illustrates the necessity of accommodation 
sales to produce profits of any significance. The repairs 
and renewals charged to revenue are relatively modest, the 
standard of the hotel being such that the major part of 
schemes of refurbishment had to be capitalized as directed 
by the tax authorities.
In recent years (1983-1985) the revenue for accommodation 
has represented only 33% to 35% of turnover and is 
therefore indicative of the low profitability of the hotel. 
The figure also reflects the seasonality of the operation. 
Although the hotel is usually 75% or more full from April
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to September, the low winter occupancies averaging less 
than 20% in the period December to February result in an 
annual occupancy of around 58%. This is at least 10
percentage points below what is required to produce a 
satisfactory level of profitability. The problem is 
compounded by the low average room rate, typically £11 - 
£12 in 1984/1985 which is caused by the volume of coach 
business. The considerable turnover in food enables the 
hotel to achieve a gross profit percentage in excess of 60 
whilst the sales mix for liquor produces a similar 
percentage of nearly 50. These figures are broadly 
acceptable when compared to industry norms for food and 
beverage operations. The key to improved profitability 
therefore is higher occupancies linked to a greater average
room rate. This, in turn, will result in improved volume
of food and beverage turnover. [19]
Although the hotel is now a soundly run business the future 
is by no means certain. On the one hand if the Welsh 
authorities, via public and private sector participation, 
can inject substantial funds into the local economy by way 
of additional tourist facilities, it could be that 
Llandrindod Wells might recapture the widespread popularity 
it enjoyed during its hey day as one of the premier Spa
towns of the Victorian era. If little or no public money
is forthcoming, however, the hotel will have to battle on 
alone. Competition for independent hotels is now severe,
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made more so by all the major groups upgrading their 
facilities and refining their sales and marketing 
strategies to provide guests with an ever widening range of 
activities.
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4. The Open Arms, Dirleton, East Lothian
Proprietor Arthur Neil
BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS
The Open Arms is a small country hotel located in the East
Lothian village of Dirleton, some twenty miles from
Edinburgh. The buildings date from the eighteenth century, 
various additions having been made both during Victorian 
times and subsequent to the Second World War. In 1947 the 
property, which had been run as a guest house, was acquired 
by a tenant farmer from Pencaitland and his wife, George 
and Marguerite Gibson. The purchase price was in the 
region of £1,000 and the company, The Open Arms Limited,
was incorporated on 20th January 1947, in the depths of a
particularly severe winter throughout Great Britain.
The moving spirit behind the enterprise was Mrs. Marguerite 
(Pat) Gibson. She hailed from Glasgow and during the war 
held a prominent position in the land army in East Lothian. 
Of vigorous disposition and commanding presence she found 
the life of a farmer*s wife did not fully exercise her 
energy and talents. She decided to become the proprietrix 
of a licensed hotel, a venture she saw essentially in terms 
of challenge and opportunity. She chose the name The Open
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Arms to symbolise a welcome return for her clients and in 
particular wished to provide comfort and relaxation for 
those who had endured the war years.
The principal aim of the hotel was to provide a standard of 
food and drink somewhat removed from the austerity of 
wartime. Foodstuffs, however, were in short supply 
although the situation in country districts tended to be 
less serious than in urban areas owing to the occasional 
availability of local fish, meat and game. Wine merchants 
to the hotel were Sandeman Brothers, originally a Dundee 
family, but prominent as long established wine and spirit 
merchants in Edinburgh. The wine list was built around 
claret and the white wines of Bordeaux: even in the first 
year of operation the hotel carried the four first growths 
of the Medoc classification of 1855 - Lafite-Rothschild,
Margeaux, Latour and Haut-Brion. In addition much 
Sauternes was sold and one client used to delight in 
drinking Chateau d'Yquem with pommes frites. At that time 
these first quality wines were sold for between £1.75 and 
£2 per bottle - to-day in similar circumstances they would 
sell from £75 per bottle upwards.
The period 1951/2 saw the formation of the outside catering 
division of the company. The main reason for this 
diversification was to boost sales during the quieter 
winter months. The venture quickly proved highly
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successful with 1000 people catered for at the Coronation 
Ball held in the Assembly Rooms, Edinburgh in June 1953; a 
similar number at a function dinner in the Assembly Rooms, 
Edinburgh in June 1953; a similar number at a function to 
mark the 21st birthday of the then Duke of Hamilton and a 
further dinner in the Assembly Rooms in honour of the 
supreme commander of NATO in 1958. A further important 
reason for diversification was that food and beverage sales 
formed by far the major part of the turnover of the 
company. There were only four letting bedrooms and in the 
early years little effort was made to sell the 
accommodation.
The outside catering division became one of the principal 
advertising media of the company and was instrumental in 
building goodwill as a result of the many family occasions 
for which it provided comprehensive facilities.
The turnover of the hotel increased during this period to 
such an extent that the restaurant was extended by building 
on a verandah which enabled a further 35 diners to be 
accommodated. Nevertheless food standards were maintained 
and the scope of the menu widened. [20]
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THE ARTHUR NEIL PERIOD 1954 - 1989
Arthur Neil, the present proprietor, came to The Open Arms 
in 1954. A native of Falkirk, his family had been engaged 
for two generations in the manufacture of confectionery. 
In the second world war his father served with the 51st 
Highland Division, was captured at St. Valery in 1940 and 
spent five years in a prisoner of war camp in Poland. 
During this time he anticipated the post war trend to 
travel and tourism and thus identified the hotel and 
catering industry as a possible career for his children.
Consequently Arthur Neil applied to the recently formed 
Scottish Hotel School in Glasgow but was initially rejected 
on account of his being under age. He therefore spent some 
eighteen months during 1946 and 1947 at the Central Hotel 
in Glasgow. He was accepted for the Scottish Hotel School 
in 1947 and was, when admitted, the youngest student and 
the first of normal school leaving age. In the earliest 
days of the School nearly all the students were ex-service 
men over the age of 21. On leaving hotel school he 
completed two years of National Service finishing with the 
rank of paid acting Captain in the Catering Corps. He then 
worked in a well-known family hotel in London, The Goring, 
and later at the Bellevue Hotel in Berne, Switzerland. He
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then decided that he would like to have a spell in a small 
hotel as he had, by that time, made up his mind to become 
eventually the proprietor of an independent hotel.
His early months at The Open Arms were spent in assisting 
Mrs. Gibson and in particular helping her operate systems 
of catering control which had been installed by Henry 
Smith, the first in a long line of post-war consultants to
the hotel and catering industry. Early in the autumn of
1955, having spent more than one year at the hotel, he 
decided to return to London where he had been offered the 
management of a reputable hotel similar to the Goring. 
Arthur Neil informed Mr. and Mrs. Gibson of his plans and 
was asked to find a successor. This he did and a suitable 
candidate was offered the position. The candidate, 
however, did not communicate by telegram acceptance of the 
post within the stipulated time.
Then, on 6th October 1955, Mr. and Mrs. Gibson, together 
with a family friend, whilst travelling by motor car to 
Edinburgh, were involved in a car accident. Tragically 
Mrs. Gibson was killed. Ironically the driver of the other
car was on his way to dine at The Open Arms. Mr. Gibson
survived the accident, re-married three years later and 
died in 1977. In the aftermath of the tragedy Mr. Gibson 
invited Arthur Neil to take over the management of The Open 
Arms and made him an offer to that effect. Arthur Neil
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agreed on condition that they travelled to London to 
explain the circumstances to Neil's potential employers. 
This was done in order to prevent the future career of Neil 
being put in jeopardy within the close knit world of London 
hotel proprietors.
On their return to Scotland arrangements were made for Mr. 
Gibson and his accountant to continue in office as 
directors of the hotel company. In order to aid the smooth 
transfer of operational management Mr. Gibson's daughter 
Rosemary relinquished her directorship. Arthur Neil was 
appointed manager and acquired a minority shareholding in 
the company. The overall effect of these arrangements was 
to create a stable business relationship between Arthur 
Neil, in his capacity as manager, and the Gibson family in 
their capacities as directors and shareholders.
Rosemary Gibson had left school in the.early 1950's and had
attended the prestigious Lausanne Hotel School. She had
also worked in the Goring Hotel in London subsequent to 
Arthur Neil. Naturally the two came to know one another 
well and were drawn closer by the death of Mrs. Gibson.
They married in 1958. In due course they bought out the
interests of Mr. Gibson's son by his first marriage. In 
the mid 1960's, with the help of an unnamed border woollen 
family they were able to buy out Mr. Gibson who, at that 
time, wished to raise finance to start a herd of cattle at
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his Pencaitland farm. Much later, in the early 1980's, 
Rosemary and Arthur Neil were able to purchase the 
interests of the border woollen family.
The authorised and issued share capital of the company 
still stands at £5,000 in shares of £1 each. Arthur Neil 
holds 2,083 his wife 1,757 and his son Jamie 1,067. The 
remainder is held in family trusts. [21]
The principal difficulty which confronted Arthur Neil from 
1955 to 1960 was living with the legend that Mrs. Gibson 
had created during less than a decade when The Open Arms 
had been brought to the forefront of the Scottish hotel and 
catering industry. The hotel was held in high regard by 
clients from in and around Edinburgh, and further afield, 
who were by the standards of the day relatively 
discriminating in the matter of the quality of provision of 
food and drink in hotels and restaurants. It was not until 
around 1962 that he felt his own reputation had been 
established mainly through the vehicle of outside catering 
functions, especially weddings.
During the 1960's Arthur Neil strove to improve and 
maintain the standards of The Open Arms. In this he was 
generally successful. With the gradual rise in disposable 
incomes during this period an increasing number of people
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found new pleasure in eating out. The reputation of the 
hotel enabled the volume of business and hence the 
profitability of the establishment to increase and improve.
Two other ventures occupied part of his time during this 
decade. He became involved, together with a local farmer, 
in the setting up of a wholesale potato and vegetable 
business - Shieldness Produce - of which he remains a 
director. The turnover of this company rose over the years 
to several million pounds per annum. In 1965 he and some 
business associates acquired a twenty year lease of some 
old farm buildings in Fife and operated them as the Grange 
Inn. The style of the operation was similar to The Open 
Arms. During the recession of 1973 to 1975 the lease was 
discharged when it became clear that owing to certain 
external influences it did not prove possible to achieve 
the initial aims of the venture with regard to agreed 
criteria for turnover and profitability.
In 1967, whilst retaining his interest in the hotel company 
and in the outside catering division, Arthur Neil became 
the first regional manager in Scotland for the Hotel and 
Catering Industry Training Board which had been created via 
the National Economic Development Office. In Scotland 
there followed effective implementation of Training Board 
policies aided by the extensive operational experience of 
Neil. This was in contrast to other regions in the U.K.
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where lack of operational expertise on the part of training 
board management, exacerbated by a hierarchical management 
structure, led to a degree of conflict and major problems 
in the implementation of board policy. Neil himself was 
seen by certain board members as being something of a 
maverick. They may have been relieved when in 1970, 
exactly three years after taking up the appointment, Neil, 
as he had intended at the outset and within the time limit 
he had set himself, informed the board that he was going to 
leave in order to pursue his business interests.
ACQUISITION OF HOWARD HOTEL IN EDINBURGH
Neil was now faced with the choice of extending The Open 
Arms, acquiring something similar or breaking new ground. 
In 1970 the chance came to acquire The Howard Hotel in 
Edinburgh. The hotel was located in Great King Street in 
the New Town having been built as a private house in 1821. 
Immediately prior to acquisition by Neil it had been run as 
an hotel but had acquired a seedy reputation. The property 
was purchased on a going concern basis for £46,000, £10,000 
of which came from Neil's own funds and £36,000 raised by 
way of external loans. During the period 1970 to 1975 a 
total of £300,000 was expended on the property. In the 
first phase some £100,000 was spent on the provision of 
private bathrooms for all twenty five bedrooms, plus the 
installation of lifts. Subsequent expenditure was in two
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tranches, one of £50,000 and the other £150,000. Grants 
under Section 4 of The Development of Tourism Act 1969 were 
approved for work to the value of £40,000. By the end of 
the refurbishment programme Neil possessed an attractive 
property set in an exclusive location with ample car 
parking and full facilities for discerning guests. [22]
Unfortunately the recession of 1973 to 1975 struck as the 
refurbishment was nearing completion and there was a 
shortfall in sales which caused the principal lenders to 
become temporarily apprehensive as to the commercial 
viability of the operation. Neil briefly considered 
selling the property but when initial interest indicated a 
purchase price somewhat below what he reckoned was 
reasonable in the circumstances he decided the optimum 
course of action was to "tough it out" and drag the lenders 
along with him. This duly happened and as the recession 
receded and the economy regained momentum sales grew 
steadily and operating profits sufficed to service the debt 
interest. Sales advanced to the point where by 1987 they 
were in excess of £500,000 per annum.
An important feature of the growth and success of the group 
has been the quality and effectiveness of the professional 
advice enjoyed by Neil who is quick to point to David 
Birrell (inter alia a director of the Clydesdale Bank) of 
Dundas & Wilson C.S., his lawyer for the past twenty-five
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years. Also Balfour Thomson of John M. Geoghegan, 
Chartered Accountants, occasional advice from Charles 
Gwynne of Christie's regarding property valuation and 
Douglas Laird of the architectural firm Campbell & Laird. 
Each has made an important contribution to the growth and 
well-being of the group over the years and collectively
have acted as a counterpart to the operational expertise of
Neil. These contacts have formed part of a web of 
interwoven friendship based on trust and mutual respect and
have allowed Arthur Neil to have "a force beyond the
purchasing power" of his business in his dealings with the 
professional and business community within and around 
Edinburgh.
Allied to this has been a caring management who know their 
business thoroughly. In particular Wilma Campbell and her 
cousin Dene McLeod, both from Lewis in the Western Isles, 
have been associated with The Open Arms for many years. 
Similarly David Ogden (college- trained with international 
experience of both operations and education) and his wife 
Marion, respectively manager and housekeeper at The Howard 
Hotel have been with the group since the mid-sixties. These 
members of staff, by their professionalism, epitomize the 
management style that the proprietor has successfully 
created and projected.
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A major key factor is the prime location of each property 
with The Open Arms set in a village of great charm and 
antiquity only twenty miles from a conurbation with a 
population of 500,000 and The Howard handily situated in 
the heart of the New Town of Edinburgh. A further factor 
is the risks that Neil took, especially with The Howard, by 
making full use of bank finance. Although this made the 
business highly geared the quality of the management 
ensured its immediate survival and latterly the business 
was sold for approximately four times the value of the 
original purchase and subsequent refurbishments.
Neil's ability, brought about by intellect and experience, 
to perceive, alleviate and satisfy the physiological and 
psychological needs of his clients is indicative of his
skill as an hotelier. The ability to please people and
make them feel comfortable in what is essentially a
business environment for which they are paying, is not 
given to many. It was, however, an attribute Neil had 
and he exercised it to the full. As a result he built 
goodwill and word of mouth advertising helped him achieve a 
successful business. Furthermore the standard of his
operation was consistent which gave increasing confidence 
to his clients and resulted in repeat business.
- 138 -
Arthur Neil suggests certain personal qualities which 
successful hoteliers require. Prominent amongst these is 
an acquisitive instinct to set up on one*s own rather than 
spend an entire career working for others. A further 
attribute is a genuine kindly nature which he considers 
essential in dealing with the wide diversity of human 
nature that is the lot of the hotelier. Alonsgide this is 
a genuine, not assumed, interest in clients - their needs, 
wishes, desires, habits and nature. Only by a full 
understanding of clients can the operation be flexed to 
suit their individual preferences. Skill in business
techniques, particularly those of accountancy and law, are 
necessary combined with technical expertise in the fields 
of the production and service of accommodation, food, drink 
and leisure. A further important requirement is skill in 
staff management.
Neil is of the opinion that, generally speaking, guests are 
easier to deal with than staff. For one thing they tend to 
be on the premises for only a few hours or a few days at 
the most. Also they tend to seek gratification when
visiting hotels and restaurants and a significant number 
are determined to obtain this gratification even to the 
extent of a degree of self delusion. Furthermore, in a
well run establishment the great majority of guests
genuinely find that their needs are satisfied. On the 
other hand staff may be with an employer for an indefinite
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period of time stretching over many years. In order to 
satisfy both employer and employee Neil reckons that staff 
must be positively motivated; must be paid well enough in 
order to release them from the poverty trap, thus allowing 
them to gain self respect and status; must be able to work 
in an environment which allows them to achieve their 
potential and must aim at a degree of self fulfilment which 
may result in them leaving an employer in order to advance 
their career. [23]
SALE OF THE HOWARD HOTEL
In 1989 a combination of circumstances, principally the 
rapid increase in hotel property values in the period 1985 
to 1988 together with firm proposals for major leisure 
developments in the Dirleton area led Arthur Neil, by now 
rising sixty, to dispose of The Howard Hotel for a sum 
comfortably in excess of £1M. With the free proceeds of 
sale he planned to build additional bedroom accommodation 
at The Open Arms together with a specialized function suite 
which would materially aid his outside catering business in 
East Lothian. Such developments, which typify his 
entrepreneurial and opportunistic approach to business, may 
be judged as holding out the promise of a felicitious 
culmination to a long and successful career in the hotel 
and catering industry.
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FINANCIAL COMMENTARY
The figures for the period 1976 to 1985 as shown in Table 2 
5 give an analysis of turnover together with 
profits/losses at the operating level. At first sight it 
would appear that neither establishment is particularly 
profitable. It has to be borne in mind, however, that a 
feature common to the majority of independent hotels is the 
ploughing back of profits into the business by way of 
continuous programmes of refurbishment of furnishings, 
fittings and equipment. For old properties in particular 
this often results in the bulk of operating profit being 
swallowed up in programmes of this nature.
It will be seen that by 1985 the two properties were 
turning over close to £1M. At The Open Arms the 
combination of hotel food sales and function food sales 
formed the largest single item of turnover. At The Howard 
Hotel the progressive refurbishing and upgrading of the 
property combined with its city centre location resulted in 
accommodation forming an increasing proportion of turnover 
which proved the key to profitability and the major source 
of funding for improvements.
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As one would expect in a professionally managed operation 
there is relatively little movement over the years in 
liquor gross profit. The variations in food gross profit 
are less marked at The Open Arms than The Howard. This may 
be attributed principally to the fact that The Open Arms 
received more direct control from Arthur Neil than The 
Howard, added to which the former enjoyed the benefit of 
outside catering which tended to minimize such 
fluctuations.
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COMMENTARY ON OPERATION OF INDEPENDENT HOTELS
From the case studies certain aspects of the operation of 
independent hotels may be seen to contribute to their 
success. The levels of staffing and the relatively low 
levels of labour turnover give them an advantage over 
competing hotels with less generous staffing levels and 
higher rates of staff turnover which lead to inconsistent 
standards. Competent staff together with fixed assets 
maintained in good condition form a sound basis for guest 
satisfaction.
The consortia which Douglas Barrington and David Baird 
Murray helped promote enabled each to attain a higher level 
of turnover and consequent profitability than would 
otherwise have been possible. David Baird-Murray, in the
early years of The Metropole, also sought to exploit the
coach trade at a time when few hotels of the quality of The
Metropole perceived such trade being of significant value.
By comparison Arthur Neil used his outside catering 
business to act as a marketing and advertising medium for 
The Open Arms.
It is notable that none of the hotels featured in the case 
studies was in the vanguard to instal health and leisure 
facilities although these were very much both in fashion 
and demand by the mid nineteen eighties. By the end of the
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decade George Goring and Arthur Neil had rejected them 
whilst Douglas Barrington and David Baird-Murray were only 
latterly persuaded that they were necessary.
A further feature common to each but not to independent 
hotels in general was that, especially latterly, all four 
of them were relatively free from debt and therefore did 
not have substantial interest payments which eradicated 
their trading profits. Many operationally successful 
competitors went into liquidation in the period under 
review as a result of high gearing which resulted in 
satisfactory operational profits being less than interest 
payments due.
EVALUATION OF INDEPENDENT HOTELS
The case studies suggest that amongst the criteria for 
success in the independent sector, the following may be 
judged relevant:
a) location
b) entrepreneurial approach of proprietor
c) skilled exploitation of the market
d) sound professional advice
e) satisfaction of both guests and staff.
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An examination of each of the case studies will reveal to 
what extent these criteria were in evidence.
a) Location
Clearly the location of The Goring Hotel has been a major
contributory factor to its commercial success. The
location of The Lygon Arms was sound but it was the
exploitation of the location that gave Douglas Barrington a
significant competitive advantage over his immediate
neighbours. In marked contrast the poor location, more
than anything else, was the cause of the relatively poor 
profitability of The Metropole. The Open Arms enjoyed a 
good location with little or no surrounding competition, 
especially in its formative years.
b) Entrepreneurial Approach of the Proprietor
In each of the case studies individual proprietors struck 
an entrepreneurial pose, some to a greater degree than 
others. Perhaps the riskiest of all actions documented was 
the purchase of The Howard Hotel by Arthur Neil - he nearly
came unstuck as a result of the recession of 1973 - 1975,
and it was only his ability to convince the bank to back 
him through those difficult years that ensured his 
commercial survival. The extensions to The Lygon Arms 
were, in themselves, risky but their deft implementation,
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co-ordinated by Douglas Barrington, was a model of astute 
timing of capital investment in accommodation, for which he 
was sure there would be a continuing demand. George Goring 
was unusually fortunate insofar as his strong position 
resulted in him having to take few risks other than to 
refuse to discount his room rates and, for many years, to 
refuse commission to travel agents. It could be argued 
that the greatest risk taken by David Baird-Murray was the 
acquisition of additional properties. Having realised that 
the timing was unfortunate he had the wit to sell them and 
escaped without serious loss.
c) Skilled Exploitation of the Market
In this area it could be fairly argued that Douglas 
Barrington achieved the greatest degree of success. The 
case study shows clearly how he built the market, exploited 
his overseas connections, consistently moved the hotel 
up-market whenever possible and generally became a byword 
amongst fellow hoteliers for his marketing expertise. 
George Goring also put a great deal of effective effort 
into the marketing of his properties. With the advantage 
of goodwill stretching back over many years he was able 
both to retain old customers and seek new ones. The 
occupancies at both The Goring and The Spa attest to the 
success of this approach. Arthur Neil was also no stranger 
to the skilled exploitation of the market and, in
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particular, to using his outside catering organisation to 
act both as a marketing device and a profit centre in its 
own right. David Baird-Murray had a hard road to travel to 
slowly build markets for a property saddled with a poor 
location and at the mercy of seasonality. That the 
property survived is, as is suggested in the text, a case 
of survival against the odds.
d) Sound Professional Advice
Sound professional advice is a pre-requisite for success in 
all businesses, but particularly so for small businesses in 
their early stages of development. In such circumstances 
the sage advice of a sound lawyer and accountant is 
especially valuable. The proprietors of many small 
businesses neither have the time nor the inclination to 
become involved in the intricacies of accountancy, finance 
or the law. Nevertheless, the successful conduct of their 
businesses has to rely on an understanding of such matters.
From the case studies it may be seen that Arthur Neil paid 
due tribute to the skills of his lawyer and accountant. 
Douglas Barrington not only took professional advice in 
such matters, but also employed a wide range of independent 
consultants to maintain and improve his business. David 
Baird-Murray would not profess to be expert in such matters 
but his powers of persuasion with both bankers and various
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insurance companies helped procure the finance necessary 
both to survive and latterly expand. George Goring, thanks 
to his very strong trading position, could afford to leave 
financial matters almost solely to his accountant. It has 
to be said that very, very few hoteliers are in such a 
fortunate position.
Professional advice is rarely referred to in the evaluation 
of business success. In these instances, however, it is 
considered that sound professional advice played a 
significant part in the success of each of the businesses 
portrayed.
e) Satisfaction of both Guests and Staff
In order to prosper and to create goodwill it is clear that 
hoteliers must satisfy the needs of both guests and staff. 
Each of the case studies shows the separate approach of the 
individual hotelier.
Arthur Neil is the most explicit in his comments about both 
guests and staff. His assertion that, generally speaking, 
it is easier to deal with guests than with staff is an 
interesting one. The key difference, of course, is the 
length of time each spends in the establishment - for the 
guest it is unlikely to be longer than a fortnight and may 
be only a few hours; for a member of staff it may be years.
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Barrington, Goring and Neil all speak of the importance of 
treating each guest as an individual, recognising that 
when people spend considerable amounts of money they 
rightfully expect management and staff to give them a high 
level of personalised service, perhaps not pandering to 
every whim, but at least providing good value for money. 
At the upper end of the market, value for money becomes 
somewhat subjective - who can evaluate the worth of a 
particular style of decor, a floral arrangement or the 
texture of a particular sauce? Rather it is the overall 
impression that a guest forms of his stay in an 
establishment that will determine for him whether or not, 
or to be more exact, to what extent, his needs have been 
truly satisfied.
In each of the case studies the benefits of a well trained 
and highly motivated staff are evident. Again the higher 
th£ standards of the establishment, the more important it 
is that the staff can relate freely to the guests. For 
this to happen, social skills have to be inculcated into 
staff - a process that may take time and which can only be 
achieved by staff whose personalities are suited to a 
service industry.
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From the case studies it is clear that the impact of the 
character and personality of the proprietor has a 
significant effect on the conduct and profitability of the 
individual business. It is noteworthy that three out of 
four proprietors - Douglas Barrington in the Navy, David 
Baird-Murray in the Marines, together with Arthur Neil in 
the Army Catering Corps, all had commissioned service in 
the armed forces. These character-forming experiences 
stood them in good stead during the formative years of 
their businesses. Arthur Neil indicates the qualities which 
are to be found in many successful hoteliers. A clear 
understanding of the needs of clients and the 
implementation of the appropriate management techniques to 
satisfy these needs were central to the success of the 
hoteliers portrayed.
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CONCLUSIONS ON INDEPENDENT SECTOR
From these four case studies the factors that have 
contributed to the success of the various proprietors may 
be seen. George Goring, of course, had a huge advantage 
over his fellow proprietors insofar as he inherited a first 
class property in an exceptionally good location backed by 
a significant market following. Nevertheless the 
professionalism which he has exhibited over the years has 
enabled The Goring to remain in the forefront of London 
hotels and it is probably the finest truly private hotel 
left in the capital.
By contrast Douglas Barrington had to rebuild the fortunes 
of The Lygon Arms in the early post war years and was only 
able to propel it to the forefront of the industry by a 
series of major extensions and refurbishments which, 
happily, did little to alter the ambience and charm of the 
property. Apart from masterminding the improvements to the 
hotel, his principal achievement was to create and then 
implement a coherent marketing strategy for a relatively 
small country hotel with such success that latterly half 
the turnover was derived from overseas visitors.
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As indicated in the case study David Baird-Murray had to 
strive over many years to overcome obstacles which would 
have defeated most. Perhaps it could be said that stamina 
was the key to his success. Certainly had he not been so 
young when he initially took over the hotel it would have 
been significantly more difficult to succeed. The fact 
that the The Metropole faced all the principal economic 
problems of the industry to a greater extent than most, 
especially with regard to size and location, made life far 
from easy for David Baird-Murray and it was not really 
until the successful launch of the health and leisure club 
that the future of the property could be called secure.
Arthur Neil was able to carve a special niche for himself 
on the strength of his particular skills and abilities in 
the food and beverage areas. Up market outside catering is 
strewn with many pitfalls and it is a measure of Neil's 
professionalism that he was able to build his personal 
reputation in this field. Allied to this was his ability 
to take risks - typified by the purchase of the Howard. 
His initial equity in this was a mere £10,000. Some twenty 
years on he was able to sell the hotel for E1.25M - an 
exceptional return even bearing in mind the £300,000 
initially spent on upgrading.
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In all cases the projection of the personality of the 
proprietor has been a key factor in the success of the 
various enterprises. It is, perhaps, the single major 
advantage they enjoy when compared with larger 
organizations. The individual attention they can give to 
their guests and the ambience they create in their smaller 
establishments enables guests to feel more comfortable more 
quickly than in large hotels where, irrespective of the 
efficiency of the service, it is more difficult to 
successfully practise the arts of hospitality.
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CHAPTER 3 HOTEL GROUPS GEARED TO THE U.K. MARKET
Introduction
A major theme of this thesis is the dual perception of the
hotel business as an investment in a property asset which
is likely to increase in capital value as well as a
specialised retail operation with inherent added value
characteristics. All companies, including those whose 
operations carry an international dimension, recognise this 
but some companies more than others have capitalised on 
this perception and it is these companies which are the 
focus of this chapter.
The four companies portrayed are as follows
1. Mount Charlotte Investments Pic
Managing Director Robert Peel
2. Norfolk Capital Group Pic
Managing Director Peter Eyles
3. Centre Hotels, Comfort Hotels and Friendly Hotels
Chairman Henry Edwards
4. Gleneagles Hotels Pic
Managing Director Peter Tyrie
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1. MOUNT CHARLOTTE INVESTMENTS PLc
Managing Director Robert Peel
MOUNT CHARLOTTE INVESTMENTS: ORIGINS AND EARLY EXPANSION
The origins of the group may be traced to 1932 when the 
company Lomah (Rhodesia) Gold Mines Ltd., was incorporated. 
The location of the mining operation moved to Australia in 
1939 and the company became Mount Charlotte (Kalgoorlie) 
Ltd. Subsequent to the Second World War the mining 
interests gradually declined and by 1958, having become a 
classic shell company, the name was changed to Mount 
Charlotte Investments Limited. At this time the chairman 
of the company was a Mr. H. Scott Thompson and the main 
subsidiary of the company, Bettafoods Limited, operated a 
chain of medium priced, self service restaurants in central 
London including Holborn and the City. [1]
In 1959 two acquisitions took place:
a) Walkers Restaurants comprising 4 units was acquired at a 
cost of £87,000. A rights issue, which raised the 
issued share capital to £25,000, was arranged to 
finance this transaction.
b) Black and White Caterers comprising 5 units were 
acquired via a share issued of 357,337 "A" Ordinary 
Shares of 2 shillings in Mount Charlotte Investments
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Limited. By 1960 the post tax profit of the group had 
advanced to £45,961 and further acquisitions were 
imminent. [2 ]
In February 1961 the company acquired the catering group 
Nuthalls for £624,706. This was by far the largest 
acquisition to date. Nuthalls pre-tax profits for 1960 
were £105,000 and it was forecast that the combined group 
would produce pre-tax profits of approximately £200,000 for 
1961. In addition to catering outlets Nuthalls owned and 
operated the Grand Hotel in Bristol and the Abernant Lake 
Hotel, Llanwrtyd Wells in Brecon, Wales. In the period 
1962 to 1965 additional hotels were acquired in Exeter and 
Torquay, together with a small group of six hotels, based 
in Buxton, Derbyshire, three of which were located in 
Norfolk. [3]
During this period the catering outlets in Central London 
continued to thrive, one of the restaurants turning over 
1,500 lunches in just 2.5 hours. Of the turnover as much 
as 65% came in the form of Luncheon Vouchers rather than 
cash. [4]
The results of the group in the period 1961 to 1966 
fluctuated considerably, the best year being 1963 when 
post-tax profits of £214,000 were recorded. These shrunk 
to £52,000 in 1965 but recovered to £95,000 in 1966. In
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February of that year the chairman, Mr. H. Scott Thompson 
retired temporarily on medical advice. Mr. Sidney C. 
Smith-Cox, a director of Nuthalls, was appointed to the 
main board of Mount Charlotte Investments. His family had 
also been connected with the Grand Hotel in Bristol since 
the turn of the century. [5]
In July 1966 Mr. H. Scott Thompson resigned as chairman his 
place being taken by a former Conservative M.P. Mr Paul 
Williams. A contributory factor to the resignation of the 
chairman was the company's involvement in radiovision and 
juke boxes. This diversification had proved both 
unfortunate and unprofitable with the chairman having to 
carry the responsibility. The chairman, however, retained 
his shareholding in the company until 1968 at which time he 
sold out to Mr Maxwell Joseph, the well known hotel and 
property dealer whose companies, Grand Metropolitan in 
particular, were in an expansionary mood. Maxwell Joseph 
joined the board of Mount Charlotte in October 1968. 
[6]
PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF EARLY AND MID 1970's
Further hotel acquisitions resulted in the group achieving 
pre-tax profits of £257,298 in 1971 and £292,381 in 1972. 
Maxwell Joseph then attempted, via Mount Charlotte 
Investments, to purchase two brewery companies in the North
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of England. These proposed purchases did not materialise 
and from that point his interest in the company waned. [7] 
He was by then more than fully occupied with his principal 
company Grand Metropolitan which had acquired the brewery 
companies Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in 1971 and Watney in 
the year following. The Watney purchase brought 
considerable organisational complications in its wake which 
left Maxwell Joseph and his directors with many problems to 
solve.
In May 1974 Joseph sold his stake in Mount Charlotte to 
institutional investors amongst whom was Slater Walker 
Securities who built up a 20% stake in the company. As was 
later widely recognised this company was heavily involved 
in the property collapse of 1974-75 and was forced to sell 
its shares in Mount Charlotte at a considerable loss - it 
was reckoned by some sections of the financial press that 
Slater Walker sold for between 3p and 5p per share. In any 
event the share price of Mount Charlotte Investments which 
had seen a high of 40p in 1968 fell to 2.5p in 1976. [8 ]
EXPANSION UNDER ROBERT E.G. PEEL
In March 1977 Sidney C. Smith-Cox was appointed chairman of 
Mount Charlotte Investments. As previously indicated, his 
family had been associated with the Grand Hotel in Bristol 
since the turn of the century, his own association with the
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company dating from the acquisition of Nuthalls in 1961 and 
having been on the main board of the company since 1966. By 
the time of his appointment the company owned and operated 
21 provincial hotels totalling 1,346 bedrooms of which 637 
had private facilities. In addition the company owned Gale 
Lister & Co. Ltd., a wine and spirit company, The Bronte 
Liqueur Company and the Knightsbridge Cake Manufacturing 
Company. There were thus a variety of businesses run with 
a strong property orientation but lacking a distinct group 
image targeted at a specific market segment. [9]
When Sidney Smith-Cox was appointed Chairman he was 67 
years old. He realised that, in order to enhance the 
fortunes of the company, he needed a dynamic young managing 
director who had hands-on experience of the hotel business. 
He found such a person in Robert Peel. Peel's father had 
been a successful businessman with extensive interests in 
the Middle East and in Egypt in particular. Unfortunately, 
as a result of the Suez crisis the father lost a great deal 
of money to the extent that Robert, then aged 16 and 
attending Eton, had to leave school two years early. [10] 
He decided to enter the hotel industry and initially worked 
as a cellarman at the Hyde Park Hotel in London. His 
experience with the Trusthouse Forte group later extended 
to the positions of banqueting manager at Grosvenor House
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Hotel in Park Lane and to General Manager of the restaurant 
complex incorporated in the Hotel Meurice owned and 
operated by the Quagalino brothers. [11]
He thus had the required range of experience sought by 
Smith-Cox. When Robert Peel joined Mount Charlotte in 1977 
he was 30 years old. It was essential for him to take 
decisive action immediately as the majority of the hotel 
stock was in relatively poor condition and therefore 
required considerable capital expenditure to bring it up to 
a competitive standard. As a result of the decline of the 
company very little had recently been spent on the fabric 
and furnishings of each hotel. In turn this had weakened 
occupancy percentages with a consequent adverse effect on 
turnover and profitability. In such circumstances it was 
not surprising that the morale of the staff was generally 
low. [12]
Immediately subsequent to his appointment Robert Peel 
acquired, with borrowed money, 300,000 ordinary shares in 
Mount Charlotte Investments at a cost of 2.5p each. Within 
two years his original stake of £7,500 was worth £75,000. 
By the end of the decade the turnover of the company was 
£9,98M with pre-tax profits of E1.05M. By this time Peel 
had embarked on major schemes of property renovation and 
improvement coupled with the raising of tariffs where 
justified. He saw clearly that there was, in Mount
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Charlotte, the base to build a major hotel company by 
shrewd acquisition of properties which could be upgraded 
subsequent to renovation and refurbishment. The acquisition 
of such properties at realistic prices together with
additional properties that were to come to the market in 
not dissimilar circumstances was to form the basis of the 
growth and successful development of the group throughout 
the 19801 s. [13]
Two entirely separate sets of circumstances contributed to 
the considerable turnover of hotel property in the U.K. in 
general and to London in particular in the period 1981 to
1984. One was the acquisition from Pan American World
Airways of the Intercontinental Group of hotels by Grand 
Metropolitan; the other was the disposal, at the 
instigation of the U.K. government, of the 27 British 
Transport Hotels. Included in the latter group were such 
properties as Gleneagles in Perthshire, Scotland, the 
Midland, Manchester and a large number of desirable
properties in Central London. In order to pay for the 
Intercontinental acquisition Grand Metropolitan, in 
separate deals, sold 12 hotels in central London for some 
£120M together with 26 provincial hotels for £30M. The sale 
gave established groups in the U.K. the opportunity to 
expand their holdings of hotel property. [14].
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PRINCIPAL ACQUISITIONS
The first major London acquisition by Mount Charlotte in 
this period was in June 1982. The London Ryan Hotel with 
213 bedrooms was acquired at a total cost of £3.2M of which 
£0. 5M was satisfied by the issue of shares in Mount 
Charlotte and the balance in cash in a series of 
instalments. [15] This was followed early in 1983 by the 
acquisition from Trusthouse Forte of four London properties 
- The Park Court and Whites Hotel in Bayswater, The 
Bayswater Post House and the Kingsley Hotel in Holborn. 
The four properties comprised 847 bedrooms and the 
consideration was £19M cash. This was financed by a medium 
term bank loan secured on the properties of £5.4M together 
with the proceeds of a rights issue which raised £13.6M 
(net). [16]
The next major move was in London where Mount Charlotte 
Investments acquired from Grand Metropolitan at a combined 
cost of £21.5M the 713 room Mount Royal hotel in Oxford 
Street and the 307 room Kennedy Hotel at Euston. Both were 
leasehold properties with, in the case of the Mount Royal, 
3 0 years of the lease remaining. Subsequent to acquisition 
Mount Charlotte Investments negotiated a fresh 125 year 
lease on this property for £9M from the freeholder, the 
Portman Family Settled Estates, and embarked on a major 
scheme of refurbishment. [17]
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The following year Mount Charlotte Investments acquired the 
Skean Dhu group, which was based in Aberdeen, for £27,7M. 
this group owned and operated three hotels in Aberdeen, one 
in Glasgow and one in Irvine, Ayrshire. These five hotels, 
all of which had been constructed from scratch since 1972, 
comprised 1,040 bedrooms including the 316 bedroom hotel in 
Glasgow, which, in terms of bedrooms, was the largest hotel 
in Scotland. The transaction was financed via an 
institutional placing of Mount Charlotte shares which 
raised £27M. This enabled the company to purchase for cash 
the majority of the Skean Dhu shares and, at the same time 
to re-finance certain Skean Dhu loan stock on more 
favourable terms. The importance of the Skean Dhu 
acquisition from the Mount Charlotte viewpoint was that it 
resulted in the company becoming the second largest hotel 
operator in the U.K. after the Trusthouse Forte group. By 
1985 the company owned and operated 47 hotels with a 
roomstock of 5,638 throughout the U.K. [18]
The principal reason why Mount Charlotte was able to 
acquire the 1,040 roomstock of Skean Dhu for as little as 
£27.7M - equivalent to £26,635 per bedroom - was that Skean 
Dhu had little experience of hotel operations. For example 
the Glasgow hotel was producing room occupancies of only 
25%. This, combined with other major operational problems
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and deficiencies, including overstaffing, resulted in the 
property losing as much as £5,000 per week at operating 
level. [19]
To overcome this problem Mount Charlotte appointed a new 
general manager, Alastair McMurrich, who had enjoyed a 
classical training with the Savoy Hotel Company which had 
included a spell as assistant banqueting manager at 
Claridges. McMurrich and his management team rapidly 
eradicated the major problems and over a two year period 
turned round the fortunes of the hotel to such effect that 
latterly it enjoyed occupancies on a par with its two major 
competitors, the Glasgow Holiday Inn and the Albany, owned 
and operated by Trusthouse Forte. As a result of his 
initial efforts McMurrich was appointed operations director 
for Scotland. [20]
Whilst 1985 was a relatively quiet year for Mount Charlotte 
in terms of acquisitions 1986 and 1987 saw major advances. 
During 1986 a total of £22.5M was expended on new 
properties, the major part, £15.7M being the acquisition 
from Chrysalis Pic of the Kingsmead Hotel Group which owned 
and operated seven hotels comprising 399 rooms, the 
majority in the provinces. In addition refurbishment 
schemes were put in hand at hotels recently acquired, 
notably at the 350 room Royal Scot at King's Cross, London, 
formerly owned by Scottish & Newcastle Breweries. [21]
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The year 1987 saw three major acquisitions which were to 
propel Mount Charlotte to the forefront of the U.K. hotel 
industry with special emphasis upon London where by the end 
of that year the group possessed a roomstock of no less 
than 4,377. In March of that year the group commenced 
negotiations with Rushkale/London Park for the acquisition 
of three hotels in central London together with an hotel at 
Heathrow Airport. The combined roomstock of the four 
hotels was 850. This transaction, at a cost of £38M and 
financed by way of an exchange of shares, was completed in 
April. Two of the hotels, located at Piccadilly in Central 
London and in Kensington, required extensive refurbishment 
work which continued after completion. [22]
The second major acquisition in that year was the purchase 
from the International Leisure Group of three major hotels 
in London with a combined roomstock of 1,049. Two of the 
properties, the Charing Cross Hotel with 218 rooms and the 
Grosvenor at Victoria with 360 rooms, had originally been 
owned and operated by British Transport Hotels whilst the 
third, the New Barbican with 471 rooms was a new hotel 
having been opened as recently as 1985. The New Barbican 
was purchased as a freehold property whilst the others were 
held on long leases of more than 120 years at a peppercorn 
rent. [23]
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The consideration for the three hotels was £96M which was 
financed via an open offer arranged by merchant bankers
Robert Fleming which raised £99M. This method of financing 
was chosen as it was cheaper than a rights issue. The 
majority of the shares were taken up by the institutions 
but provision, on a favourable basis, was also made for the 
smaller shareholder. [24] Then in the autumn the company 
acquired from Ladbrokes eight smaller hotels in Scotland 
and two in the north of England with a total roomstock of 
879 for £18•65M. [25]
The overall result of the 1987 acquisitions was to increase 
the total number of hotels within the group to 68 with a 
bedroom capacity of almost 9000 of which slightly more than 
50% were in London. In terms of rooms the company had 
grown to become the second largest in the U.K. exceeded
only by Trusthouse Forte. As has been shown the growth was 
brought about entirely by acquisition, in many cases of 
properties which had long term potential and the ability to 
be upgraded with a view to obtaining improved room rates 
and consequently greater potential profitability. The 
expansion had been in all areas of the U.K. but the greater 
part was focussed on London which, although involving 
substantial capital outlay, had the merit of higher annual
occupancies and a lesser degree of seasonality than
provincial properties. After long negotiations with 
Edinburgh District Council the company announced in the
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spring of 1988 that it would build a 288 bedroom hotel 
together with a multi-purpose convention centre capable of 
handling 2,500 delegates. This venture, to be located near 
Edinburgh city centre, was capitalised at £45M all of 
which, at least initially, to be funded by Mount Charlotte 
Investments. [26]
FINANCIAL RESULTS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
When Robert Peel took over as Managing Director he was 
faced with a particular problem as far as pricing was 
concerned because the properties were of widely differing 
standards and in scattered locations throughout the U.K. 
As additional properties were acquired he decided to 
apportion them to distinct market segments, each aimed at 
separate markets and price ranges. The result of this 
approach saw the company emerge with five distinct 
groupings - Luxury City Centre Hotels of which there are 5, 
Hospitality Inns of which there are 10, city centre hotels, 
the largest group, of which there are 29, country hotels of 
which there are 21 and finally budget hotels of which there 
are only 3 and which comprises a mere 152 rooms.
The great majority of city centre and country hotels are 
three star, the Hospitality Inns and the luxury city centre 
hotels are four star whilst one of the London properties 
enjoys a five star rating. The room rate for the majority
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of three and four star properties is (at 1988 prices) in 
the range £35 to £55 per night in the provinces and £50 to 
£75 in London. These represent the rack rates but there 
are significant discounts for corporate clients and for 
groups of .over 20 people. [27] The overall aim of the 
pricing strategy is to maximise occupancies rather than to 
sell only at rack rate. This produces greater revenue both 
for accommodation and for attendant food and beverage sales 
outlets.
As may be seen from the financial summary, group turnover 
has climbed steeply between 1983 and 1987 as the result of 
major acquisitions. Despite the costs associated with 
acquisitions the return on sales (trading profit) has 
improved each year from 1983 when it was 22.8% to 1987 by 
which time it had risen to 35.0%. These figures saw Mount 
Charlotte being placed second only to Glaxo in a league 
table compiled by Management Today in February 1987. [28].
In the words of a Mount Charlotte director the results stem 
from the Mount Charlotte policy of "very close control of 
hotel operations and concentrating on filling hotels at a 
reasonable price to the consumer rather than partially 
filling them at a higher price". The early success of the 
policies spearheaded by Robert Peel gave confidence to 
joint stock banks and city institutions who gained 
increasing respect for the managerial abilities of the 
company. Robert Peel's brother, Charles, a partner in the
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stockbroking firm of Fielding, Newson-Smith & Co. played an 
important role in raising the city profile of Mount 
Charlotte. It was by such means that the company was able 
to raise finance via open offers, institutional placings 
and medium term loans. The raising of substantial tranches 
of finance at competitive rates helped ensure the cost of 
acquisitions remained reasonable and did not result in 
undue pressure being put on operational profits via 
interest charges (Table 3 - 1).
The financial summary also indicates the conservative 
dividend policy adopted by the company whereby the ratio of 
post tax profits to dividend has been maintained at 
approximately 4:1 in the period 1983 to 1987. In turn the 
high level of retentions has enabled the necessary amount 
of refurbishment to take place thus ensuring the 
competitive standard of the properties. [29] One feature 
of the company which places it in a minority when compared 
with the majority of its competitors is that it does not 
revalue its properties regularly. The revaluation of hotel 
properties, certainly in recent years, has had the effect 
of lowering the rate of return on capital invested as 
property valuations have moved significantly upwards.
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TABLE 3 - 1
MOUNT CHARLOTTE INVESTMENTS PLc and SUBSIDIARIES 
- FINANCIAL SUMMARY
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
£’000 £'000 £'000 £•000 £*000
Turnover 26,694 43,740 60,283 64,913 93,358
Profit before 
Interest
6,303 12,002 18,561 21,693 33,726
Interest Payable 1,707 1,975 2,502 3,052 4,685
Profit before 
Taxation
4,596 10,027 16,059 18,641 29,041
Taxation 537 1,538 2,990 3,767 6,942
Profit after 
Taxation
4,059 8,489 13,069 14,879 22,100
Extraordinary
Items
- 315 - - 289
Profit for 
Financial Year
4,059 8,804 13,069 14,874 22,389
Dividends 1,250 2,164 2,964 3,557 5,637
Profit retained 2,809 6,640 10,105 11,317 16,752
Earnings per 
share (net)
4. lOp 5.20p 6. 30p 6.90p 8.30p
Dividends 
per share
1.03p 1.20p 1.40p 1.63p 1.90p
Net Tangible 
Assets (£’000)
50,902 96,190 115,177 127,198 282,347
Source: Published Accounts 1987
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When Mount Charlotte eventually revalued its properties in 
1988 substantial surpluses were disclosed with the total 
property portfolio shown to be worth close to £1 billion. 
This, of course, reflected not only the general rise in 
hotel property values but the improvements made to run-down 
and unprofitable hotels by competent management. The 
success of Mount Charlotte in recent years clearly stems 
from the partnership of Sidney Smith-Cox and Robert Peel 
which, since the appointment of the latter to the post of 
managing director in 1977, transformed the fortunes of the 
company.
It is interesting to note that the modus operandi of Robert 
Peel centres on a very small board of directors, four in 
total, with only Kenneth Pawson, the company secretary and 
himself as executive directors operating from the company 
head office in Leeds whilst the chairman has an office in 
Bristol and the non-executive director works in the city of 
London as an investment fund manager. Consequently control 
of the company and the major decision process is vested in 
Robert Peel and Kenneth Pawson. Peel takes the view that 
this style of management is best suited to the company's 
needs particularly where rapid decisions regarding 
acquisitions have to be made. Indeed with just Pawson and 
himself in executive control the management style is akin
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to a partnership with each knowing the other's mind and 
able to respond rapidly to advice, suggestions or 
opportunities that may arise. [30]
For both of them having their head office in Leeds is a 
considerable bonus. Rents and rates are much cheaper and 
the momentum of the company is such that the morale of head 
office staff is maintained at a high level. Kenneth Pawson 
commented "if I arrive at 7.30a.m. some staff are already 
here and if I leave at 10.00p.m. the situation is similar". 
There are marked advantages for staff compared with London 
in terms of commuting time, house prices, quality of life 
and the like. [31]
Clearly the confidence in the company that Robert Peel has 
engendered within the City of London has been especially 
important in successfully completing major acquisitions in 
the period 1984 to 1988. It is difficult to identify which 
deal in the 1984-1988 period will turn out to be the most 
profitable for the company but it may well be that the 
acquisition of the Mount Royal with its 700 plus bedrooms, 
together with the Kennedy with 300 plus bedrooms, will be 
ranked as high as any. Grand Metropolitan were criticised 
for selling off their London hotels too quickly and too 
cheaply - six years on the price paid by Mount Charlotte 
now seems like a bargain despite the subsequent costs of 
refurbishment and the negotiations for a fresh lease.
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Despite the significant rise in hotel property values in 
recent years it is likely that there will still be 
opportunities for Mount Charlotte to make further 
acquisitions thus strengthening their competitive position 
and increasing their market share. Simultaneously, as some 
of their major competitors have already done, Mount 
Charlotte may decide to expand on the continent of Europe, 
both via acquisition and management contracts.
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2. NORFOLK CAPITAL GROUP PLc
Chairman Anthony Richmond-Watson 
Managing Director Peter Eyles
INTRODUCTION
The post war origins of Norfolk Capital may be traced to 
1946 when Maxwell Joseph acquired the Norfolk Hotel (Hove) 
Limited. He subsequently sold the hotel but retained the 
company which carried a London stock exchange listing. 
During the next two decades, whilst expanding his hotel 
interests in London, Maxwell Joseph simultaneously made 
opportunistic purchases of hotel property in the West of 
England and Wales. His interest in this part of the 
country stemmed partly from owning a large country house at 
Melksham in Gloucestershire to which, particularly in the 
early and mid 1960's, he would often retreat of a Thursday 
evening returning to London the following Monday morning. 
[1]
Properties were acquired in Gloucestershire at Tetbury and 
Gloucester, in Somerset at Bath and Weston super Mare, in 
Warwickshire at Warwick, in Wiltshire at Chippenham 
together with properties at Cardiff and Swansea. The 
properties were mostly old, built at the turn of the 
century or earlier and consequently required substantial 
expenditure to maintain the furnishings and fittings let 
alone the fabric. All the hotels were controlled from
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Maxwell Joseph's small corporate office in Mayfair, London. 
Each was constituted as a private limited company but in 
due course the companies were reversed into Norfolk to form 
a group. After 1966 when Maxwell Joseph embarked on a 
dazzling series of acquisitions which transformed Grand 
Metroplitan from a medium sized company in the hotel 
business to one of the largest industrial groups in the 
U.K., the west country hotels, understandably, received 
less than their fair share of attention. [2]
MIXED FORTUNES 1973 - 1981
The west country group enjoyed mixed fortunes during the 
1970's. In June 1973 Associated Hotels, a London based 
company which included the Kensington Palace Hotel and 
Norfolk Hotel, South Kensington was acquired. Shortly 
afterwards the group was severely affected by the 
quadrupling of oil prices and the recession of 1973 to 1975 
with the result that the shares were suspended until 
towards the end of 1975. By 1979, subsequent to a series 
of sales and purchases of various properties the group 
comprised 17 hotels with a roomstock of 1800. Turnover 
grew steadily to the point where, in 1979, it was E8.59M 
with pre-tax profits of £914,000. This was barely 
acceptable and the group lacked a distinct corporate image.
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It was not held in high esteem by institutional investors 
who regarded it as peripheral to the main business 
interests of Maxwell Joseph. [3]
In October .of 1980, the year he was awarded a knighthood, 
Maxwell Joseph appointed his son-in-law Peter Eyles as a 
non-executive director for Norfolk. His previous career had 
been in sales, marketing and advertising in firms outwith 
the hotel industry. In addition, however, he had also run 
his own property company through which he first came to 
know Maxwell Joseph. He was appointed managing director 
after a period of six months and immediately set about 
re-organising the company. When he joined the 
administration of the company was divided between London 
and Bath and the head office personnel had grown to more 
than forty. In a short space of time Eyles reduced this by 
more than a half, devolving considerable responsibility 
onto individual hotel managers. He reorganised the sales 
and marketing staff, directing the thrust of their efforts 
towards direct selling to business rather than tourist 
clients, simultaneously ensuring that they operated in 
close contact with the hotel managers. Furthermore he 
instituted a management development programme to upgrade 
the capability of managers, especially in the areas of 
sales and marketing. In addition a bonus incentive scheme 
was applied to give managers a stake in the improving 
profitability of their units. [4]
- 180 -
The following year saw a marked decline in the health of 
Sir Maxwell Joseph and in June 1982 he appointed his wife, 
Lady Eileen Joseph to the board. Subsequent to Sir 
Maxwell's death in September 1982 Lady Joseph became 
chairman. Additional board members were James McGuffie, an 
independent hotel consultant who had originally joined 
Maxwell Joseph's organisation in 1957, had been appointed a 
non-executive director in 1969 and who latterly had 
occupied a senior sales and marketing position with Grand 
Metropolitan, and Anthony Good of Good Public Relations. 
The group was adversely affected by the recession of 
1980/81 and in the immediate aftermath the board determined 
to dispose of unwanted properties, to refurbish selected 
existing properties and to embark on a series of carefully 
targeted acquisitions. [5]
In the first phase of disposal, carried out in the period 
March to September 1982 four hotels and three investment 
properties were sold realising a total of £3,019,501 
against a book value of £2,628,500. The only acquisition 
was the freehold of the four star, 100 bedroom Angel Hotel 
in Cardiff purchased in January 1982 from the major brewer 
Whitbread at a cost of £850,000. Capital Gains Tax arising 
from disposals was absorbed by rollover and other reliefs 
available to the company. [6]
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The bulk of the net proceeds was diverted to the 
modernisation and refurbishment of two of the principal 
London properties, the Royal Court Hotel in Sloane Square 
SW1 and the Norfolk Hotel in South Kensington SW7. The 
improvements at each hotel were of such magnitude that the 
Royal Court was closed from September 1984 until December 
1985, partially re-opened in January 1986 and made fully 
operational by the spring of that year. These closures 
made heavy inroads to the level of group profits but the 
wisdom of radical improvement was fully vindicated within 
weeks of each property operating at full capacity. So well 
did the Royal Court perform in the year to September 1983 
that the manager of the hotel, as a result of the 
management incentive scheme, was, for that year, the 
highest paid employee (directors included) within the 
group. [7]
The refurbishment and operation of the Royal Court typified 
the fresh management strategy that Peter Eyles wished to 
implement at each of the hotels. The refurbishment was 
carried out to a high standard with custom built, free 
standing furniture imported from Italy being used for all 
the bedrooms. This was felt to be a useful marketing tool 
as it was a cut above the standardised built-in furniture 
and fittings which were representative of competing 
establishments. [8]
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Furthermore each bedroom floor had a different decor and 
design theme - again this was an added attraction compared 
with the bulk of the competition. The restaurant, named 
The Old Poodle Dog, the wine bar and the lounge bar were so 
constructed as to enable them to be run as separate 
businesses with many customers being unaware that they were 
in fact an integral part of the hotel. This allowed 
distinct market segments to be tapped for each area of the 
business and thus improved turnover and profitability. [9]
RE-FINANCING OF BANK LOANS
Towards the end of 1981 group borrowings had been heading 
towards £10M and this high level of gearing had made the 
company vulnerable to even modest falls in turnover or 
increases in costs. During 1982 the opportunity was taken 
to rearrange the loan facilities of the group as follows:
a) a bank loan for £4M for a period of 10 years from 23rd 
July 1982 repayable in annual tranches, the first 
repayment of £250,000 being due on 23rd July 1985;
b) a bank overdraft of up to £1.5M repayable on demand;
c) a standby facility of £1.5M for a period of three years
commencing 12th July 1982. [10]
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When Lady Joseph took over as chairman she held in her own 
right 29.9% of the equity. The next largest shareholding 
was held by the Kuwait Investment Office with 15%. Other 
hotel groups, notably Stakis and Kennedy Brookes, took a 
stake in the company with a possible view to proceeding to 
a full take over bid. None emerged and these two holdings 
were subsequently sold on the open market. [11]
A NEW PHASE OF EXPANSION 1984 - 1987
During the following eighteen months management attention 
was directed towards building fresh markets for the
refurbished hotels. In May 1984 the company raised E3.2M 
by way of a rights issue, unconventionally issuing its 
shares at par in the ratio of 7 to 2. The reason for this 
was to eliminate the speculative element in the shares at 
the time which would have otherwise prejudiced the 
availability of this source of finance. The company was 
advised by Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd., brokers to the 
issue being Grievson, Grant and Co. Morgan Grenfell was 
an interesting choice insofar as Sir Maxwell Joseph had 
been advised throughout his career by their arch rivals
S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd. Nevertheless the choice of Morgan 
Grenfell was to have considerable implications for the
group as Lady Joseph appointed the bank director who 
handled the account, Anthony Richmond-Watson, to the board
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on 28th July 1984. In due course, at Lady Joseph's 
request, he became chairman of the company in June 1986. 
[12]
Peter Eylea realised that in order to move the group up 
market and to obtain comprehensive geographical coverage of 
the U.K. it would be essential to acquire existing hotels 
of a high standard. Simultaneously he realised that to 
obtain worthwhile property required painstaking research 
and not a little patience. In his search for suitable 
property he was assisted by a property agent who worked for 
him on a "no sale, no fee basis" and by James Baker, a 
senior partner in Weatherall, Green, Smith, Chartered 
Surveyors, who had extensive experience of hotel valuation. 
[13]
The first set of properties to catch his eye were the 
twenty-nine hotels owned and operated by British Transport 
Hotels which, at the instigation of the government, were to 
be disposed of either as a single group or in collective 
lots. Initial information regarding these properties was 
made available early in 1981. Eyles set his sights on 
bidding for four properties - Gleneagles, The North British 
and Caledonian in Edinburgh together with the Charing Cross 
in London. He reckoned that a viable bid would be in the 
order of £15M or slightly more. [14] At this stage, 
regrettably, the group did not enjoy the backing of a bank
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as powerful as Morgan Grenfell, and consequently Eyles was 
not in a position to bid. Nothing daunted he lowered his 
sights somewhat and concentrated on acquiring one suitable 
property in the north of England and one near London. To 
achieve completion each property took more than two years.
In September 1984 the group acquired the Old Swan Hotel in 
Harrogate from Leisuretime International for E2.25M. This 
well known property, a grade II listed building, was 
originally constructed in the eighteenth century with later 
additions in the 19th century. It was of four star 
standard with 140 bedrooms and 8.5 acres of ground, some of 
which was available for future expansion and development. 
The consideration for the Old Swan Hotel was satisfied by 
the allotment of 13,798,391 new Ordinary Shares of 5p each 
in the company, all of which were placed by Morgan Grenfell 
on behalf of the vendors through the market at 16.5p per 
share. [15]
This was an important coup for Norfolk and brought the 
added bonus that the company was subsequently able to 
dispose of the 2 star Granby hotel in Harrogate. Further 
disposals included the Norbreck Castle Hotel in Blackpool, 
which catered for the mass tourist market and the New 
County Hotel in Gloucester which was impracticable to 
refurbish to a 4 star standard. These two disposals 
fetched £3.2M.
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Norfolk was able, in October 1985, to complete the purchase 
of the Briggens Hotel near Ware in Hertfordshire on which 
Peter Eyles had been working for more than two years. The 
Briggens Hotel was originally built as a country house in 
the eighteenth century and, like the Old Swan, was a listed 
building. It had been converted to an hotel in 1982 and had 
rapidly achieved 4 star status. The property was set in 45 
acres of parkland in which there had been constructed a 
nine hole golf course. In addition the hotel had tennis 
courts and an outdoor swimming pool and enjoyed fishing 
rights on the river Stort. The consideration of £2.9M was 
satisfied by the allotment of 14,310,980 new ordinary 
shares in the company, all of which were placed by Morgan 
Grenfell on behalf of the vendors through the market at 
20.5p per share. [16]
In May 1986 the board of Norfolk announced that 
negotiations had been finalised for the construction from 
scratch of a 124 bedroom, four star property at Reading in 
Berkshire at a capital cost of some £7M. An added 
advantage of this development was that it was located at a 
particularly attractive site by the river Thames. This was 
the first such development by Norfolk but it was in tune 
with the overall strategy of the group to acquire suitable 
property in prosperous parts of the U.K. The development 
was financed by an eight year loan, secured by guarantees, 
commencing February 1989. [17]
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Each of these three moves, Harrogate, Ware and Reading 
served to bring the Norfolk Capital group up market and to 
give the company a higher public profile. In the spring of 
1986 Peter Eyles, still in an acquisitive frame of mind, 
noted the public interest surrounding the Guinness group 
and its acquisition of The Distillers Company Limited for 
£2.5 billion which had been finalised in April 1986. 
Previously, in August 1985, Guinness had acquired the 
whisky firm Arthur Bell & Co., for £375M. In turn Bells 
had acquired, in February 1984, the Gleneagles group which 
originally had been formed in 1981 comprising Gleneagles 
itself together with the North British and Caledonian in 
Edinburgh - the very hotels over which Peter Eyles formerly 
had cast a speculative and acquisitive eye. By the time 
they were acquired by Bells, the Gleneagles group had 
acquired and entered into a costly refurbishment contract 
for the Piccadilly Hotel in London which they acquired from 
Grand Metropolitan. [18]
Almost immediately after the acquisition of Distillers had 
been finalised, Guinness sold the Piccadilly Hotel to the 
hotel subsidiary of Air France for £31M. Guinness, 
however, retained the health and leisure club which had 
been constructed by Gleneagles in the basement of the hotel 
at a cost of £4.5M. This fitted in with the other health 
and leisure centres owned by Guinness. Guinness also made
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clear that whilst it intended to retain Gleneagles itself 
it would consider bids for the Caledonian and the North 
British.
ACQUISITION OF THE CALEDONIAN AND NORTH BRITISH 
HOTELS IN EDINBURGH
A number of other hotel groups were interested in acquiring 
the Edinburgh hotels. Scottish & Newcastle Breweries who 
were headquartered in the city perceived the properties as 
having especial attraction. Mount Charlotte Investments 
had been examining possible sites in the city and they also 
showed interest as did Trusthouse Forte who were under 
represented in Scotland generally and in Edinburgh 
particularly. Alick Rankin, the chief executive of 
Scottish & Newcastle had approached Guinness as early as 
the summer of 1985 to enquire as to whether the two hotels 
might be available. At that time the official Guinness line 
was that they were not for sale. Rankin, however, knew 
personally the chairman and chief executive of Guinness, 
Ernest Saunders, and harboured hopes that the two 
properties might eventually come on the market.
In the year that Gleneagles Hotels PLc was formed the 
hotels' valuers Christies had valued the Caledonian at 
£2.8M and the North British at E2.33M. [14] In the years
immediately prior to the formation of Gleneagles Hotels,
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the Caledonian had been just breaking even, at operating 
level, on a turnover of between £2M and £2.25M whilst the 
North British produced remarkably similar figures with 
marginally lower tariffs. Under the direction of Peter 
Tyrie and -aided by substantial capital investment, 
especially at the Caledonian, where £4.5M was spent, the
turnover figures were increased to in excess of £6M for the
Caledonian in the year to December 1985. The turnover 
figures for the North British are unavailable but it may be 
presumed that they were substantially less than those of 
the Caledonian. [19] This is due to the fact that the North 
British received only minimal capital investment in the 
period 1981 - 1985 and that the tariffs were lower. There 
were further complications at the North British surrounding 
the proposed redevelopment of the entire property with the 
projected capital costs of various schemes ranging from 
£10M to £50M.
As Guinness were using Morgan Grenfell Laurie, the property 
arm of Morgan Grenfell, to advise on the disposal of the 
two hotels Norfolk did not use Morgan Grenfell for advice 
on the purchase of the hotels but only to effect the
financing following the agreement in principle of terms 
with Guinness. Tony Richmond-Watson was involved, as a
principal, in the decisions taken by Norfolk but was not 
favoured in any way by Guinness and was not privy to the 
advice being given by Laurie to Guinness. [20]
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Norfolk was in a slightly different position from 
Trusthouse Forte, Scottish & Newcastle and Mount Charlotte. 
Each of these companies already had hotels in Scotland and 
they were used to driving hard bargains for properties they 
acquired. On the other hand Norfolk was relatively a much 
smaller company and had no properties in Scotland - the 
opportunity to purchase the five star Caledonian was a 
considerable attraction and, to Norfolk, justified a 
premium price. In the event Norfolk submitted two bids to 
Guinness - one for the Caledonian alone and one for both 
properties. Subsequent to an outline agreement with 
Guinness Peter Eyles instructed Weatherall, Green & Smith 
to carry out full structural surveys of the two properties 
and to confirm their preliminary valuations. [21]
The survey uncovered unexpected faults in the Caledonian 
which led them to reduce their combined valuation to 
£23.5M, £18.5M for the Caledonian and £5M for the North 
British. This was £1.5M less than the £25M which Norfolk 
had agreed with Guiness for both properties and led to 
lively meetings to persuade Guinness to accept that 
significant remedial work, of which they had not taken 
account, was necessary. Having achieved this in May 
Guinness effectively withdrew from the final stage of 
negotiating the agreement owing to the pressures imposed by 
the "Thomas Risk" affair which plagued Guinness throughout 
the summer of 1986. Once Ernest Saunders, chairman and
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chief executive of Guinness was able to gain shareholder 
support at an extraordinary meeting held in London on 11th 
September, Peter Eyles and Tony Richmond-Watson were 
relieved to see the negotiations resurrected. Even then 
considerable uncertainty remained as to the outcome, 
principally as a consequence of Guinness' requirement to 
accommodate the proposed development of the North British. 
Nevertheless, by the end of September, agreement was 
finally reached and completion dates arranged for the sale 
of both properties.
Both Tony Richmond-Watson and Peter Eyles perceived the 
acquisition of the Caledonian and North British as the most 
important single event in the development of the Norfolk 
Capital Group. [22]. The acquisition, at a stroke, almost 
double the size of the group, brought it into the five star 
market, gave it greater credibility both within the 
industry and with institutional investors and paved the way 
for future acquisitions in the four and five star market. 
The acquisition costs were met mainly by a rights issue of 
115,900,832 5p shares at a price of 18.5p per share. This 
raised £20.2M net of expenses with the balance being met by 
the internal resources of the group. [23]
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An additional long term attraction, especially to Norfolk 
compared with the other bidders, was the significant 
property redevelopment that was scheduled to take place in 
the environs of each hotel. The authorities in Edinburgh 
had been trying for a number of years to attract private 
sector investment to construct a conference centre on land 
adjacent to the Caledonian. The directors of Norfolk 
reckoned that the Caledonian would be a major beneficiary 
were such redevelopment to take place - the other major 
beneficiary would be the Sheraton Hotel, opened in 1985, 
located to the south of the proposed conference centre. 
Regrettably, even by the end of 1987 the combined efforts 
of Norfolk, the Scottish Development Agency, Edinburgh 
District Council and Lothian Regional Council failed to 
produce an acceptable plan which had the agreement of all 
parties concerned. [24]
The property redevelopment plans for the North British were 
even more fraught and towards the end of 1987 Norfolk 
realised that the optimum approach to the problem would be 
to redevelop the entire site by themselves. This would 
necessitate the closure of the North British for a period 
of two to three years and entail expenditure on the hotel 
alone of some £12M to £15M to bring it up to the same 
standard as the Caledonian. [25]
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In the short term the entry costs to the Edinburgh hotel 
market proved expensive for Norfolk. The cost of the 
Caledonian in particular was judged by some to be high at 
the time. The marked increase in hotel property values 
since then, however, has largely vindicated the decision. 
Longer term judgement on the Edinburgh hotels must wait 
until the mid 1990's by which time the North British will 
have been fully refurbished and hopefully the capital will 
have a conference centre of international standard.
FURTHER ACQUISITIONS IN THE 1980's
In January 1987 the opportunity came for Norfolk to bid for 
a group of four country house hotels, each with a four star 
rating. They were privately controlled by a Canadian, who, 
being in his seventies, was approaching the time when he 
wished to dispose of his assets in the U.K. [26] Peter 
Eyles had spent time cultivating his acquaintance and the 
acquisition by Norfolk of the Caledonian together with the 
refurbishment of the Royal Court and the Norfolk had 
favourably impressed the Canadian who decided to sell the 
four properties to Norfolk. Thus for the sum of £15.3M the 
group was able to purchase four properties with a total of 
184 bedrooms with extensive conference facilities. The 
hotels were situated in Kent, Berkshire, Worcestershire and
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Warwickshire and each had the added advantage of being set 
in their own grounds which ranged from 9 to 62 acres as 
indicated below.
Kent Eastwell Manor 24 bedrooms
grounds extend to 62 acres
Berkshire Oakley Court 92 bedrooms
grounds extend to 25 acres
Worcestershire The Elms Hotel 27 bedrooms
grounds extend to 9 acres
Warwickshire Billesley Manor 41 bedrooms
grounds extend to 9 acres
The consideration was satisfied via an institutional 
placing of 61.2M shares at 25p per share arranged via 
Morgan Grenfell. This was an extremely sound purchase for 
Norfolk. Not only did it emphasise the role of the group 
in the country house hotel market but it gave a useful 
geographical spread from Kent to the Midlands. As a result 
of the subsequent rise in hotel property values Peter Eyles 
found that he would have been able to sell, within little 
over a year of acquisition, one of the hotels for as much 
as the group paid for all four. [27]
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Later in the year Norfolk was able to acquire a four star 
property with 45 bedrooms, The Royal Crescent Hotel in Bath 
for £7.5M thus enabling the company to dispose of the Royal 
York Hotel in the same city. The Royal York had been owned 
by the group since the 1950's. It was in an inferior 
location to the Royal Crescent and refurbishment, which had 
been planned, would have cost some £4.5M.
Subsequent to meetings between Peter Eyles and Peter de 
Savary Norfolk was able to set in hand arrangements to 
acquire the St. James's Clubs in London and Paris at a 
combined cost of £22M. Between them the clubs had 91
bedrooms thus the acquisition cost was in excess of
£200,000 per bedroom. [28] In addition Norfolk obtained an 
option to acquire the St. James's Club, Los Angeles, which 
was due to open in early 1988.
In order to pay for these Norfolk raised £44.2M (net of 
expenses) via a 1 to 3 rights issue of 102,655,884 5p
shares at a price of 45p per share, the issue being
underwritten by Morgan Grenfell. [29] It was a matter of 
regret that while the issue price of 45p seemed reasonable 
in comparison to the market price of 51p at the time of 
issue the whole market turned soft shortly afterwards and 
Norfolk suffered from institutional reaction to the 
financing of other major acquisitions.
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Less than 20% of the shares were taken up leaving the bulk 
with the underwriters. The stock market crash of 19th 
October occurred only six weeks after the issue was 
finalised. The shares, which earlier in the year had 
reached more than 50p, fell back sharply and by the end of 
the year had recovered to only 25p, 2Op below the issue
price. Norfolk, had, nevertheless, obtained the 
necessary finance to fund the acquisition on, in 
retrospect, very favourable terms. In turn the 
underwriters took substantial losses: some of them sold
their shares at a loss at the end of 1987 while others have 
written down their holdings having taken a long term view 
of the future success of the company. The view of the 
chairman, Tony Richmond-Watson, was that it was merely "a 
technical position that has to be unwound." Clearly a 
degree of sangfroid is an asset under such circumstances. 
[30]
Interest had also been taken in Westin Hotels which was a 
substantial USA group which controlled 66 hotels throughout 
the USA, Central America, Canada and the Far East. Its 
parent company was the Allegis Corporation which earlier in 
the year had sold Hilton International to Ladbroke for $1 
billion and Hertz for $1.3 billion. The price it put on 
Westin was similar to that for Hilton International. 
Initially there were as many as fifty interested buyers but 
this was whittled down first to fifteen and then to five.
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It was a major undertaking for Norfolk who, at the time, 
were capitalised at approximately one third of the value of 
Westin. Peter Eyles spent a week in New York with some two 
dozen advisers from Morgan Grenfell, Peat Marwick McLintock 
and Weatherall, Green & Smith analysing the details made 
available by the vendors. [31]
Unfortunately the stock market crash put paid to hopes that 
Norfolk would be able to put in a realistic bid for the 
group which was sold subsequently to a Texan oil family. 
Nevertheless, Peter Eyles felt that it had been a useful 
exercise and that it gave both Norfolk and its professional 
advisers the feel for mounting a similar exercise should 
the occasion present itself and considerable knowledge of 
the USA which was put to good use six months later when 
Norfolk decided to exercise its option to acquire the St. 
James's Club, Los Angeles. [32]
The results for the year to December 1987 showed turnover 
of £32.2M and pre-tax profits of £5.2M. Despite the 
acquisitions made during the year the company was keen to 
acquire further properties judging that "Only in a period 
of absolute bear market frenzy would it become difficult to 
finance suitable purchases" (Table 3 -2).  [33]
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PERFORMANCE OF NORFOLK CAPITAL 1984 - 1987
During the period 1984 to 1987, via a strategy of 
acquisition, the group grew dramatically with net tangible 
assets moving from £12M at the end of 1983 to £153M by the 
end of 1987. [34] It should be noted, however, that whilst 
the capital costs of refurbishment of the London hotels, 
together with the acquisition of Celebrated Country Hotels 
may be judged reasonable the later purchases, particularly 
the St. James's Clubs must be judged as being relatively 
expensive. On the one hand they may be justified on the 
basis of the likely long term appreciation of high quality 
property but it is more difficult to justify them on the 
basis of current profits and rate of return on capital 
invested. It could be argued that the full price paid for 
the St James's Clubs was reflected in the disappointing 
level of take up of the 1987 rights issue.
The geographic spread of hotels throughout the U.K. is 
concentrated in and around London and the Home Counties. 
The remainder are divided between the West Country, the 
West Midlands and Edinburgh. It remains to be seen whether 
buying opportunities arise in major English provincial 
cities which, if taken, would result in a more balanced 
property portfolio. It should also be noted that financing 
fresh acquisitions became more difficult from mid 1988 as a 
result of rising interest rates.
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All told there is no doubt that Norfolk Capital made 
impressive strides both in the quality of its properties 
and the ability of its management throughout the 19801 s. 
In particular the combination of the property dealing 
skills of Peter Eyles linked to the finance raising ability 
of Tony Richmond-Watson and Morgan Grenfell has been a 
potent factor in the growth and development of the company.
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TABLE 3 - 2
NORFOLK CAPITAL GROUP 
FINANCIAL RESULTS 1983 - 1987
The results of the efforts of Peter Eyles and his management may be 
judged by the following financial results:
Year ended 30 Sep 
1983 
£’000
30 Sep 
1984 
£'000
.5 months 
31 Dec 
1985 
£’000
31 Dec 
1986 
£•000
31 Dec 
1987 
£'000
Turnover 9,292 10/619 15,055 13,440 32,201
Operating Profit 
before Interest
743 1/064 1,592 1,730 5,109
Profit before Taxation 55 505 1,272 1,412 5,230
Profit after Taxation 38 347 1,133 1,140 4,206
Dividends 38 241 331 724 1,694
Issued Share Capital 949 5/042 5,757 11,590 20,531
Net Assets 11/657 20,567 35,417 64,170 153,357
Net Asset Value 
per Share
17.4p 18.8p 24.Ip 27.7p 37.4p
Earnings per Share 
(net basis)
0.06p 0.43p 0.99p 0.80p 1.30p
Dividends per Share 0.06p 0. 23p 0.28p 0.375p 0.45p
Notes
1. Net asset value per share for 1987 is calculated by dividing the 
net tangible assets at the end of the year by the number of shares in 
issue at that date. Net asset values per share for 1983-1986 have been
adjusted to take account of the share issues in 1984 and 1986.
2. Earnings per share for 1987 is calculated by dividing the profit
after taxation by the weighted average number of ordinary shares in 
issue during the year.
3. Earnings per share and dividend per share for 1983 to 1986 have
been adjusted to allow for the effect of the bonus element of the share 
issues in 1984 and 1986.
Source: Published Accounts
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FINANCIAL COMMENTARY
It has already been noted that a principal reason for the 
successful development of the group was the especial 
expertise of the merchant bank Morgan Grenfell. Indeed, 
without them, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
development would have been neither successful nor as 
swift. A measure of the financial success of the group may 
be seen by reference to the price earnings ratio of the
shares of the company which were, even in the two years
subsequent to the stockmarket crash of October 1987, 
approximately twice those of their competitors - in the 
range 30 to 3 6 compared with industry norms of 14 to 18.
The diversification into clubs initially brought 
substantial losses but it is likely that all the club 
operations will eventually produce a satisfactory level of 
profitability. In the period subsequent to acquisition 
(1987 - 1989) however, the losses made by the clubs were
partially responsible for an adverse effect on the share 
price of the group. In fact the weakness in the share
price was reflected by the fact that in mid 1989 the shares 
were being traded in the 34 to 36p range - more than 20% 
less than the price at which the rights issue of 1987 took 
place. It was, in part, owing to this weakness that Mount 
Charlotte took a 12% equity stake in the company. 
Nevertheless, the company is soundly financed with an
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enviable portfolio of high grade hotel property. On the 
one hand this gives it security but on the other the 
possibility of an unwelcome takeover bid cannot be ruled 
out.
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3. CENTRE HOTELS, COMFORT HOTELS AND FRIENDLY HOTELS
1965-1987
Chairman Henry J Edwards
THE EMERGENCE OF CENTRE HOTELS
The aim of this case study is to trace the growth and 
development of three middle market hotel groups Centre 
Hotels, Comfort Hotels and Friendly Hotels during the 
period 1965 to 1987. During this time Henry J. Edwards was 
chairman of each company. Edwards1 family came originally 
from near Vienna, Austria and Edwards was brought as a 
teenager to the U.K. prior to the Second World War by his 
parents who had been in the textile trade and who continued 
in this line of business in their adopted country. During 
the war he served in the British Army in both the Tank 
Regiment and latterly in the Intelligence Corps. [1]
Subsequent to demobilisation he became involved in the 
hotel industry in London and around 1950 came into contact 
first with Fred Kobler and subsequently Maxwell Joseph. One 
of his early jobs was assistant manager at the Grosvenor 
Court Hotel just to the south of Oxford Street and near 
Bond Street underground station. The lease of this hotel 
was held by Fred Kobler who sold it in 1953. Kobler then 
went into partnership with Joseph and within two years, by 
1955, acquired the leases of four London hotels. These,
- 206 -
together with The Mandeville, which Joseph had purchased 
some years earlier, were to form the nucleus of the rapidly 
expanding group. [2]
Joseph himself was, for a short time, the manager of one of 
the properties - The Washington, in Curzon Street, Mayfair, 
W.l. He did not care, however, for the intricacies of 
day-to-day hotel management but preferred to concentrate on 
property dealing in which field he was to become
pre-eminent during the 1960's. [3]. It was determined,
therefore, that Joseph should be the chairman of the
company, Kobler the managing director and Edwards the
general manager. The group was constituted as Grand Hotels 
(Mayfair), the majority of hotels being in that
fashionable district of the metropolis, but was operated as 
The Washington Group of Hotels. This name was deliberately 
chosen to create a market image and to attract 
transatlantic business. [4]
In a relatively short space of time the team of Joseph, 
Kobler and Edwards made a considerable impact on the London 
hotel industry of the 1950's. Their management style which 
was an amalgam of shrewd property acquisition implemented 
by Joseph, imaginative use of available space together with 
innovative sales and marketing techniques both spearheaded 
by Kobler allied to rigorous financial controls instigated
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by Edwards brought the company to the forefront of the 
industry, producing above average (and in some cases 
exceptional) rates of return on capital investment. [5]
The number of hotels grew steadily to the point where, in 
1962, the group owned and operated 12 hotels in central 
London and after the acquisition of the Eglinton Hotel 
Group in 1962 a further 6 in Scotland. On the 10th of July 
in that year Joseph merged his hotel interests via Mount 
Royal (Marble Arch) Limited to form Grand Metropolitan 
Limited. [6] Although Henry Edwards remained General 
Manager of the enlarged group he was conscious of the fact 
that Maxwell Joseph was beginning to rely increasingly on 
his two senior accountants Stanley Grinstead and Ernest 
Sharp for the management and administration of the 113 
companies of which he was a director. Sensing that further 
promotions might go to men who were professionally 
qualified as lawyers, accountants or surveyors Henry 
Edwards determined to strike out on his own lest he became 
vulnerable should a power struggle develop. As the junior 
partner in the trio he did not have the financial 
wherewithal of either Joseph or Kobler. He realised that 
he would require financial support for his plans to succeed 
and to this end approached Joseph in the summer of 1964. 
[7]
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His chance came later that year. Grand Metropolitan, as 
the holding company was now called, had formed a company 
G.M. Hotel Projects for the purpose of identifying possible 
acquisitions. In December of that year acting on behalf of 
this subsidiary company, Messrs. Colegrave & Co. of 14/18 
Gresham Street, London EC2 made a successful offer for the 
Issued Ordinary Stock of The Cranston London Hotels Company 
Limited, the consideration being £620,000. Cranston had 
been originally incorporated in 1900 and its main business 
was that of operating temperance hotels. In 1964 its 
principal assets were three hotels in the Bloomsbury 
district of London - the Ivanhoe, the Kenilworth and the 
Waverley. These names indicate the Scottish origin of the 
company whose registered office had always been in 
Edinburgh. Indeed, Grand Metropolitan may first have come 
across the company at the time it was investigating the 
acquisition of the Eglinton Group two years earlier. [8]
In the event Henry Edwards purchased the three hotels from 
Grand Metropolitan, resigned as a director of Grand 
Metropolitan on 1st January 1965, was appointed Chairman of 
Cranston that month and came to an arrangement with Maxwell 
Joseph whereby Grand Metropolitan would take a substantial 
holding in Cranston amounting to 28% of the ordinary stock 
in issue and 34% of the issued preference capital. At the 
time this was publicly perceived as a generous gesture on 
the part of Maxwell Joseph. Without this financial
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assistance Henry Edwards would have had considerable 
difficulty in raising sufficient capital to purchase, 
refurbish and expand Cranston. Nevertheless the confidence 
Joseph displayed in Edwards was handsomely vindicated in 
the ensuing years via the substantial capital appreciation 
of the trade investment. [9]
CENTRE HOTELS 1965 - 1977
Consequent to the acquisition of Cranston the name of the 
company was changed to Centre Hotels (Cranston) Ltd. The 
first major task was to implement a scheme of capital 
reorganisation of the company the main thrusts of which 
were:
a) an increase in the Authorised Share Capital of the 
company from £172,000 to £500,000;
b) an increase in the Ordinary Issued Share Capital from 
£62,000 in Stock Units of £1 to £166,720 in Ordinary 
Shares of 2s (lOp) each;
c) the existing 5 per cent Cumulative Participating
Preference Stock in units of £1 of which £85,440 was 
issued was reclassified as 7% Cumulative (Non
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Participating) Preference Stock;
d) The existing unissued 24,560 Preference Shares of £1 
each were reclassified as Ordinary Shares of £1 each;
e) the objects clause of the Company's Memorandum of
Association was revised to delete the prohibition on 
the sale by the company of alcoholic beverages and to 
permit the establishment of share option schemes;
f) borrowings by the company would not, without the
sanction of an Ordinary Resolution, exceed three times 
the aggregate of the issued share capital and 
consolidated reserves. [10]
The next important move was to form a board of directors. 
A. A. Davis, a senior partner in the accountancy firm of
Stoy Hayword & Co who had been auditors to Grand Hotels
(Mayfair) joined the board together with two executives 
from that company: Michael Thompson, a lawyer, became
general manager and dealt with the detail of subsequent 
acquisitions while Rory Fraser was appointed Company 
Secretary in charge of administration. [11]
With an appropriate capital structure and a fresh board the 
new company set about improving the existing properties and 
seeking out suitable acquisitions. Their business policy 
was predicated on three principal factors:
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1. Rising living standards would make the concept of 
away-from-home holidays more commonplace.
2. The growth of air travel, especially the increasing 
popularity of group travel and package tours, would 
reduce both price and travel time for those seeking 
holidays in other countries.
3. The development of larger divisionalised companies
would lead, not only to more business travel, but to a
demand for more business facilities in hotels.
On this basis the board envisioned three principal strands
in their anticipated pattern of growth:
a) the development of existing properties
b) the acquisition of existing hotels
c) construction from scratch to match strict 
specifications in line with budgeted costs and budgeted 
standards aimed at the growing middle market (3 star). 
[13]
The foregoing was encapsulated in the company philosophy
which was stated as follows:
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1. Centre Hotels' objective is to earn the best possible 
return for its shareholders, together with 
ever-increasing rewards for its staff, by owning, 
operating and supplying management services for hotels 
and catering outlets in the United Kingdom and 
overseas. We offer a satisfactory product, responsive 
to market needs, and geared to a pre-determined price 
structure.
2. Our long term marketing aim is to gain and retain the
loyalty of business firms, tour operators, travel 
agents and the general public. To this end, we provide 
value-for-money, with strategically placed
accommodation and consistent standards of comfort and 
convenience. In addition, we have developed an 
advanced formula for purpose built multi-function 
suites, matching the needs of conference, exhibition 
and social event organisers.
3. Centre Hotels impose strict budgets for both new 
structures and conversions. Bedroom selling prices 
being directly related to capital costs, our investment 
in large hotels, with relatively low capitalisation 
ensures sensible tariffs and high occupancy.
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4. By catering for the anticipated needs of British and 
Overseas travellers, within a controlled cost 
framework, Centre Hotels are well placed to benefit 
from the world's long-term upward trend in away-from 
-home business and leisure activities. [14]
With a business policy in place and a clearly defined 
company strategy the group, backed by strong management, 
was set fair to expand rapidly and make an important 
contribution to the U.K. hotel industry of the 1960's. 
This it did via a process of refurbishment of existing 
properties, acquisition of additional properties and the 
construction from scratch of three hotels - two in London, 
the Regent Centre and the West Centre together with one at 
London Airport.
FINANCIAL REVIEW
By the end of the decade the group had eight hotels in 
London, two hotels in Birmingham together with properties 
in Brighton, Eastbourne, Hull, York, Edinburgh and Dundee. 
In addition the company ran 21 Centre restaurants 
separately from the main hotels and in 1970 purchased 27 
Old Kentucky restaurants throughout the London area. An 
indication of the growth of the company during the
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chairmanship of Henry Edwards is reflected in the following 
financial statistics.
TABLE 3 - 3
CENTRE HOTELS FINANCIAL DATA 1967-1976 Source 
Published Accounts.
YEAR ENDED TURNOVER PRE-TAX PROFIT POST-TAX PROFIT
Mar 31 £ £ % £ %
1967 947,981 158,348 16.7 99,476 10.5
1968 1,110,125 205,201 18.5 201,425 18.1
1969 2,539,786 325,986 12.8 269,872 10.6
1970 3,500,518 532,739 15.2 407,039 11.6
1971 6,375,564 977,060 15.3 671,960 10.5
1972 7,401,936 1,283,246 17.3 843,816 11.4
1973 8,368,959 1,581,848 18.9 1,198,188 14.3
1974 11,411,478 1,218,355 10.7 917,398 8.0
1975 12,871,640 709,089 5.5 589,826 4.6
1976 16,210,742 568,283 3.5 380,099 2.3
At first sight these figures are impressive until one 
realises that, while the figures for 1973 show turnover of 
£8,368,959, pre-tax profits of £1,581,848 and post-tax 
profits of £1,198,188, three years later (during which time 
the turnover had doubled to £16,210,742), the pre-tax 
profit had declined to £568,283 and the post-tax profit to 
£380,099. [15]
The downturn in profits in the period 1973 to 1976 may be 
attributed to certain specific factors. In the first place 
the period 1973 to 1975 marked a time of severe recession 
in the U.K. and all hotel companies were adversely affected
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to a greater or lesser extent. In the case of Centre the 
problem was compounded by the heavy capital investment of 
the late 1960's and early 1970's. For the most part this 
capital expenditure had not yet worked its way through 
to profits with the new hotels initially being a drag on 
the profits of established properties. In the early and 
mid 1970's the group decided to expand on the Continent of 
Europe and acquired four properties in Amsterdam with a 
total of 440 bedrooms. This took the number of hotels 
operated by the company to 30 with a total of 5,350 
bedrooms. [16]
The principal reason why the company had been able to 
expand so rapidly rested on the reputation of Henry Edwards 
as a highly efficient hotelier who was able to discern a 
specific market niche and then to provide facilities in 
accommodation, food and liquor that exactly matched the 
chosen market segment. In particular his rigorous cost 
control of capital expenditure (including professional 
fees) had won many admirers and gave confidence to bankers 
and institutional lenders who were more than prepared to 
back his expertise. The fact that the new Centre hotels, 
both in London and in the provinces were completed on time 
and within budget (in marked contrast to some of the more 
grandiose schemes that were implemented subsequent to the 
Development of Tourism Act of 1969) was further proof of 
the professionalism of his management team. This allied to
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tight revenue control and assertive marketing of 
accommodation brought about the surge in turnover and 
profits in the period 1969 - 1973. It was only when the 
recession struck with the accompanying squeeze on margins 
allied to the high interest charges that the formula came 
under pressure. Although the company was sound from the 
point of view of underlying assets the ratio of pre-tax 
profits to turnover made it vulnerable to predators.
Furthermore the company had only recently established 
Centrelink, a marketing and purchasing organisation for 
hotels in the U.K. who wished to be associated with Centre 
to take advantage of the company's marketing and purchasing 
strength. In addition the company had established Hotel 
Management International to manage hotels overseas. These 
operations together with the management of the restaurants 
throughout the group placed a heavy financial burden on the 
company. Margins were squeezed and the interest charges 
rose substantially, eating into the operating profits and, 
as the figures indicate, although the turnover for 1976 was 
almost twice that of 1973 post-tax profits were only one 
third of the 1973 figure. The company thus became 
particularly vulnerable to any predator who recognised the 
underlying asset value and the potential of a company whose 
profits, in all probability, would be likely in due course 
to show a strong upward trend.
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It was thus that, early in 1977, the expanding bookmaking 
group, Coral, who had the benefit of a strong positive cash 
flow, decided that they should increase the asset base of 
their company and reckoned that a bid for Centre would be a 
shrewd vehicle for so doing. Coral's timing of the bid was 
excellent. Not only would they be purchasing an hotel 
group where a significant proportion of the roomstock had 
been recently built but in Jubilee year the prospect of 
improved room occupancies with an immediate contribution to 
post-acquisition profits was a strong incentive. [17]
In addition although the total assets of Centre were, in 
1976, in excess of £30M, the value ascribed to the Ordinary 
Shareholders was only £11M. It was this highly geared 
situation that had made the company vulnerable. Also it 
was ironic that in the financial year 1976/1977 the profits 
of Centre were due to show a marked rise and this 
represented a further benefit to Coral. Negotiations began 
in April 1977 and on 17th May the company, advised by their 
merchant bankers Kleinwort Benson, wrote to shareholders 
advising them to accept the Coral offer which valued Centre 
at £16.7M. In view of the fact that the equity was valued 
at £11M this was as good an offer as Centre could have 
expected. [18]
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In the manner of such negotiations a statement was made to 
the effect that as a result of "the changed economic and 
financial circumstances" the board of Centre was of the 
opinion that a merger with a larger company was in the best 
interests of shareholders and was the optimum route to 
further expansion. The immediate intention was that 
subsequent to the merger Centre should continue as a 
separate division of Coral with Henry Edwards as Chairman 
and Managing Director supported by two directors from the 
main board of Coral. [19]
Consequent to the communication from the board of Centre to 
its shareholders Coral rapidly obtained more than 50% of 
the equity of Centre and the bid thus became unconditional. 
All things considered it was a satisfactory outcome for the 
shareholders of Centre. As recently as November 1976 they 
had seen their shares languishing at a mere 17.5p - only 
seven months later the shares had more than tripled in 
value. For Henry Edwards himself it must have taken the 
sting out of the take-over, having 2.8M shares in the 
company he had seen their value rise from just under £.5M 
to £1.58M. [20]
As might have been expected he did not stay with the new 
board for long. Within a year he resigned his position,
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determined to go it alone once again and in a manner not 
too dissimilar from his early days at both Grand Hotels 
(Mayfair) and Centre Hotels (Cranston) Ltd.
THE COMFORT HOTEL PHASE 1978 TO 1984
As soon as it became evident to Henry Edwards that staying 
with Coral was to invite tiresome constraints on his 
freedom of action he began the task of tracking down 
suitable hotel property with a view to launching a fresh 
company under his personal direction and control. By May 
1978 he had found what he was looking for - the chance to 
buy a significant stake in a company that was ripe for 
expansion. At that time Adda Hotels owned six properties 
in London together with one each in Amsterdam and Paris. In 
the autumn three additional hotels in London were acquired, 
each for around £1.5M. Henry Edwards, together with some 
business associates, acquired 29.5% of this company from 
Derek Garcia and the estate of his late brother A. A. 
Garcia. It was to be via this vehicle that he was to build 
his second hotel company. [21]
Although it had been under the control of the Garcia 
brothers since the mid 1960's the period prior to the 
approach had been difficult and it was only the sale of a 
property in Chelsea for some £6M that made the group a 
saleable proposition. In the half year prior to the change
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of ownership the turnover was £3.4M with pre-tax profits of 
£408,000. The return to profit from a prior period of 
operating losses had been the principal aim of Derek Garcia 
subsequent to this achievement he was happy for Henry 
Edwards to buy into the company whilst he, together with 
family interests, retained 22% of the equity. [22]
The first major acquisition engineered by Henry Edwards for 
Adda was the purchase of City Hotels, a group of five 
London hotels with a combined roomstock of just over 500,
together with the Strikes restaurant chain and the Dayville 
ice cream operation which had 80 retail outlets. This gave 
the enlarged group a roomstock just short of 1500. 
Subsequent to the acquisition of City Hotels the Adda name 
was dropped and the new name of Comfort Hotels
International adopted. It was clear even at this early
stage that significant expansion was likely. [23]
The period 1979 to 1981 was not an easy one for Comfort 
Hotels International. The group was burdened with
considerable debt and the optimum route towards its
elimination was via improved trading levels. Given the
recession of this period this was no easy task. The 
alternative - to sell off hotels in a depressed market
would have proved but a short term palliative and would 
clearly not have squared with the overall aim of enlarging 
the group. Consequently the aim during this period was to
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gradually improve trading levels, spend what was needed by 
way of refurbishment and to identify those properties 
within the group, mainly the smaller ones, that could be 
easily sold once the recession had run its course. As it 
turned out the group was able to dispose of four of its 
smaller properties in 1982/1983 for £5.6M. During this 
period it acquired the lease of the 400 room Royal 
Kensington Hotel and a property development company based 
in Mayfair. These acquisitions were financed via a £7.6M 
rights issue. [24]
As the economy gradually moved out of recession the trading 
performance of Comfort improved. Agreement was reached with 
a property company British Land to build a chain of Comfort 
Lodges throughout the provinces. These were to provide 
"three star standard facilities for the travelling public 
at two star prices." [25] Clearly this was an extension of 
Henry Edwards' philosophy of providing value for money 
accommodation and related facilities at a price his 
competitors would find difficult to match. The initial 
agreement was for five lodges at a total capital investment 
of £10M of which Comfort was to provide 10% together with 
the operating management. The profit split was not 
disclosed but it was a major breakthrough for Comfort and a 
sign of British Land's confidence in the management style
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and technique of the company. The initial cost projections 
indicated a cost per room of £17,000 - less than half the 
average costs of construction from scratch.
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF COMFORT HOTELS INTERNATIONAL 
1978 - 1983
An indication of the rate of growth of Comfort Hotels 
International during the time it was directed and 
controlled by Henry Edwards may be seen from the following 
figures.
TABLE 3 - 4
YEAR ENDED TURNOVER PRE-TAX PROFIT POST-TAX PROFIT
Dec 31 £M £M % £ %
1978 8.3 1.3 15.7 1.0 12.1
1979 18.5 2.6 14.1 1.9 10.3
1980 21.4 1.6 7.5 1.5 7.0
1981 24.1 0.6 2.5 0.4 1.7
1982 26.5 1.3 4.9 1.0 3.8
1983 32.3 2.4 7.4 1.9 5.9
Source: Published Accounts 1983
With the recession out of the way Comfort Hotels 
International was able to continue its expansion. By 1984 
the group was beginning to attract the attention of would 
be takeover predators. The first of these emerged in 
October 1984 in the form of the second largest tour 
operator in the U.K. - Intasun, run by the ebullient Harry 
Goodman, who obtained a 14.97% stake in the equity of the 
company by purchasing shares from Comfort*s two largest
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shareholders, Imperial Life Assurance of Canada and Mr 
Abdul Shamji's Gomba Holdings. [26] At this stage 
Comfort was valued at £44M, which indicated the rapid rise 
in hotel property values since the recession of 1980/81. 
At the time Goodman talked expansively of acquiring the 
entire Comfort equity - "The £50M it would cost to buy the 
whole of Comfort is no problem". Goodman also indicated he 
would consider, in the interim, joint ventures overseas 
with Comfort. Comfort vehemently rejected the approaches 
of Intasun and whilst they were being made bid itself for 
another hotel group, the Prince of Wales for £15M. This 
potential acquisition brought with it the prospect of links 
to a major U.S. chain which had expansion plans for Europe 
which Comfort hoped to exploit.
The value of £44M which Intasun placed upon Comfort has to 
be seen in the light of the fact that, by this time, 
Comfort had a roomstock close to 4,000, 1,700 of which were 
in London, 1,200 in other parts of the U.K. and 1,000 on 
the Continent. The bid was thus equivalent to some £11,000 
per bedroom. The anticipated pre-tax profits for the year 
to December 1984 were in the order of £3.5M. [27]
In December 1984, however, a counter bid for Comfort was 
made by the bookmaking giant Ladbroke which valued the 
company at £67.44M, some 50% more than Intasun. The 
rationale behind this bid was that Ladbroke wished to
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expand in a number of directions and that a successful bid 
for Comfort would allow it to emerge as the second largest 
hotel operator in the U.K. Ladbroke also had the advantage 
of having as merchant bankers Morgan Grenfell who were 
then, before the Guinness scandal, perhaps the pre-eminent 
bank in the field of contested takeovers. Thus the 
Ladbroke bid was much more difficult for Henry Edwards to 
defend.
The Ladbroke bid was pitched at 5 Ladbroke shares for every 
14 Comfort shares incorporating a cash alternative in 
respect of 11.76M Comfort shares thus giving a Comfort 
share valuation of 85p. In the event a slightly revised 
bid by Ladbroke raised the value of Comfort to £71M and 
this was sufficient to persuade Henry Edwards to grudgingly 
agree to the offer on 17th December 1984. [28]
Thus a further chapter in the career of Henry Edwards came 
to an end. Although he had by this time been responsible 
for the creation of three major hotel companies he was now, 
at the age of 61, eager to strike out on his own yet again. 
He had substantial capital and his reputation ensured that 
the raising of capital presented no problem. It only 
remained to find a suitable vehicle to found yet another 
hotel company.
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FRIENDLY HOTELS PLC 1985 - 89
In a matter of only weeks Henry Edwards re-established 
himself by acquiring another temperance hotel group, Arden 
and Cobden which operated two hotels in Birmingham, The 
Cobden with 210 rooms and The Norfolk with 175 rooms. [29] 
In February 1985 the name of the company was changed to 
Friendly Hotels Limited and a straightforward scheme of 
capital reorganisation implemented. Subsidiary companies, 
which indicated future company strategy, were formed 
namely Care and Comfort Homes Limited, Comprehensive 
Resources Limited, Friendly Lodges Limited and Friendly 
City Hotels Limited. In addition to traditional hotel 
services the company planned to move into the residential 
care market for the elderly and into office management and 
services. In his own right Henry Edwards held 1,274,370 
ordinary shares in Friendly Hotels Limited. [30]
The company then proceeded to embark on an acquisition 
programme to implement its agreed strategy. In August 1985 
the company acquired French Franks, a small chain of fast 
food restaurants in central London. This was followed in 
November of that year by the acquisition of 100,000 sq. ft. 
of office space in central London which the company 
proposed to run as serviced offices. In September of the 
following year the company completed the initial phase of
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its programme of diversification by acquiring two 
residential nursing homes for the elderly, one in Hampshire 
and one in Suffolk at a combined cost of £1.4M.
In addition to these important moves the company, in May 
1986, acquired from the Virani group four large hotels in 
the provinces and one in London for £5.9M, the 
consideration being satisfied by E2.65M cash, £2.83M in 
convertible preference shares in Friendly and the balance 
of £420,000 by the issue of 303,000 ordinary shares in 
Friendly at 133p per share. The provincial hotels, the 
Central in Glasgow; the Station in Perth; The Royal Station 
in Hull and the George in Nottingham had a combined 
roomstock of 484 while the London property had 120. The
purchase price thus equated to £9,768 per room. In
addition the provincial hotels had extensive conference and 
banqueting facilities. The Glasgow hotel was held on a
short lease with 19 years remaining, the Hull hotel on a 
long lease with 122 years remaining while the other two 
provincial hotels were freehold. The London property, the 
Eccleston in Victoria, was held on a twenty five year
lease. [31]
These acquisitions were the most important development in 
the expansion of Friendly. At the time the economy was 
forging ahead and with the improved management techniques 
of Friendly the room occupancies at all hotels, together
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with food and beverage income, showed increases. In 
addition the sales and marketing efforts of the group
resulted in greater utilisation of the banqueting and 
conference facilities at each hotel.
One major problem was that of refurbishment. In particular
the properties at Glasgow, Perth and Hull, each of which 
had been bought by the Virani group from British Rail in 
1983, all required considerable capital expenditure to 
restore them to a satisfactory standard.
In April 1987 Friendly successfully bid for Connaught
Restaurants which owned one of the largest and most 
prestigious banqueting suites in London for a consideration 
of £2.6M. This purchase resulted in the combined fixed 
assets of the enlarged group being valued at £22M. [32]
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF FRIENDLY HOTELS
Prior to the arrival of Henry Edwards the Arden and Cobden 
group had been run in an ultra conservative manner. 
Subsequent to his arrival and change of company name 
(Friendly Hotels had been originally incorporated in 1875) 
the new group made rapid advances as may be seen from the 
following figures. [33]
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TABLE 3 - 5
YEAR ENDED TURNOVER PRE-TAX PROFIT POST-TAX PROFIT
Dec 31 £M £ % £ %
1984 1.5 123,746 8.3 106,186 7.1
1985 1.6 180,393 11.3 142,731 8.9
1986 6.1 781,000 12.8 656,000 10.8
1987 (est) 9.2 1,450,000 15.8 1,160,000 12.6
Sources Published Accounts 1987
The importance of the Virani group acquisition is clear 
from the above figures but it should also be noted that by 
mid 1987, less than three years from inception, the group 
had made significant progress both in the hotel business 
and in areas into which it had chosen to diversify.
CONCLUSION
This case study demonstrates the successful development of 
a middle market group whose success stemmed from clever 
property acquisition, stringent control over capital and 
revenue expenditure, a marketing strategy directed towards 
the sale of accommodation and the targeting of income 
groups largely ignored by traditional hotel companies. 
Regrettably, both Centre and Comfort were adversely 
affected by the recessions of 1973 - 1975 and 1980 - 1981, 
in particular the high level of interest rates during these 
periods. As shown in the text, not surprisingly, each 
company was the subject of a successful takeover bid.
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Latterly, Friendly Hotels, which expanded at a slower rate, 
was able to escape the attention of predators throughout 
the 1980's.
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4. GLENEAGLES HOTELS PLc
Managing Director Peter Tyrie
One of the declared intentions of the Thatcher 
administration which came to power in June 1979 was to 
privatise as many state assets as could successfully be 
sold off to the public. British Rail, because of its large 
annual subsidy was an unattractive proposition but the 
collection of 29 hotels owned and operated by British 
Transport Hotels (BTH) which had been brought into being in 
1947, was thought to be sufficiently appealing as to make 
plans for its collective disposable feasible.
Concurrent with these early developments the City of 
Edinburgh was attempting to generate interest in the 
creation of a conference centre to be located immediately 
adjacent to the Caledonian Hotel. [1] In fact the land had 
originally been the main freight depot for the London, 
Midland and Scottish Railway Company. The then deputy 
chairman of British Transport Hotels, Sir Alexander Glen (a 
former chairman of the British Tourist Authority) became 
involved in these discussions as did the Bank of Scotland 
and its merchant banking arm the British Linen Bank. [2] 
Agreement on the development of the site was frustrated by 
differing views taken by Lothian Regional Council and 
Edinburgh District Council. [3] Nevertheless, Sir Alexander 
Glen, aware of government thinking instigated a series of
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meetings with the then Secretary of State for Transport, 
Norman Fowler. As a result of these meetings the 
government determined that, as a first step, the main 
Scottish Hotels - Gleneagles, together with the Caledonian 
and the North British should be sold via the flotation of a 
new company to be called Gleneagles Hotels PLc (GH). [4]
Gleneagles Hotel was originally opened in 1924 as a luxury 
hotel with sporting facilities. [4] In 1980 it had 210 
letting bedrooms, produced a turnover of £3.5M, an average 
room occupancy of 64% and showed an operating profit of 
£2 04,000 from a 190 day season commencing in April. [6] 
The Caledonian Hotel was originally opened in 1903 by the 
Caledonian Railway Company, later to become the London,
Midland and Scottish Railway Company. In 1980 it had 213
letting bedrooms, produced a turnover of £2.25M, an annual 
room occupancy of 60%, was open all year round and showed 
an operating profit of £41,000. [7] The North British Hotel 
was originally opened by the North British Railway Company 
in 1902. In 1980 it had 193 letting bedrooms, produced a 
turnover of £2.17M, an annual room occupancy of 56%, was 
open all the year round and showed an operating profit of 
£14,000. [8] Both the Caledonian and North British were
rated as four star hotels. The intention was to upgrade
the Caledonian to five star, in line with Gleneagles, and
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to refurbish the North British to three star standard, thus 
minimising the competition between the two city hotels.
[9]
On 11th May.1981 Gleneagles Hotels (GH) was incorporated as 
a private company and re-registered as a public company on 
21st May. [10] This was arranged by the British Linen Bank, 
the merchant banking arm of the Bank of Scotland acting as 
advisers to British Transport Hotels (BTH). The aim was to 
create a company, in which BTH would retain one third of 
the equity to own and operate Gleneagles Hotel, 
Auchterarder, Perthshire together with the Caledonian and 
North British Hotel, both in Edinburgh. It was felt that 
the combination of two city hotels and one resort hotel 
would form an attractive investment opportunity and would 
gain support from city institutions.
An open market valuation of each hotel was carried out by 
Christie & Co in the period January to June 1981. [11]
The values ascribed were as follows:-
Gleneagles Hotel 
Caledonian Hotel
£7,600,000
£2,800,000
North British Hotel £2,330,000
Total £12,730,000 [12]
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The conditional purchase agreement between GH and BTH 
provided for the acquisition of the three hotels for a 
consideration of £10,350,000, a discount of approximately 
18% over the valuation which reflected the then weakness in 
hotel property prices. The consideration was to be 
satisfied by a cash payment on completion of £7,600,000 and 
the balance in two equal annual instalments. This 
agreement was conditional upon other parties subscribing 
for 5,950,000 shares and £1,500,000 stock for cash at par. 
The result would be the BTH would have one third stake in 
the new company which was capitalised at £9,000,000. It
r
was further decided that the issue would not be
underwritten and that no allotment would be made unless all 
the placing shares and stock were subscribed. The capital 
structure was to be £9M equity with £4.5M 12% unsecured
loan stock 1991-1995. [13] The initial profit forecast,
compiled by Arthur Young McClelland Moores was for pre-tax 
profits to be at an annual level of . £600,000. Initially 
there were to be no dividend payments so that all available 
monies could be applied to the refurbishment of the three 
properties.
Preliminary estimates of desired capital and revenue
expenditure at the three properties in the period 1982 to
1986 indicated a total of £2.6M should be spent on
Gleneagles, £1.5M on the Caledonian and £3.5M on the North 
British. There were, however, complications regarding the
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amount for the North British in view of current and 
possible future property redevelopments in the immediate 
environs of the hotel. [14]
It should be noted that the British Linen Bank as financial 
advisers to GH experienced considerable difficulty in 
putting the original financial act together and the poor 
level of support from the Edinburgh financial community was 
particularly disappointing. [15] Schooled as they were in 
financial rectitude the majority of fund managers perceived 
the hotel industry as unknown and unquantifiable territory 
in which they deemed it prudent not to venture. 
Consequently the British Linen Bank was obliged to approach 
no fewer than eighty institutions in order to secure the 
requisite finance. [16] Added to this tiresome problem was 
the prevailing pattern of interest rates. In June 1981 
bank base rates, minimum lending rates, were in the 12-14% 
band. Such high rates of interest naturally hit hard any 
hotel companies which showed even a modest degree of 
gearing and the unsecured loan stock element of the 
package, pitched at 12%, required a formidable £540,000 
annual servicing cost.
One important breakthrough, however, did occur during this 
period and without the financing would have proved even 
more difficult and, in retrospect, perhaps impossible. 
This was a directive from HM Treasury which reduced the
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minimum state holding in firms which were to be privatised 
from 50% to 33% thus allowing investors to gain equity 
control. BTH had originally sought a larger, albeit still 
minority shareholding. [17]
Accordingly the group and its advisers were able to 
attract 18 institutions and their take up percentages 
were as follows: [18]
British Transport Hotels 33.33
Kuwait Investment Office 15.00
Bank of Scotland 1976 Pension Scheme 7.78
Coats Paton Superannuation Scheme 5.56
Scottish Amicable Pensions Investment 
Scottish Amicable Life Insurance 5.56
Prudential Assurance 4.44
Unity House (Holdings) NUR 4.44
North British Properties 3.71
Melville Street Investments (Edinburgh) 3.71
Equity and Law Life Assurance 3.33
Legal and General Assurance 3.11
NC Head Office Nominees (DCL Pension Fund) 2.78 
Scottish Mutual Association 2.67
Clerical and Medical Life 2.22
Clydesdale Bank (London) Nominees 1.11
Reo Stakis (as an individual) 1.11
British Linen Securities 0.14
Total: 100.00
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The first chairman of the company was William Stevenson, 
whose principal job was chairman of the Scottish Transport 
Bus Group. He was succeeded in 1983 by another director, 
Sir Alan Smith, who was formerly the chairman and chief 
executive of Dawson International, the textile group. They 
were joined by two members of the board of the British 
Linen Bank, Ian Brown and Ian Jones together with the 
deputy chairman of BTH, Sir Alexander Glen and its finance 
director John Tee and with the chairman of The Lygon Arms, 
Broadway, Worcestershire, Douglas Barrington, who was a 
prominent hotelier in his own right. [19]
Sir Alexander Glen went on the board at the specific 
request of Ian Jones and was an independent member. John 
Tee represented the interests of British Rail. He, 
however, resigned early in 1983 when he was afforded the 
opportunity to acquire two other BTH hotels, The Great 
Northern at King's Cross and The Great Eastern at Liverpool 
Street. These two hotels were to form the nucleus of his 
new company Compass Hotels Limited. Subsequent to the 
departure of John Tee British Rail did not have any 
representation on the Board, though they still retained one 
third of the equity of the company, and this situation was 
a source of considerable annoyance to British Rail and 
ultimately may have played a minor part in their decision 
to dispose of their shareholding. [20]
During 1983 Ian Jones left the British Linen Bank, for whom
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he had worked ten years, to set up his own firm Quayle 
Munro. He brought in as chairman Sir Alan Smith, the 
former chairman and chief executive of the Dawson textile 
group. Quayle Munro effectively became the principal 
financial adviser to GH working closely with Samuel 
Montagu, the London merchant bank and the Kuwait Investment 
Office with whom they latterly arranged the leveraged lease 
deal on the Piccadilly Hotel. [21]
Concurrent with raising the necessary finance the promoters 
had also been searching out a group chief executive. The 
man they chose to rescue the three moribund properties was 
34 year old Peter Tyrie who had an interesting track 
record, his previous assignment having been Executive Vice 
President-Development for the Ramada group in the Far East. 
[22] Most significantly Tyrie brought not only energy and 
determination but also youth and charm to the group. He 
took up the post in September 1981 and set about creating a 
management team. The key appointments were new General 
Managers at each of the three properties - Guy Macpherson 
(subsequently Peter Lederer) at Gleneagles, Dermot 
Fitzpatrick at the Caledonian and Carl Donnelly at the 
North British. [23] In addition, via the efforts of Sir 
Alexander Glen and Douglas Barrington, Peter Bates was 
appointed as sales and marketing manager. [24] It was as a 
result of the efforts of these five executives together
- 240 -
with their staff, that the ailing group regained its 
operational expertise and subsequently attained five star 
standards initially in Scotland and latterly in London.
It was clear at the outset that much more than had been 
originally anticipated would have to be expended on each of 
the three properties. All three were in a state of decay, 
having been starved of necessary capital expenditure for 
many years, and there was a clear need for investment in 
both fabric and basic facilities. At Gleneagles the public 
areas were refurbished at a cost of £440,000 and half the 
guest bedrooms at a cost of £785,000. [25] Tyrie then
commissioned a Glasgow firm of architects, Cobban and 
Lironi, to design a Country Club and Conference Centre. The 
firm had sprung to prominence as a result of their design 
of the Glasgow Holiday Inn which had opened in April 1982 
and immediately proved a resounding success. The Club and 
Conference Centre was duly constructed at a total cost of 
£1.8M. This, in Tyrie's words, enabled the group to "wrap 
leisure round the traditional hotel products of 
accommodation, food and drink". [26] Additionally and 
equally important it allowed the hotel to be open 
throughout the year instead of from April to October. This 
naturally led to significantly increased turnover and 
profitability and resulted in a distinct improvement in the 
attitudes and morale of staff, although when the decision 
was announced it was received with considerable scepticism
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- a view which quickly proved to be unjustified. By the 
end of 1984 there was further expenditure on Gleneagles 
when the top floor was converted from staff accommodation 
to create a further 50 guest bedrooms and the remainder of 
the accommodation areas were fully refurbished. [27]
At the Caledonian the refurbishment programme commenced 
with the cleaning of the red sandstone exterior (unusual in 
Edinburgh) and the smartening up of the main public rooms 
at a cost of £750,000. This was followed by an expenditure 
of £1,500,000 on existing rooms and the provision of a 
further 50 rooms, formerly used as staff quarters, at a 
cost of £650,000. As a result of these and other 
improvements the hotel was subsequently awarded a five star 
rating by the Automobile Association. [28]
In the first full financial year of operation, to 31st 
December 1982, the combined turnover of the three hotels 
was £8,759,020. This produced an operating profit, after 
interest payable and receivable, but before tax of £83,161. 
[29]
Apart from the consolidation of operating activities in 
Scotland the other agreed objective of all the members of 
the board was to obtain a London hotel, which was perceived 
as being fundamental to the successful development of the 
group. Several properties were considered before it was
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decided that the Piccadilly would be the optimum one to 
acquire. Together with a clutch of lesser hotels it had 
been put on the market by Grand Metropolitan as part of a 
rationalisation of their U.K. hotel interests subsequent to 
their acquisition of the Intercontinental Group. Peter 
Tyrie, together with his chairman, was confident that the 
hotel had significant potential due to the 
under-utilisation of available space and they reckoned that 
with the burgeoning sales and marketing expertise within 
the group led by Peter Bates, the additional property would 
dramatically improve group profitability. Other members of 
the Board were cautious as to the likely outrun cost of the 
massive and complex refurbishment that was needed to 
refurbish the property to full five star standards. [30]
The Piccadilly had been constructed during the first decade 
of this century and had originally opened in 1908. Due to 
the excessive capital sums required during the course of 
construction and fitting out, allied to a severe shortfall 
in income subsequent to opening, the first company to 
operate the property was forced into bankruptcy within 
eighteen months. [31] Subject to varied vicissitudes 
during the ensuing fifty years the hotel was acquired by 
Grand Metropolitan in the early 1960's. That decade was a 
successful one for the hotel industry in the U.K. in 
general and the Piccadilly prospered. The hotel division 
of Grand Metropolitan met with less success during the
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1970's and by the beginning of the following decade the 
property was somewhat 'tired'. Consequent to the 
acquisition of the Intercontinental Group by Grand 
Metropolitan in 1981 the company decided to dispose of 
certain of its U.K. hotels and this programme of divestment 
included the Piccadilly. [32]
The property was held on a 125 year Crown Lease with an 
asking price of £15M. In addition, the property itself 
required substantial refurbishment particularly if it was 
to operate in the five star market in accordance with its 
true potential. GH, on the advice of Ian Jones of Quayle 
Munro, floated the idea to St Martin's Property Corporation 
of a leveraged lease deal between St Martin's and GH 
whereunder St Martin's would acquire the head lease which 
would be supported by a back-to-back under-lease to GH who 
would be responsible for refurbishing the property to five 
star standard. The lease would be on a 'leverage basis' 
with both St Martin's and GH having basic shares from the 
income of the hotel and thereafter sharing the profits in 
proportion of 60% to St Martin's and 40% to Gleneagles 
after the amortisation of GH's initial expenditure. These 
negotiations were concluded and they resulted in St 
Martin's acquiring the head lease from Grand Metropolitan 
and granting an under-lease to GH, all commencing in 
October 1983. [33]
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The principal detailed terms of the underlease were as 
follows:-
a) St Martin's agreed to contribute the sum of £1.4M, 
being a reverse premium on the lease, in order to help 
GH in meeting the initial costs of professional fees 
together with preliminary work in connection with 
repairs, re-equipment and provision of plant and 
machinery at the hotel.
b) It was agreed that the annual rent payable by GH to St 
Martin's would be the aggregrate of:
i) a ground rent of £40,000 per annum or 1% of the 
gross turnover of the hotel, whichever was the 
greater. As it was confidently anticipated that 
the gross annual turnover of the hotel would 
comfortably exceed £4M it was this latter figure 
that St Martin's had in mind.
ii) the basic rent was to be £155,000 per quarter and 
was thereafter to rise by annual increments to a 
maximum of £371,341 in the first quarter of 1991. 
Thereafter it was to reduce by £1,286 per quarter 
until the expiry of the lease in 2082, the final 
quarterly rate being £96,031.
iii) the net operating profit of the property was to be
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split as to 60% St Martin*s and 40% GH after 
charging all operating expenses, including 
depreciation, amortisation, ground rent, basic 
rent, insurance, rates and a management charge to 
GH of 7.5% of gross turnover. [34]
A provisional cost summary for the acquisition of the 
Piccadilly, together with the continuing improvements to 
the three existing hotels is set out below: [35]
Table 3 - 6
£'000 £'000
The Piccadilly Hotel
Repairs, re-equipment and provision of
plant and machinery, professional fees 10,125
Acquisition Costs 492
10,617 
1,400 
-----  9,217
2,796 
1,004 
60
  3,680
£13.077
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Less contribution from St Martin*s
Existing Hotels 
The Gleneagles Hotel 
The Caledonian Hotel 
The North British Hotel
Total expenditure:
The proposed methods of financing the expensive 
refurbishment of the Piccadilly brought to the surface 
latent discontent and mistrust between opposing factions on 
the Gleneagles board. At the outset in 1981 all the 
directors, both executive and non-executive, were keen to 
tackle together the problems that faced them. [36]
By 1983, however, the power structure within the board had 
changed significantly. Throughout 1981 and 1982 the 
British Linen Bank had been an invaluable source of 
support, the long experience of the chief executive Ian 
Brown being complemented by the intellect and creativity of 
Ian Jones. When this partnership was terminated Ian Jones 
aligned himself with Sir Alan Smith and Peter Tyrie. This 
triumvirate emerged as the power group within the board. 
[37] Sir Alan Smith was impressed by the professionalism 
and ability of Peter Tyrie and perceived the non-executive 
directors as having relatively little to offer the company 
from the viewpoint of hotel operations. As a consequence 
Sir Alexander Glen and Ian Brown became somewhat isolated. 
A further area of contention was that, despite maintaining 
a one third equity stake in the company, BTH did not have 
an official representative on the board. Taken together 
these factors resulted in a somewhat uneasy boardroom 
atmosphere where the assertive, dynamic attitude of Peter 
Tyrie tended to be out of step with the more restrained 
approach of the non-executive board members. [38]
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The Board of GH decided that these expenditures should be 
financed by a rights issue of £9.7M with the balance being 
satisfied by internal sources, including leasing. At this 
stage there was disagreement with the British Linen Bank 
who were principal advisers in regard to the rights issue 
and the bank refused to proceed unless the issue was 
restricted to £5M. The GH board declined to accept this 
and the British Linen Bank resigned to be replaced by 
Samuel Montagu who, together with Quayle Munro, proceeded 
to complete the formalities for and underwrite the rights 
issue at the original figure of £9.7M. [39]
These proceedings were brought to an abrupt halt when 
Arthur Bell & Sons pic (Bells) brought an unwelcome 1984 
New Year present in the form of a E20.24M bid for the 
group. [40] This was sent to shareholders on 5th January 
1984 by Bell's merchant bank, Henry Ansbacher & Co. This 
move had its origins in the acquisition of 29.9% of GH's 
equity on 23rd December 1983 from BTH for a total 
consideration of £6,074,998 equivalent to 225p per ordinary 
share of GH. Bells also acquired 1,500,000 nominal of the 
12% 1991 - 1995 unsecured loan stock of the company for a 
consideration of £1,500,000. This move was certainly 
influenced by the refusal of the transport secretary 
Nicholas Ridley to allow BTH to subscribe to the proposed 
rights issue. [41] It may also have been influenced by a
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feeling of isolation on the part of the British Railways 
Board who still lacked formal representation on the GH 
board.
In any event once they were barred by the government for 
applying for shares and thus furthering their interest in 
the company they merely took the line of least resistance 
and sold out to the first available suitor. The government 
must be held responsible for a policy decision which 
effectively decreed that the British Railways Board should 
terminate its association with GH despite the fact that it 
was showing a capital gain of more than 100% on its
investment in the company with the likelihood that further 
capital appreciation was a near certainty.
Under the terms of the offer 173 new ordinary shares of 5Op 
of Bells were to be exchanged for every 100 ordinary shares 
of £1 each in GH (the share offer) OR 225p in cash for
ordinary shares of £1 (the cash alternative). A condition
of the offer was that the proposed Rights Issue to raise 
£9. 7M for the refurbishment of the Piccadilly should not 
proceed. [42] Bells, and in particular their chairman
Raymond Miquel, were of the opinion that such an amount was 
too onerous for a company of the size of GH to undertake. 
In point of fact they were merely displaying their limited
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knowledge of the hotel business as the Rights Issue 
represented less than 20% of the value of group assets at 
that time.
The GH board were angered and dismayed at the bid on a
number of grounds.
a) they felt that BTH had been disloyal in selling their 
retained stake - their sale of shares to Bells was a 
breach of a written assurance to the chairman of 
Gleneagles Sir Alan Smith that the BTH stake would not 
be sold without prior reference. At the same time the 
board did acknowledge that BTH had been compromised by 
the government in the form of Nicholas Ridley and that 
they had made a useful profit on the deal.
b) they were of the opinion that the Bells bid was 
undervaluing the group on both an asset and a 
profitability basis.
c) they were of the opinion that they had rescued the 
hotels, had worked hard to greatly improve their 
standards and were now being pressured into a marriage 
in which they would undoubtedly have substantially less 
control over the operation of the properties.
d) GH had been in business for only 2.5 years. Its growth
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potential was scarcely recognised and the whole venture 
deserved shareholder support for a much longer period. 
[43]
In its own way the Bells versus GH takeover battle appeared 
to the outsider to be the forerunner of the era of 
vitriolic takeovers - some very hard things were said and
the public took a close interest with much of the sympathy
being directed towards GH. It is interesting to note that 
certain of the major players reappear in the Guinness saga 
- Morgan Grenfell acted for BTH in the disposal of their 
interests in Gleneagles to Bells and were at that time also 
acting for Bells in other matters. Lord Spens of 
Ansbachers acted for Bells in the bid. [44]
During the course of the battle, coming to the defence of
the fledgling company, the Kuwait Investment Office sought 
to build a blocking interest sufficiently large as to 
ensure the continuance of the independent existence of GH, 
but the four subsequent acceptors of the Bells Offer failed 
to respond, even though the Kuwaiti tender was marginally 
higher. They also failed to accept higher offers for their 
shares made by the Gleneagles financial advisers Samuel 
Montagu and Quayle Munro. Although they did not overtly 
admit that they knew of each others1 intentions there is 
but little doubt that they did. On evaluation it is 
reasonable to conclude that the sale by BTH of the 29.9% of
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the equity allied to the action taken by the British Linen 
Bank and its influence with other shareholders was
instrumental in delivering GH into the hands of Bells. 
[45]
Bells had come back on 26th January with an increased offer 
which valued the group at £27M. This was accepted by a 
number of shareholders including the Bank of Scotland
Pension Fund, Melville Street Investments (Edinburgh), a 
company controlled by the Bank of Scotland, together with 
Coats Patons, Distillers Company Pension Fund and British 
Rail in respect of its remaining holding of 3.4%. [46]
These acceptances resulted in Bells claiming 52% of the
equity and thus control of the company. This control was
legitimised despite an appeal by the GH Board to officials 
of the Take-Over Panel. On 3rd February the full Panel of 
Take-Overs and Mergers overturned an earlier ruling of 
their officials. The Panel decided that the commitments 
obtained by Bells during the first acceptance period did 
not contravene the Code on Take-Overs and Mergers. Thus 
were Bells able to legitimise their control of GH. [47]
Following the takeover Bells realised that it had but 
little option to press on with the refurbishment of the 
Piccadilly as a contractual consequence of the arrangements 
that had been completed between GH when independent and St 
Martin's Property Corporation. It was clearly an onerous
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agreement and some felt that the principal advantages lay 
with St Martin's. Put another way, however, it was the 
cost that Tyrie and his Board had to pay in order to secure 
a prime site in central London, one which they perceived as 
the vehicle for gaining entry to the lucrative London 
market and thus affording their clients a London stopover 
en route to their Scottish properties and to Gleneagles in 
particular. Indeed it was more than that because 
Gleneagles was a world famous name, but without any 
metropolitan hotels in the leading international centres 
had very limited growth prospects, particularly for the 
gaining of further management contracts essential to the 
group's growth. When GH was taken over by Bells one such 
contract was already available. This was in Portugal in a 
new luxury sporting hotel in the Algarve, however, with the 
subsequent break-up of the new group the venture was 
abandoned.
The Piccadilly underlease has been much criticised but 
noticeably only by predators for GH, either by Bells 
directly or by Guinness when bidding for Bells. Privately, 
however, there had been deep concern within the GH board, 
particularly by Sir Alexander Glen and Ian Brown both of 
whom were castigated by the chairman for their views. [48] 
It is interesting to note, however, that Bells became 
converted on closer acquaintance and Guinness themselves 
had no difficulty in disposing of the underlease subsequent
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to taking over Bells in the early autumn of 1985. Since 
then the hotel market has continued to prosper and the 
early move by Tyrie and his board to London, although seen 
by some to be foolhardy at the time, has proved to have 
shown considerable foresight, despite the heavy overrun of 
conversion cost against the original estimate. The final 
judgement must rest on the £31M paid by Meridian which 
represented a profit to Bells/Guinness of close to £10M on 
the net outlay when the value of the retained leisure 
centre is taken into account. The consideration received 
appears high in relation to the net outlay of approximately 
£17M provided as part of its obligation in terms of the 
Underlease but the net income from the property due to GH 
appears to have been at an annual rate of some £2M and on 
the basis of the long (125 year) lease has clearly 
justified a premium valuation. The income derived by St 
Martin's has, like GH, never been made publicly available 
but it is likely that it is close to that derived by GH. 
[49]
The acquisition of GH by Bells was the start of the end. 
The relationship between Tyrie and Miquel, rarely easy at 
the best of times, was bound to be strained by the ardour 
of the bid battle - each had very different personalities. 
Miquel was looking hard for the growth that was eluding the 
whisky activities of his group and failing to find it. The 
City was doubtful and by the autumn of 1985 Bells had been
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acquired by Guinness who quickly made it clear they were 
not particularly interested in the hotel group. [50] 
Shortly after the acquisition of Bells they were 
preoccupied with much weightier matters when they launched 
a massive £2.3 billion bid for the Distillers Company 
Limited subsequent to a blatantly overt approach from the 
Board of Directors of that company who wished, at all 
costs, to avoid being taken over by James Gulliver whose 
Argyll food group had commenced the bidding for DCL in 
December 1985 with a ranging shot of £1.8 billion. [51]
Once Guinness successfully gained control of DCL they 
proceeded in the spring of 1986 to sell the Piccadilly to 
the hotel subsidiary of Air France for £31M but retained 
the health and leisure club which, it will be recalled, was 
capitalised at £4.5M. [52] It is likely that Guinness
could have obtained significantly more for the Piccadilly 
had the sale not gone ahead with almost indecent haste, but 
even at £31M the sale produced some profits even after 
taking into account the heavy refurbishment costs which had 
originally been borne by Bells. In the autumn of 1986 the 
break-up of the group was completed when the Caledonian and 
North British were sold to the Norfolk Capital Group for 
£18.5M and £5M respectively. [53] Considering that Bells 
had earlier acquired Gleneagles for £27M the net result of 
these transactions was that Guinness effectively acquired 
Gleneagles, with a 1986 value of some £40M, for nothing.
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The management of the group was also broken up - Peter 
Tyrie returned to the Far East as Chief Executive of the 
Mandarin Group based in Hong Kong and he was quickly 
followed there by the sales and marketing director Peter 
Bates.
It had taken a mere five years for the three properties to 
have been rescued, owned successively by no fewer than five 
proprietors, only to be sold off at the earliest 
opportunity to the highest bidder and not in the happiest 
circumstances. British Rail broke a written assurance 
given to the GH Chairman, Sir Alan Smith, when it sold its 
29.89% stake in Gleneagles to Bells at Christmas 1983 and 
the four institutions who sold out to Bells, viz the 
British Linen Bank, Coats Patons Pension Fund, DCL Pension 
Fund and British Rail with its remaining 3.4%, all took a 
short term view of the situation and let down a young and 
very capable management team whom they had recruited for a 
much longer term objective. [54] It is ironic that their 
premature sale almost certainly deprived them of a much 
larger profit that would have been made had they held on 
and it is also arguable that Bell's acquisition of GH was 
widely perceived as a strategic mistake thus making it more 
vulnerable to being taken over.
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It is difficult to evaluate the role of the British Linen 
Bank in the whole affair. In the early stages of 
development, during 1981 and 1982, there is no doubt that 
the support of the bank was helpful in establishing the 
credibility of the GH board. Once Ian Jones left the bank 
and established himself, together with Samuel Montagu, as 
the main financial adviser to the GH board the role of the 
British Linen Bank becomes somewhat obscured. Ian Brown 
and Sir Alexander Glen were critical of the methods adopted 
by Peter Tyrie and Sir Alan Smith regarding the financing 
of the refurbishment of the Piccadilly. In their judgement 
the methods adopted by the chairman and managing director 
were open to criticism on the grounds that the other 
directors were given insufficient time to study the 
proposed patterns of expenditure and were not allowed to 
express their opinions in the boardroom as freely as they 
might have wished. [55] The disinclination of all
concerned to close ranks at a vital period highlighted the 
split in the board and, to a certain extent, increased the 
vulnerability of the company to a take-over bid. Indeed it 
is fair to say that in the circumstances had the take-over 
approach not come from Bells it might well have come from 
elsewhere, sooner or later. Any predator had only to 
persuade BTH to sell their holding to be in a position to 
launch a full-scale bid.
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As might be expected in such circumstances opposing 
personalities were a potent factor. Ian Brown, the Chief 
Executive of the British Linen Bank, regarded Tyrie and his 
team as somewhat aggressive and it may be that he felt the 
dynamism of the team out of step with his own modus 
operandi. [56] It has already been noted that Peter Tyrie 
and Raymond Miquel did not form a harmonious working 
relationship and it was noticeable how Tyrie distanced 
himself from the other Bell's directors during the Guinness 
takeover. Following the takeover by Guinness, it rapidly 
became clear to Tyrie and his team that there was no 
commitment to the future of GH notwithstanding earlier 
assurances, and the original initiative to build a major 
international hotel group was clearly about be terminated. 
Ernest Saunders, the Guinness chairman behaved in an 
altogether cavalier fashion towards Tyrie, latterly 
ignoring him completely. [57] It may be seen therefore 
that it was the attitude of first Miquel and then Saunders, 
as much as anything else, that made Tyrie seek pastures 
new.
Tyrie and Bates, together with the General Managers of the 
three hotels, had comprehensively demonstrated their 
management skill and ability in turning the properties from 
loss making concerns to profitable businesses. The only 
major criticism of Tyrie concerns the Piccadilly where he 
seriously underestimated the refurbishment costs. As
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things turned out, however, it would have been extremely 
difficult to have accurately forecast the structural and 
technical difficulties that were encountered during the 
course of the refurbishment.
Nevertheless even taking £35M as the final total investment 
represents good value for money, at 1985 prices, for a 300 
bedroom, 5 star hotel in central London, complete with 
health and leisure facilities. By comparison the
Dorchester, albeit freehold, with approximately the same 
number of bedrooms exchanged hands shortly afterwards for a 
sum reputed to be more than £60M. As the only way to free 
himself of the constraints put on him by Miquel and 
Saunders, Peter Tyrie briefly considered a management 
buy-out of the four properties for some £70M. [58] There
is but little doubt that he and his backers could have 
raised such a sum but the notion was scuppered by Guinness 
who reckoned, quite correctly, that an even greater sum 
could be raised by piecemeal realisation.
With hindsight it is fair to say that the personality 
differences between board members of GH did little to help 
the development of the company. Whilst certain 
non-executive board members may have felt that the chairman 
should have kept the managing director on a shorter rein 
the circumstances called for a seasoned professional, as 
Tyrie was, to act with speed and decisiveness to remedy a
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situation where internationally known hotels had been 
starved of capital investment to the point where their 
future operation was in jeopardy.
EVALUATION .
Although the story of Gleneagles Hotels PLC in the period 
1981 to 1986 had an unhappy ending it nevertheless 
illustrated many of the determinants necessary for success 
in the hotel industry. The application of professional 
management skills to a situation where the property was 
under-utilised and in parts nearly derelict, together with 
a simultaneous attack on a product-led market which was 
surviving mainly on rapidly deteriorating goodwill, 
resulted in sharply increased profits. Most of these were 
retained in the business for purposes of refurbishment and 
upgrading, resulting in a fivefold increase in the value 
of group properties. This clearly demonstrates the hotel 
industry is as much property business as retail.
Gleneagles displays those determinants of success that are 
most closely linked to corporate strategy viz. suitable 
location, acquisition at competitive cost, ability to grow 
via acquisition and sound professional advice. In the case 
of Gleneagles each of these determinants was matched by 
professional management skills that led to growth in 
turnover and profitability.
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The determinants relating to marketing strategy were 
clearly shown from the early months of Peter Tyrie's 
stewardship. Indeed, the major achievement in the period 
1981 to 1986 was to revive the Gleneagles name, both 
within the U.K. and abroad, to the extent that when 
Guinness acquired Bells it decided to retain the flagship 
hotel despite disposing of all the others.
As far as innovation is concerned it is fair to say that 
Peter Tyrie was one of the major innovators during the 
1980's in the field of health and leisure as applied to the 
hotel industry. The health and leisure complex at 
Gleneagles transformed the property and was a principal 
factor in enabling it to stay open throughout the year 
whilst the facilities installed at the Piccadilly, at a 
capital cost of £4.5M, proved such a success that they 
were retained by Guinness when the hotel itself was sold.
On a somewhat discordant note, as the text illustrates, all 
was not sweetness and light in the Gleneagles boardroom. 
From the time the first moves to acquire the Piccadilly 
were initiated to the eventual break-up of the group, 
conflicts of personality diminished the ability of the 
directors to act in an effectively united manner. This 
syndrome was seen to accelerate during the Guinness battle 
for Bells when Peter Tyrie changed horses in mid-stream. 
In so doing, whilst it was felt at the time he had settled
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the score with Raymond Miquel, he partially allowed himself 
to become a piece on the chessboard as far as the 
machinations of Ernest Saunders were concerned.
Gleneagles Hotels PLC typifies the fast moving pace of the 
hotel industry in the 1980's; few properties had 
the dubious distinction of having had five proprietors in 
just five years. It is ironic to note that the transaction 
which set in train the moves that led ultimately to 
Gleneagles losing its independence was the sale, at the 
instigation of the government, of the 29.9% equity stake 
in Gleneagles Hotels PLC by the original owners British 
Rail. This was sold to a company which within 18 months 
was acquired by Guinness, whose subsequent sales of hotel 
property effectively enabled Guinness to acquire the 
Gleneagles hotel itself for nothing.
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CONCLUSIONS ON GROUPS GEARED TO THE U.K. MARKETS
From the case studies certain factors relevant to the 
profitable operation of groups with a property bias may be 
discerned. Certainly in the 1960's and 1970's, albeit to a 
lesser degree in the 1980's, none of the groups had a clear 
strategy as to how to develop and manage its business - to 
a great extent growth reflected whatever the group was able 
to buy at a particular time. Consequently deals were 
driven as much by timing as by location, cost or 'fit' 
with a particular market. In the later stages of growth 
collective purchases of properties tended to be made with 
the aim either of securing greater geographical spread, as 
was the case of Mount Charlotte or gaining a greater share 
of a particular market in a given geographical area as 
shown by the various purchase of London properties by 
Centre and Comfort.
It is also evident that these groups tended to aim more for 
the business than the tourist market. They each saw how 
Grand Metropolitan, having been outstandingly successful 
in the 1960's, tended to falter in the 1970's by placing 
undue reliance on the tourist market. The result was that 
the groups with a property bias concentrated on the 
property aspects of their business almost as much as on the
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retail aspects of hotelkeeping in an effort to enhance 
asset values while simultaneously attempting to improve 
operating profits.
On close examination of the groups represented in the case 
studies some interesting facts emerge. As has already been 
stressed the dual nature of the industry as a property 
business and a retailing operation is of supreme importance 
and is illustrated in each of the companies portrayed. One 
without the other can never result in optimum profitability 
being achieved. In the case of Mount Charlotte it was the 
adoption of this perception allied to acquisition at 
competitive cost, especially in the early years of 
development, and the stringent control of operating costs 
that laid the foundations for the continuing profitability 
of the group.
Indeed the notion of acquisition at competitive cost, 
especially in the early years of companies, is shown in the 
development of Norfolk Capital and to a lesser extent, 
Gleneagles. Clearly the keener the cost the less the 
burden of interest on operating profit - a vital factor of 
success in the formative years of virtually any company.
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The importance of property assets used in schemes of 
diversification is also relevant to some of the groups 
portrayed. It is interesting to note that Henry Edwards, 
when he diversified, ensured that the assets had property 
backing.
In all cases the notion of acquisition at a competitive 
price was aided by wide ranging professional advice. With 
the growth and development of Norfolk Capital, for example, 
the merchant banking skills of Morgan Grenfell were crucial 
in enabling Tony Richmond-Watson to secure the finance 
required for the succession of acquisitions in the period 
1984 to 1986. Likewise, the advice of Kleinwort allowed 
Henry Edwards to expand Comfort and Friendly, although it 
has to be said that the merchant bank was not able to 
secure the degree of independence that Edwards would have 
wished.
A further factor linked to successful expansion is the 
pattern of interest rates. Clearly property acquisitions 
which are effected when interest rates are rising tend to 
carry a greater degree of risk than when interest rates are 
moving down. An adverse upward trend may be seen in the 
case of Centre which "was badly hit by the economic 
problems of the early and mid 1970's when interest rates 
reached 20%".
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Certain techniques of professional hotel management also 
emerge from the case studies. For example, the importance 
of marketing and branding can clearly be seen in the case 
of Gleneagles, where Peter Tyrie and his management team 
were able to turn round a loss making property open only 
190 days of the year into a thriving concern open all year 
round, helped latterly by the name Gleneagles which had 
positive international recognition. For othe companies, 
once satisfactory levels of occupancy had been achieved 
stringent control over costs resulted in satisfactory 
levels of profitability. This is demonstrated both in the 
study of Centre, Comfort and Friendly on the one hand and 
Mount Charlotte Investments on the other.
Each of the studies indicates the increasing pace of the 
U.K. hotel industry as it grew towards maturity by the end 
of the nineteen eighties. In this connection perhaps 
Gleneagles Hotels PLc is the best illustration; few 
properties had the dubious distinction of having had five 
proprietors in just five years.
It has already been shown that each of the four companies 
was quick to realise that opportunistic purchases of hotel 
property coupled with extensive refurbishments and, in some 
cases, developments from scratch in which rigorous control 
was exerted over capital costs, formed the optimum route to
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successful growth and development. Moreover the companies, 
some with a greater degree of success than others, sought 
to compound this success by improving the quality of their 
retail skills as applied to accommodation, food, liquor and 
latterly leisure. The combination of shrewd property 
purchases allied to an increasing awareness of retailing 
skills was the key to success for each of the companies 
portrayed. Furthermore the success was best consolidated 
by those companies which were able to maintain strict 
control of operating costs. This is no easy task and is 
made all the more difficult when companies, such as Mount 
Charlotte and Norfolk Capital, were moving up-market thus 
involving themselves with a significantly greater number of 
cost centres than lower grade hotels.
It would be invidious to suggest that one group was 
conspicuously more successful than another - each occupied 
distinct niches in the market place. What can be said is 
that the renaissance of Gleneagles was so successful that 
it attracted take-over predators within little more than 
two years of commencing operations. Likewise the success 
of Centre led to the unwelcome take-over bid by Coral. 
There is no doubt that had Tyrie and Edwards been less 
successful take-over bids would not have happened so 
quickly. The successful growth of Norfolk Capital is 
directly related not only to the property acquisition 
skills of managing director Peter Eyles but also to the
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ability of Anthony Richmond-Watson and his merchant banking 
colleagues at Morgan Grenfell to raise the necessary 
finance for expansion as and when required. If one were to 
choose one firm as being marginally more successful than 
the others it would have to be Mount Charlotte where not 
only was skilful property acquisition and the raising of 
finance in evidence but also the stringent control of 
capital and revenue expenditure which resulted in handsome 
rates of return on capital investment.
Having considered in this chapter four companies each of 
whose operation was either wholly or almost wholly based in 
the U.K. it will be necessary in a further chapter to 
describe other companies whose operation carried an 
international dimension. For these companies also the 
successful acquisition of hotel property at a competitive 
price was a principal factor in their development. As many 
of the acquisitions were outwith the U.K. they were often 
more complex and carried a greater degree of risk.
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CHAPTER 4 THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR
Introduction
The third group of companies to be considered in this study 
have in common the fact that their hotel interests are 
operated on an international basis. In addition, with one 
exception - that of Queens Moat Houses - the hotel 
operation represents but one division of each company. 
Grand Metropolitan is a group which is represented over a 
wide range in the food and drink industry. In the case of 
Bass, investment in hotels represented a strategic 
diversification into a particular sector of the leisure 
business. Trusthouse Forte was the result of a merger 
between a long established hotel company operating around 
the middle of the market, managed in a generally restrained 
and gentlemanly fashion, with a thrusting dynamic catering 
company which perceived the hotel group as an ideal vehicle 
to further its ambitious expansion plans.
Clearly each of the companies has had to compete in 
international markets against the leading hotel companies 
worldwide. This has meant competing against the likes of 
Hilton, Sheraton, Holiday Inn, Intercontinental, Marriott 
and Hyatt. International hotel groups are essentially a 
post war phenomenon. The largest hotel company worldwide,
Holiday Corporation, originated in 1951 and its first
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property was opened in Memphis, Tennessee in August 1952. 
It positioned itself in the large three/four star market, 
expanded rapidly and by 1985 controlled 1750 hotels in 51 
countries across six continents. Similarly, Pan American 
World Airways formed a wholly owned hotel subsidiary 
Intercontinental Hotels, incorporated in the state of 
Delaware in 1946. The company became the leading hotel 
group serving the international business traveller with the 
great majority of its hotels enjoying five star status. By 
1980 it controlled 100 hotel properties worldwide. Another 
major U.S.A. airline Trans World Airlines acquired Hilton 
International in 1967. This company was originally formed 
in 1949 as a separate subsidiary of Hilton Hotels 
Corporation and was subsequently spun off as an independent 
public company in 1964, at which time it was granted the 
exclusive right to the Hilton name outwith the U.S.A. In 
strong competition to Hilton and Intercontinental was the 
Sheraton Hotel Corporation which was constituted as a 
subsidiary of I.T.T. - International Telephone and
Telegraph. Consequent to considerable investment worldwide 
from 1970 onwards by the parent company, Sheraton 
controlled, by 1985, some 500 hotel properties. Other 
major international groups such as Holiday Corporation,
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Marriott, Hyatt, Westin and Ramada each targeted their 
efforts on distinct market segments.
The general pattern within the U.K. was for emergent hotel 
companies to consolidate their position nationwide and then 
to expand abroad either by acquiring hotel properties on an 
individual or group basis. Latterly U.K. hotel companies 
made a series of spectacular coups, led by Grand 
Metropolitan acquiring the Intercontinental Group in 1981 
at a cost of US$ 500M, followed by Bass acquiring the 
Holiday Inn properties outwith the U.S.A., Canada and 
Mexico in 1987 at a cost of US$ 475M, and in the same year 
the purchase by Ladbroke of Hilton International at a cost 
of US$ 1.07 billion. These purchases brought the
respective U.K. companies to the forefront of the 
international hotel business.
These moves were followed in 1988 by Grand Metropolitan 
divesting itself of Intercontinental to the Japanese 
conglomerate Seibu Saison. The net proceeds of sale were 
£1.35 billion which represented a post tax profit of more 
than £500M - a considerable reward for just seven years, 
ownership. There were two principal reasons for the sale. 
The first was that as a result of spiralling property 
prices the return on investment became very small 
especially from the viewpoint of financial analysts and 
shareholders keen to receive a tangible return on their
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investment. The other reason was that Grand Metropolitan 
increasingly took the view that the role of the company 
should be that of a specialized retailer and that retaining 
high class hotels did not fully blend with such a strategy.
Against this international background the examples chosen 
illustrate how relatively small companies grew by 
acquisition, in two cases with the financial backing of 
their parent company, to the point where the optimum route 
to further expansion lay overseas. Many of the 
determinants of success in the hotel industry are clearly 
demonstrated over a range of strategic decisions taken by 
each of the companies.
The examples are:-
1. Grand Metropolitan PLC
Chairman Sir Maxwell Joseph 
1962 to 1982 
" Sir Stanley Grinstead
1982 to 1987 
11 Allen Sheppard
1987-
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2. Bass PLC
Crest Hotels Chairman Brian Langton
Holiday Inns
3. Queens Moat Houses Pic Chairman John Bairstow
4. Trusthouse Forte PLC Chairman Lord Forte of Ripley
1. Grand Metropolitan PLC
Chairman Sir Maxwell Joseph 
1962 to 1982 
" Sir Stanley Grinstead
1982 to 1987 
" Allen Sheppard
1987-
The origins of the company may be traced to 1903 in which 
year Grand Hotels (Mayfair) Limited was formed. [1] On 6th 
September, 1934, Mount Royal (Marble Arch) Limited was 
first registered as a private company. [2]
The founder of Grand Metropolitan was Max Joseph (in later 
years he adopted the name of Maxwell) born in Whitechapel, 
London on 31st May 1910. After leaving school he had 
several jobs with firms of estate agents and in 1929, at 
the age of nineteen set up his own firm of estate agents, 
Connaught Hooper, in Bayswater with the help of £500 lent 
to him by his father Jack Joseph. He continued in this 
field until war broke out in 1939. He applied for a 
commission in the R.A.F. but this was not forthcoming. He 
joined the Royal Engineers and was demobilized in 1946 with 
the rank of Lance-Corporal. [3]
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At the end of the war property in general throughout London 
was in a very poor state of repair and was available for 
purchase at very low prices. As an experienced estate 
agent Joseph was in a position to capitalize on this and
made a number of extremely shrewd purchases. He was
assisted in these purchases by an exceptionally able 
conveyancing solicitor Leonard Tobin who indicated to 
Joseph the potential of hotel property. As a result he 
purchased in 1948 The Mandeville Hotel in Mandeville Place, 
Wl, which lay less than a quarter of a mile to the north of 
Bond Street underground station in Oxford Street. At the
time of acquisition it was in a very run down state having 
but six letting bedrooms. [4]
In the early 1950's Joseph came into contact with two men 
who were to play a prominent part in the initial expansion 
of his hotel interests - Fred Kobler and Henry Edwards - 
who were later to become Managing Director and General 
Manager respectively of Grand Metropolitan Hotels. Both 
were of central European origin, Kobler from Czechoslovakia 
and Edwards from Austria, and had come to England in the 
1930's. Edwards, some twenty years younger than Kobler, 
had served in the British army during World War 2,
latterly with the army of occupation on the Continent of 
Europe. [5]
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Fred Kobler entered the hotel business in 1946 when he 
leased a small property in Bentinck Street, W1 which he 
operated on a bed and breakfast basis. In the following 
year he took a lease on Airways Mansions, a small block of 
flats in Charles 11 street and later acquired the lease on 
Grosvenor Court Hotel which lay just to the south of Oxford 
Street. [6] At this hotel Henry Edwards, then in his mid 
twenties, was the assistant manager. In 1953 Kobler sold 
his interests in each of the three properties and, in 
partnership with Maxwell Joseph for the first time, 
purchased the lease of the Ford Hotel in Manchester Street. 
[7] In April 1955 Joseph and Kobler sold their interest in 
the Ford Hotel to Marks & Spencer. With the proceeds, 
which included a significant element of profit, Joseph and 
Kobler were able to acquire the leases of two substantial 
hotels in Half Moon Street, Mayfair W1 - The Green Park 
and Flemings, each of which had close to 100 letting 
bedrooms and the then well known restaurant Manetta's, 
which was an integral part of Flemings. In addition the 
proceeds of sale allowed the purchase of the lease of The 
Clifton Hotel which was very near to The Mandeville. [8]
During this period Maxwell Joseph had purchased on his own 
account and for a short time actually managed The 
Washington Hotel in Curzon Street. [9] Joseph, however, 
did not care for the day-to-day administration of hotels 
but preferred to concentrate on property dealing. He
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determined, therefore, to form the five hotels into a group 
which was constituted as Grand Hotels (Mayfair) but 
operated as The Washington Group of Hotels. The latter 
name was deliberately chosen to create a market image and 
to promote, transatlantic business. [10] Joseph was 
appointed Chairman of the group, Kobler Managing Director 
and Edwards General Manager. By 1960 the group operated 10 
medium-price hotels with a combined book value of £835,846. 
The fact that a significant proportion of the hotels - 
Flemings, Green Park and The Clifton Ford to name but three 
- had not been purpose built but simply formed a collection 
of contiguous London town houses is the principal 
explanation for the modest book-value. [11]
On 1st July 1957 Maxwell Joseph, with the help of Isaac 
Woolfson of Great Universal Stores (who subsequently sold 
his stake), purchased Mount Royal (Marble Arch) from Sir 
Bracewell Smith for E1.05M. It had originally been built 
as a block of flats in the 1930's. [12] In 1957 it was a
leasehold property, having 714 letting bedrooms, with 55 
years of the lease remaining, the ground rent being 
£40,000 per annum. Under the direction of Maxwell Joseph 
and with the help of Stanley Grinstead the profitability of 
the hotel improved to the extent that its value on a going 
concern basis doubled within four years. [13] The profit
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record and a summary of the net assets of Grand Hotels 
(Mayfair) and Mount Royal (Marble Arch) Limited for the 
period 1956 to 1961 is shown in Table 4 - 1  and 2.
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The tables illustrate the Balance Sheets of Mount Royal 
(Marble Arch) Limited and Grand Hotels (Mayfair) Limited at 
the time of the merger that took place in July 1962 to form 
Grand Metropolitan. Even at this early stage in the 
development of the company the importance of property 
assets, especially those which were freehold, may be 
appreciated. Although the company was highly geared at 
later stages in its growth, the increasing value of 
property assets was indicitive of the underlying strength 
of the company and these assets were, on many occasions, a 
valuable source of collateral when short term borrowing was 
necessary. Although the hotel interests of the company were 
secondary in the 1970's they received a boost with the 
acquisition, in 1981, of Intercontinental. Grand 
Metropolitan, by capitalization, continued to increase in 
value to the point where by the end of the decade it was 
valued at more than £5 billion. The key to this growth was 
the series of acquisitions, none of them hotels, in the 
period 1966 to 1972, followed by organic growth and 
further acquisitions in 1980, 1981 and 1987.
PUBLIC COMPANY STATUS: GRAND METROPOLITAN LIMITED
On 2 3rd June 1961 Mount Royal (Marble Arch) Limited was 
converted to a public company. The Offer for Sale, handled 
by Ocean Trust, was an enormous success, the offer being 
oversubscribed 24 times. [14] The purchase and subsequent
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conversion to a public company of the Mount Royal was 
crucial to the career of Maxwell Joseph. As he said to 
Anthony Bambridge of The Observer in an interview thirteen 
years later "It was the real turning point in my career." 
He was then* in 1961, aged 51. [15]
In the same year Grand Hotels (Mayfair) Limited acquired 
Eglinton Hotels (Scotland) Limited. In the following year 
on 10th July 1962 the two groups were merged and on 15th 
July the name of the company was changed to Grand 
Metropolitan Hotels Limited. [16] In the three years 
subsequent to the merger additional hotels were acquired in 
London, in Scotland and on the Continent of Europe. During 
this time Maxwell Joseph, by astute deployment of funds and 
effective systems of management was able to build a 
position from which to launch a major series of 
acquisitions, mergers and takeovers. [17]
The effective systems of management were best displayed in 
the management organization of Grand Hotels (Mayfair). In 
the immediate post-war period whilst the rest of the 
industry carried on much as before with the hotel 
manager/proprietor usually playing a "mine host" role and 
departmental managers such as chefs and restaurant managers 
enjoying a substantial degree of autonomy (frequently with 
results not altogether favourable to the business), Grand 
Hotels (Mayfair) sought to impose stringent operating and
- 285 -
financial controls on individual hotel managers. This 
strategy was achieved by the implementation of a carefully 
organized head office located at 16 Half Moon Street in the 
heart of Mayfair. The strategy owed much to Fred Kobler 
who visited the United States frequently, learning at first 
hand how the emergent U.S.A. groups, Hilton in particular, 
operated their properties.
The operation was headed by Henry Edwards as General 
Manager who took an active part in all aspects, 
particularly financial, of the administration of the 
rapidly growing group of hotels. His management style, 
influenced principally by his unbounded energy, helped 
create a dynamic environment which in turn produced healthy 
rivalry and competition amongst and between head office 
executives and individual hotel managers. He was aided by 
an assistant general manager whose main task was personnel 
and training. The early 1960's produced a useful crop of 
hotel school graduates who were quickly assimilated into 
the group and given the opportunity to make their mark 
early in their careers in both individual hotels and in the 
specialist head office functions. In the former, able 
graduates were assigned either food and beverage or 
accommodation roles where they were responsible for cost 
and profit centres, whilst at head office they would act
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as assistants to executives in charge of sales and 
marketing, personnel and training, finance, purchasing 
and control.
INNOVATION IN SALES AND MARKETING
A particularly important and innovative area of head office 
influence was the sales and marketing department headed by 
two executives who were to become leading practitioners in 
their field - Harold Delvin and Derek Taylor. The company, 
benefiting from Fred Kobler's visits to the U.S.A., 
pioneered the idea of a permanent head office sales and 
marketing organization both for groups and individual 
tourists as well as for business clients. The conscious 
effort to organize centrally the selling of hotel rooms was 
an important factor in the continued prosperity of the 
company. The objective was to discover new ways of 
marketing hotel rooms to avoid the seasonal fluctuations 
that previously had left rooms empty for part of the year. 
[18] In the mid 1960's the group began the promotion of 
mini-holidays (usually week-ends) which were priced to 
barely cover marginal costs, and which proved so
successful, despite the initial opposition of travel 
agents, that occasionally Grand Metropolitan had to refer 
clients to competing hotels as their own were 100% full. 
The resultant improvement in room occupancies stemming from 
the success of the various sales and marketing techniques
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had a significant effect on group profitability. Much of 
the incremental income filtered through to operating 
profit, the fixed costs having already been met. [19]
During the early 1960's the fledgling group made rapid 
progress, acquiring additional hotels such as The Reubens, 
The Rembrandt and The Piccadilly and refurbishing existing 
hotels such as St. Ermin's, Clifton Ford and The Londoner. 
[20] The Londoner was an excellent example of the 
creativity of the group whereby an old hotel, originally 
called The Welbeck Palace, was completely gutted and 
transformed into a modern hotel with all amenities. An 
added advantage of the hotels was that "they are sited in 
exceptionally strategic and valuable locations" which bore 
testimony to the skill of Maxwell Joseph as a dealer in 
property. [21] In fact, by common consent, he was judged 
"the incomparable dealer of the period." [22]
The board was strengthened in 1963 by the appointment of 
Maxwell Joseph's two senior accountants, Stanley Grinstead 
and Ernest Sharp. The following year saw the largest 
opening to date, that of the 300 bedroom Europe Hotel in 
Grosvenor Square, London Wl. 1965 was an important year 
for the group in a number of ways. [23] On 1st January 
Henry Edwards resigned as general manager and as a 
director. [24] He had played an influential part in the 
development of the group but now wished to set up his own.
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This he did by acquiring Cranston Hotels Limited, a group 
of temperance hotels controlled from Scotland but with 
three properties in London. Maxwell Joseph backed him in 
this venture, arranging for Grand Metropolitan to take a 
stake in the company amounting to 28% of its ordinary 
capital and 34% of its preference capital. [25] This was a 
generous gesture on the part of Maxwell Joseph but his 
confidence was rewarded in the long term by the substantial 
capital appreciation of the trade investment. With the 
departure of Henry Edwards, Eric Bernard was appointed 
general manager and was appointed a director in 1969, a 
post he retained until his departure from the group in 
1976. The year 1965 also saw the acquisition of the Gordon 
Group of hotels which included the renowned Mayfair Hotel 
in Stratton Street, Wl. [26]
1966 TO 1972 - ACQUISITION AND DIVERSIFICATION
1965 may be viewed as the peak year for the hotel interests 
of Maxwell Joseph. Although he subsequently acquired 
numerous additional hotels which were controlled by Grand 
Metropolitan he entered in 1966 upon a rapid phase of 
expansion and development spearheaded by a dazzling series 
of acquisitions. These acquisitions radically altered the 
nature of his interests and in the space of some six years 
he grew from being principally a property dealer to a 
magnate controlling businesses as diverse as milk,
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breweries and casinos. The spate of acquisitions commenced 
in August 1966 with the acquisition of the old established 
London drink and catering firm of Levy & Franks. This was 
followed in September 1969 by the acquisition of Express 
Dairies. .In May 1970 came the acquisition of the 
steakhouse chain Berni Inns followed in September of the 
same year by Mecca. These moves were consolidated in 
August 1971 by the acquisition of the brewers Truman, 
Hanbury & Buxton and the sequence was completed in July of 
the following year by the acquisition, in the face of 
fierce competition, of Watneys incorporating International 
Vintners and Distillers. [27] All these, however, were 
more opportunistic strikes than phases of an overall 
strategy.
As a result of these acquisitions there was considerable 
pressure on top management to direct the rapidly expanding 
number of companies under Maxwell Joseph*s control. Much 
of the burden fell on Stanley Grinstead and Ernest Sharp. 
This was particularly true in the case of Watney where 
radical reorganization was required to the extent that it 
took fully five years to implement. [28] Consequently, 
less top management time than might otherwise have been 
expected was expended upon the hotel group. Nevertheless 
in the period 1966 to 1972 a number of hotels were 
acquired, prominent amongst which were The Carlton in 
Cannes, The Metropole in Monte Carlo, The Lotti and The
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Scribe in Paris, together with several U.K. properties 
including the 460 room Britannia (built from scratch and 
opened in 1969) on the south side of Grosvenor Square which 
complemented the Europe on the north side. These hotel 
acquisitions resulted in Grand Metropolitan becoming the 
largest hotel group in London and the second largest in the 
U.K. after Trusthouse Forte, who claimed the top spot by 
virtue of some 200 provincial properties throughout the 
U.K. [29]
COMMENTARY ON THE NINETEEN SIXTIES
The 1960's proved a successful decade for the British hotel 
industry. By innovation and example it is fair to say that 
Grand Metropolitan made more progress than any other group and 
emerged as the industry leader especially in the field of the 
management of hotel operations and in sales and marketing 
management applied to the hotel and catering industry. This was 
brought about by a combination of the property skills of Maxwell 
Joseph linked to the general management abilities of Kobler, 
Edwards, Grinstead and Sharp and to the operational expertise 
of practising hoteliers such as Blattner, Dergiman, Giordano, 
Menard, Ross-Watt and Worz.
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GRAND METROPOLITAN IN THE 1970's
It has been noted that the spate of acquisitions which 
commenced in 1966 resulted in considerable pressure being 
placed upon top management. Consequently it was decided in 
1972 to reorganize the hotel interests on a regional basis. 
In the forefront of this development was the creation of 
the County Hotels Division which represented 38 units with 
a geographical spread from Exeter to Edinburgh. These were 
smaller hotels and motels which had previously belonged 
either to Express Dairies, Truman's and Watney's, or which 
had originally been Grand Metropolitan regional hotels. 
[30] This allowed the London hotels to be managed 
separately as was the case with the hotels located on the 
Continent of Europe in which Maxwell Joseph used to take a 
personal interest. The major hotel investments were in 
Amsterdam, Rome, Paris, Cannes and Monte Carlo. The 
acquisition of each of these was in the nature of an 
opportunistic strike as the individual properties became 
available.
The fortunes of the hotel division in the early and mid 
seventies were closely linked with the overall performance 
of the group. In acquiring Watney, Grand Metropolitan had 
taken over a company larger than itself. Subsequent and
- 292 -
consequent to the Watney acquisition, Grand Metropolitan 
was very heavily geared with some £275M outstanding in 
loans. [31]
Whilst the servicing of these loans and capital projects 
did not seem an insuperable task at the time of the merger 
two further factors came into play to compound the problem 
considerably. One was the pattern of interest rates in the
period 1972 to 1975. The high for MLR in 1971 was 7% but
this was increased to 9% in 1972, to 13% in 1973 and 1974 
and only in 1975 did interest rates begin to fall. The 
impact of high interest rates on the group was dramatic. 
By late 1974 interest payments were costing the group in 
excess of £1M per week. [32]
The other factor was the bear market of 1973/4. In a 
period of rising rates share prices in general came under 
pressure. In late 1974 the share price of Grand 
Metropolitan fell to a meagre 18p by which time the F.T.
500 share index had fallen to 150. [33] Reports in the
financial press suggested that the group was hovering on 
the brink of collapse. [34] Whilst the financial situation 
was certainly serious the reports were somewhat exaggerated 
as the group, had it proved essential, would have been able 
to dispose of sufficient of its many properties to remain 
financially viable. In the event, £4.5M worth of property 
was sold. As from the beginning of 1975 the stock market
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began its long climb to recovery taking the Grand 
Metropolitan share price with it. By early 1976 the share 
price had quadrupled from its low point and was back in 
favour with private and institutional investors alike.
During this difficult period it could be said that the 
asset value of the hotel properties helped buttress the 
share price of the company. The 1970's, however, was not 
such a successful decade for the U.K. hotel industry and 
the U.K. hotels of Grand Metropolitan contributed but a 
small proportion of group pre-tax profits.
The economic position of the U.K. improved subsequent to 
the recession of 1973-1975 and 1977 saw the best year in 
the decade for the U.K. hotels, largely as a result of it 
being Jubilee year. [35] In later years selective
purchases were made on the Continent of Europe, in 
particular the Hotel d'Angleterre in Copenhagen which 
Maxwell Joseph purchased in April 1979 in the face of 
fierce competition, including a competing bid from Sir 
Charles Forte. [36] In the following year three de luxe 
hotels in Paris were acquired - the Meurice, the Prince de 
Galles and the Grand with a combined total of 1027 rooms. 
[37] Developments in the U.K. centred on refurbishing the 
major hotel properties in an effort to move up market and 
thus maximise revenue. These developments were
concentrated on the London hotels such as The New
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Mandeville, the Berners and The Mayfair where in each 
property multi-million pound schemes of refurbishment were 
implemented.
CHANGING STRATEGIES OF 1980fs
Towards the end of the 1970's it became clear to the joint 
managing director, Stanley Grinstead, that in order to 
maintain the momentum of the group it would be necessary to 
expand abroad. Further bids in traditional areas of 
activity would almost certainly attract the attention of 
the Mergers and Monopolies Commission. Grinstead's 
prognosis was duly vindicated when the Grand Metropolitan 
bid for the gaming and hotel company, Coral, was referred 
to the Commission in October 1980. The re-organization of 
Watney was by this time almost complete; a sound divisional 
structure had emerged allowing a flexible balance between 
decentralization of management activity and retention of 
centralized financial control. [38] This, combined with 
the abolition of exchange control and the pattern of U.K. 
interest rates, produced a situation where the optimum 
route to further development lay in acquisitions overseas.
Once this decision had been taken - in the face of initial 
opposition from Maxwell Joseph himself, who was content to 
limit his activities to the U.K. and the Continent of 
Europe, the prime target became the United States of
- 295 -
America. The first major acquisition at a cost of US $570M 
(£260M), was the Liggett corporation where the principal
attraction was the distribution rights throughout the 
U.S.A. of J & B whisky, the main brand of International 
Distillers and Vintners. This bid was successfully
completed in May 1980. [39]
By early 1981 it was clear to Sir Maxwell Joseph that the 
acquisition of Liggett was an undoubted success. With a 
bridgehead in the U.S.A. now established the exploitation 
of the U.S. market was possible. Whilst the chairman and 
Stanley Grinstead were not overly concerned with acquiring 
additional hotels (the U.K. hotel division having been 
somewhat of a disappointment in the 1970's), when the 
opportunity arose to purchase Intercontinental, they could 
scarely resist a strike that would:
a) allow the group to acquire an . international hotel 
business;
b) enable the corporate image to be promoted worldwide in 
locations used by the international business traveller;
c) promote a degree of synergy between the operating 
divisions. [40]
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In addition the deal effectively allowed Grand Metropolitan 
to extricate itself from possible involvement in a bid for 
the Savoy Hotel Group. [41] Taking into account the fact 
that the early development of the group had centred on 
hotels the successful conclusion of the bid, conducted by 
Stanley Grinstead, represented a felicitous climax to the 
career of the Chairman.
Several of the largest hotel companies in the world are 
subsidiaries of multi-nationals. Sheraton, for example, 
the second largest in terms of rooms, is a subsidiary of 
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). The growth of 
international airlines after the second world war led to 
the building of a spate of hotels in a manner similar to 
the growth of the railway hotels a century before. The 
traumatic aftermath of the quadrupling of oil prices in 
1973 left international airlines vulnerable to even slight 
reductions in turnover. As the recession of 1979 deepened, 
both tourist and business travel diminished with the result 
that major airlines found themselves in deep financial 
trouble. It was against this background that Grand 
Metropolitan commissioned a major U.S. investment bank to 
make a study of airlines who might wish, or better, might 
be forced to sell off an hotel subsidiary. This study was 
completed in the spring of 1981. [42] By July Grand
Metropolitan was in a position to commence negotiations. In 
the period July 9th to July 10th Stanley Grinstead, whilst
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in New York, indicated to Pan American that Grand 
Metropolitan might be interested in acquiring the 
Intercontinental Hotel Corporation. [43]
In 1946 Pan American World Airways formed a wholly owned 
subsidiary Intercontinental Hotel Corporation (IHC). 
Incorporated in the state of Delaware the company was 
headquartered in New York with divisional offices in 
Europe, Africa and the Pacific. Legislation forbade Pan Am 
to operate flights within the U.S.A., thus hotel 
development was promoted on an international basis. By 
1981 the company had grown to the point where it was 
involved in nearly 100 hotels and hotel projects spread 
over 51 countries and spanning six continents. Only six 
hotels were owned via franchise and 15 were at the stage of 
either construction or design. The total number of rooms 
available was 31,000 with a medium term target of 40,000.
The acquisition of IHC was carried out by Grand 
Metropolitan with secrecy and speed with the result that 
many would-be bidders were left at the starting gate. For 
U.S.$500M (£270M) Grand Metropolitan was able to secure a 
truly international hotel corporation at the top end of the 
market, catering for the business rather than the tourist 
and with a proven reputation for efficient and effective 
management. In acquiring IHC Grand Metropolitan was able 
to recoup its position in the forefront of the hotel
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industry, increase its exposure to the markets of the 
U.S.A., withdraw from its middle market operations in the 
U.K. and provide additional points of sale for its liquor 
products.
The bid made Grand Metropolitan the ninth largest hotel 
group in the world on the basis of number of rooms and more 
important one of the top three, together with Hilton and 
Sheraton, in the international business market. This 
up-market move allowed the group to dispose of the vast 
majority of middle market hotels in the U.K. The 
provincial hotels fetched £26M and, during 1982 and 1983, 
sales of selected London hotels raised close on £100M. The 
proceeds were utilized to reduce group debt which, at its 
peak, stood close to £1 billion. [44]
It was rapidly decided that IHC would operate as an 
autonomous division within Grand Metropolitan and would 
continue to be headquartered in New York. This move, very 
much in line with the management style of the group, was 
widely seen as an early vote of confidence in the undoubted 
quality of IHC management. As a result the other principal 
hotels within the group, both in the U.K. and the Continent 
of Europe were incorporated or aligned to IHC. The other 
major development centred on the de-regulation of airline 
legislation (which naturally brought about increased 
competition) within the U.S.A. This had been announced
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prior to the bid and permitted Pan Am to fly within the 
U.S.A. and as a result a number of important hotel 
projects in selected U.S.A. cities were commenced. Such 
moves aided other hotels in the group as the business 
traveller in the U.S.A. could then use the same airline 
and hotel group throughout.
Prior to the bid, Pan Am's efforts in the late 1970's to 
gain domestic traffic rights gave the impetus to an attempt 
develop its own network of hotels in the U.S.A. 
Consequently several hotel projects were initiated and 
progressed to the planning and design stage. In 1980 Pan 
Am acquired National Airlines thus enabling market entry. 
It is ironic that the failure of Pan Am to successfully 
assimilate this acquisition was a major factor in its 
subsequent financial embarrassment and the resultant forced 
sale of IHC. It is also ironic that the internal financial 
problems of IHC in the post acquisition period stemmed from 
major hotel projects within the U.S.A. With the exceptions 
of New York and Washington all proved difficult and were 
disappointing at operating, let alone post interest and tax 
levels. [45]
At the time the bid was severely criticized by certain 
sections of the financial community on the grounds that of 
the U.S.$500M consideration only U.S.$116M represented 
tangible assets - the balance represented goodwill - the
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bulk of it in the Intercontinental brand name. Furthermore 
the critics made the valid point that the spate of U.S. 
properties to be developed would take some years to come 
into profit and consequently it would not be until around 
1990 that the division would show a post interest profit. 
The bid, however, really has to be viewed in the light of 
the strategic approach taken to such acquisitions both by 
Sir Maxwell Joseph, who died in the year following the 
bid, and Stanley Grinstead whose overriding aim was to 
acquire global brand names that would support each other 
and which would form the core activities of the expanding 
international group. In the short term the IHC acquisition 
adversely affected gearing and impeded group profits.
It should be noted that in 1982, the year after 
acquisition, the 6 properties that were owned produced 30% 
of the divisional profit, the 39 that were managed produced 
45%, the 19 that were leased 23%, whilst those 23 that were 
franchised (mainly in eastern Europe) accounted for a mere 
2% of the divisional profit. This shows the complex nature 
of each of the agreements and the substantial sums involved 
in rent and similar fixed charges. Whilst the properties 
owned produced a significant percentage of the divisional 
profit they did, of course, individually account for a very 
substantial capital investment. [46]
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The U.K. hotels of Grand Metropolitan did not carry a 
consistent image. Indeed, on one occasion they were 
referred to by a fellow director as "a series of one off 
property deals engineered by Max Joseph." [47] This is a 
valid comment and indicates the especial attraction of an 
international brand such as IHC which is synonymous with a 
de luxe standard of accommodation, food and drink. 
Consequently the opportunity was taken to rationalize the 
U.K. hotel portfolio in 1982 and 1983 as a result of which 
some £125M was realized. Prominent amongst the disposals 
was the sale of the 26 Country Hotels to the rapidly 
expanding Queen's Moat House group in 1982 for £30M, the 
sale of the Mount Royal to the Mount Charlotte group for 
£21.5, the sale of the Piccadilly to the Gleneagles group 
for £15M, whilst the Mandeville and the Berners were 
together sold for a like sum to private buyers. Part of 
the proceeds were applied to major refurbishment schemes at 
the Britannia (£8M) , and Mayfair, (£13.6M), in London and 
the Grand in Paris. Other properties received similar, 
albeit less costly treatment, and the total expended in 
this way was close on £60M. [48]
Within IHC, a separate Forum division was set up in the mid 
1970's. By 1988 it consisted of 13 large hotels of a 
standard not quite so high but offering a wide range of 
services at a competitive price (4 star). At the time of 
acquisition there were only six but the group has shown a
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commitment to expanding this area of the division where 
market opportunities presented themselves such as Glasgow, 
where the construction of a 300 bedroom hotel with 
extensive conference and banqueting facilities commenced in 
April 1987. .
The performance of the U.K. hotels of IHC may be seen by 
reference to Table 4 - 3 .  It will be noted that the 
occupancy percentages at the Intercontinental and the 
Portman improved year on year. At the Britannia and the
Mayfair the major refurbishment at each property was the 
cause of the temporary decline. It is also noteworthy that 
the income (operating profit) of the other three hotels 
increased in each of the years under review. This was the 
result, especially in 1983/4 of high occupancy percentages.
In June 1987 Sir Stanley Grinstead retired after thirty 
years service with the group. He was succeeded by Allen 
Sheppard who strengthened the board by a number of non 
executive appointments, the most notable that of Sir John 
Harvey-Jones, the former chairman of Imperial Chemical 
Industries, as Deputy Chairman of the group. [49]
Allen Sheppard appointed Peter Cawdron, formerly of 
merchant bankers S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd., to undertake a 
strategic review of group operations with a view to 
increasing the overall rate of return on the capital
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TABLE 4 - 3
VALUE AMOUNTS IN £(000s)
LONDON OPERATING RESULTS - 1981-1984
1981-1982 LONDON IHC PORTMAN BRITANNIA MAYFAIR
OCCUPANCY 65.9% 69.8% 75.7% 55.7%
TOTAL REVENUE 16,420 6,296 6,566 5,867
INCOME BEFORE FIXED COST 5,273 1,838 1,922 700
1982-1983
OCCUPANCY 73.0% 73.4% 64.3% 52.4%
TOTAL REVENUE 18,954 6,967 6,584 6,350
INCOME BEFORE FIXED COST 7,055 2,218 1,912 1,261
1983-1984
OCCUPANCY 81.0% 79.3% 64.8% 46.8%
TOTAL REVENUE 23,024 8,312 7,488 7,174
INCOME BEFORE FIXED COST 9,546 2,552 1,998 1,240
Source: Company Records - Intercontinental Hotel Corporation
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employed within the company. One suggestion following this 
review was that Grand Metropolitan should sell 
Intercontinental. The reasoning behind this was twofold: 
with only 100 hotels worldwide the group would have 
difficulty in significantly raising this number as the 
hotels operated at the top end of the market; furthermore 
as a result of the continuing increase in the value of 
hotel property, particularly in the period 1985 to 1988, 
the rate of return was substantially below company norms. 
The decision was thus taken to sell Intercontinental and 
this was achieved in the autumn of 1988 when it was sold to 
the Japanese conglomerate Seibu Saison for £1.35 billion 
net. This enabled Grand Metropolitan to make a post-tax 
profit, after expenses, of more than £500M - a very good 
return for seven years ownership.
CONCLUSION
It may be seen, therefore, that the hotel interests of 
Grand Metropolitan underwent radical changes during the 
lifetime of the company. The 1950*s and 1960's reflected 
the property oriented approach to the hotel industry 
favoured by Maxwell Joseph. During this period Grand 
Metropolitan emerged as the leading hotel group in the 
U.K., especially with regard to advanced management 
techniques, particularly in the area of sales and 
marketing, which were later copied by competitors. The
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1970's was a disappointing decade for U.K. hotels in 
general and within Grand Metropolitan growth was restricted 
essentially to the purchase of selected properties on the 
Continent of Europe. The 1980's saw marked change with the 
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Intercontinental, as 
a result of which the company effectively withdrew from the 
international hotel industry and retained only a very 
limited presence in the U.K., via properties which had a 
small amount of accommodation but which were effectively 
run as either pubs or restaurants.
The success of the group in the hotel business was due 
primarily to the property dealing skills of Sir Maxwell 
Joseph, secondly to the strategic management skills of Sir 
Stanley Grinstead who co-ordinated the IHC acquisition and 
last but not least to the management skills within IHC that 
resulted in its world wide reputation both for the tourist 
and more especially for the business traveller.
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2. Bass PLC
Crest Hotels Chairman Brian Langton
Holiday Inns
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASS
Bass PLC is the leading brewer in the U.K., having 22% of 
the beer market by volume and is the largest exporter of 
beer brewed in the U.K. [1] The group also has extensive 
interests in wines, spirits and soft drinks. In recent 
years the group has diversified into several sectors of the 
leisure industry and is now a major player in the travel 
trade, the hotel industry and in off course bookmaking. 
[2]
Brewery companies within the Bass group have been traced as 
far back as 1492, the year in which Hoare and Company of 
London was founded. Bass itself was founded in the
eighteenth century in Burton on Trent. [3] The Bass red
triangle is recognized as the world's first registered
trade mark, used as the shipping mark on casks of beer sent
to Russia and the Baltic States by William Bass in the late 
eighteenth century. The reputation of the company grew 
rapidly, the consequent growth resulting in the company 
being recognized as the largest brewing company in the 
world by the end of the nineteenth century. In the second 
half of that century the chairman was Michael Thomas Bass,
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the grandson of the founder. He was a Victorian in the 
best entrepreneurial tradition of the industrial 
revolution. He had a strongly paternalistic attitude
towards his employees and provided conditions of service 
and rates of pay that were generally superior to those of 
his competitors. During this century Bass merged first 
with Worthington in 1926 and then with Mitchells and 
Butlers in 1961. [4]
Charrington and Company together with Tennent Caledonian 
Breweries formed the two other major constituents of Bass. 
The origins of Charrington may be traced to 1757 when a 
brewery was built in the East End of London. John 
Charrington acquired an interest in this brewery in 1766,
bought out his partners a few years later and by 1806 had 
become the second largest brewer of ale in London.
Continued expansion during the next 150 years made 
Charrington one of the largest brewers in the South East in 
the post war era. [5]
The Tennent family's association with brewing in Scotland 
dates back to 1556. In 1793 the family acquired the 
Wellpark Brewery in Glasgow, which is still the
headquarters of the company. In 1885 Hugh Tennent began to 
brew lager and this became the major product of the
company, thus pointing the way for the increasing 
popularity of lager throughout the U.K. [6]
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The structure of the brewing industry in the U.K. changed 
markedly in the immediate post war era. In 1953 there were 
135 quoted companies engaged in brewing - by 1969 this had 
shrunk to 35. Similarly the number of breweries in the 
U.K. in 1960 was 358 - by 1969 this had fallen to 211. [7]
The merger of Bass, Mitchells and Butlers with Charrington 
United Breweries took place in 1967 and from it emerged a 
strong group with nationwide coverage and distribution, 
selling 70 major brands of beer. The name of the company 
was changed first to Bass Charrington Limited, then in 1979 
to Bass Limited and in 1981 to Bass PLC. [8]
The last three chairmen of Bass have all been accountants 
by profession. Sir Derek Palmar took over the chair from 
Sir Alan Walker in 1976 and served in that capacity until 
1987 when he was appointed president, Ian Prosser being 
appointed chairman. This syndrome has been partially 
responsible for the development of sophisticated 
computerized systems of management reporting and the 
consequent strong position of divisional finance directors. 
This is not to say that the company is entirely run by 
accountants - indeed many would say that the principal 
strength of the company is the consistently high standard 
of its wide range of beers which, in turn, must be 
attributed to the professional and technical skills of its 
brewers. To this should be added the strong distributive
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skills of the company which ensure that the products 
leaving the brewery arrive in sound condition at the 
ultimate point of sale.
CREST HOTELS DIVISION
Most of the companies within the Bass Charrington group 
owned a few premises which were larger than the traditional 
pub - in some cases these were pubs with restaurants, in 
others they were pubs with a few rooms trading as hotels, 
and there were in addition a small number of motels. One 
company in particular, Hunt Edmunds Hotels, owned and 
operated some 25 small hotels in the Cotswolds and these 
properties were controlled from Banbury. [9] Subsequent to 
the 1967 merger the combined group decided to form a 
separate hotel division with separate management to cover 
all the hotels, of which there were some 120, with 
locations as geographically diverse as the South East coast 
to the North of England. The Crest name had been used by 
one of the companies located in the North of England and it 
was decided to use this name for all hotels in the combined 
group. Thus Crest Hotels came into being in 1969. [10]
The first managing director of Crest Hotels was Christopher 
Price who had been involved in the hotel industry since 
1935, subsequent to having taken a degree at Cambridge and 
having spent two years with a firm of chartered
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accountants. Having been appointed to the board of Hunt 
Edmonds, the brewers, in 1950 he had been responsible for 
forming their hotel company in 1954. When Hunt Edmunds 
merged with Bass, Mitchells and Butlers in 1965, Price was 
given responsibility for all hotel properties within the 
combined group and this responsibility was extended to the 
Charrington properties in 1967. The deputy managing 
director was Edgar Gerhardt who had come to England from 
Germany in the late nineteen thirties. Subsequent to more 
than a decade with British Transport Hotels, Gerhardt held 
various management positions with a number of hotel 
companies before being appointed general manager of the 
northern hotels of Hunt Edmunds at the time of the merger 
with Bass, Mitchells and Butlers. He was appointed a 
director in 1967 and deputy managing director in 1970. 
[11]
From the outset Price and Gerhardt decided to concentrate 
on the business as opposed to the tourist market. With the 
financial muscle of a blue chip company behind them they 
sought to build from scratch purpose built hotels/motels, 
sited at strategic points throughout the U.K. to service 
the steadily growing business market. Carefully sited 
properties brought with them accessibility for both guests, 
staff and suppliers.
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Original brewery hotel properties which possessed special 
features, such as the Hunt Edmunds hotels in the Cotwolds, 
were retained but many of the 120 original properties were 
either sold or transferred to either the managed or 
tenanted estate of the brewery. Other properties which 
were suited to refurbishment and modernization were 
retained but the emphasis was placed firmly on providing 
modern facilities for the business traveller. [12]
Typical locations for the early Crest hotels opened in the 
period 1969 to 1972 were Preston, Walsall, Grimsby, Luton 
and Carlisle. The average number of bedrooms was 110, all 
with private facilities and additional features such as 
trouser presses and mini-bars. [13] The range of
facilities offered to clients was superior to many 
competing establishments and in the early 1970's the room 
rates were a mere £4.20 per person per night. Capital 
construction costs were then very modest - the 139 bedroom 
Luton Crest hotel with an area of 5,620 square metres was 
built and fitted out at a total cost of £597,000, 
equivalent to £4,300 per bedroom. [14] It is worth noting 
that only 15 years later the comparable cost would be at 
least ten times the 1972 amount. The bar and restaurant 
areas tended to reflect aspects of local community life - 
this to encourage local business in all food and beverages 
areas.
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When the hotels opened the average food spend in the 
evening, the majority of clients being businessmen on 
expenses, was in the region £1.20 to £1.30. [15]
The parent company was well pleased with the initial 
performance of Crest hotels and saw its success as 
vindication for keeping the management of the hotel group 
completely separate from the managed and tenanted estate. 
Whilst in retrospect this may seercv a "common sense" 
decision, it was not then the norm for major brewery 
companies to do so. Competing firms did not, in a number 
of cases, form separate hotel divisions until much later. 
As a result, this gave Bass and Crest an added advantage 
and spurred the hotel division towards a degree of 
independence. The head office of the hotel division was 
located in Banbury and has remained there since the 
formation of Crest in 1969. [16]
In addition to Kit Price and Edgar Gerhardt, top management 
consisted of a properties and development director, an 
operations director and two divisional general managers 
together with functional specialists covering sales & 
marketing, finance, personnel & training and catering. The 
catering executive Ken Butcher subsequently became 
development director. With such a range of expertise the
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group continued to grow rapidly and having garnered 
considerable experience in the hotel/motel field set its 
sights on development outwith the U.K.
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ACQUISITION OF ESSO MOTOR HOTELS
The main board of Bass, and the chairman Sir Derek Palmar 
in particular, were by this time seeing the benefits of 
investment in the hotel industry and were of a mind to 
increase their range of activities in this field. Sir Derek 
had joined Bass in 1970, having been associated with the 
group in his capacity as a merchant banker with Hill Samuel 
during the nineteen sixties, where he had responsibility 
for arranging many of the mergers within the company. He 
realised the importance of diversification into leisure and 
related fields for the major brewery companies and was keen 
to ensure that Bass would be at the forefront of such 
movement. Accordingly it was he who was instrumental, 
towards the end of 1972, in starting negotiations with the 
oil company Esso for the acquisition, at a cost of £27M, 
of their hotel/motel operations on the continent of Europe. 
[17]
Esso Europe (Standard Oil of New Jersey) had diversified 
into the motel business in 1963, the aim being to provide 
the travelling motorist with facilities for accommodation, 
food and drink. The motels were sited on the Continent of
Europe next to filling stations thus providing a
comprehensive package for the client.
- 318 -
The development proceeded in three stages - in the early 
years Esso concentrated on developments of low rise motels 
with 50 - 100 bedrooms, immediately adjacent to filling
stations throughout Scandanavia. It was found that these 
were profitable and carried the added advantage of a short 
pay-back period. Gratified by their initial success Esso 
followed these with slightly larger properties of two or 
three stories at sites in the U.K. together with properties 
in Belgium, Holland and West Germany. As these also proved 
successful Esso proceeded to the third stage in its 
diversification into the hotel industry, by constructing 
several high rise conference hotels including a 339 bedroom 
hotel at Wembley near London. [18] The capital costs of 
these properties was considerably greater than the earlier 
properties, the management and marketing presented greater 
problems, the pay back periods were inevitably much longer 
and consequently Esso found that their honeymoon period 
with the hotel industry was all but over.
In addition Esso found that the operational costs involved 
were greater than originally anticipated (particularly with 
regard to the larger third generation properties) and this, 
together with the costs associated with a labour intensive 
industry, led them to decide to dispose of selected motels. 
They retained the 30 or so properties that had been 
established throughout Scandanavia but offered the 
remainder for sale. Consequently Bass was able to acquire
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24 established properties together with three projects then 
under course of construction. The properties were widely 
spread - 9 in the U.K., 9 in West Germany, 4 in Holland, 2
in Italy and 1 each in Austria, Belgium and France. [19] 
The largest property in the U.K. was the 339 bedroom hotel 
in Wembley, North London while the largest on the Continent 
of Europe was a 300 room property in Antwerp which opened 
in 1974.
Between 1974 and 1978 the new owners, Bass, made further 
acquisitions - 5 properties in the U.K., 3 in West Germany
and 1 in Belgium, thus giving the group a strong presence 
in Continental Europe. [20] The operation of hotels both 
in the U.K. and on the Continent of Europe gave Bass the 
opportunity, ahead of most of its U.K. competitors, to 
build a group which covered the majority of European 
countries, which in turn provided the springboard for the 
international expansion which was to occur in the following 
decade. That this came about and that a leading European 
hotel group was developed from what originally had been but 
a few Cotswold inns, owes much to the strategic vision and 
foresight of Sir Derek Palmar whose initial determination 
for Bass to become involved in the hotel and leisure 
industry was handsomely vindicated.
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Bryan Langton joined Crest in 1971 as a divisional manager.
Trained at the hotel schools of Westminster and Lausanne
and with extensive practical experience gained in 
Switzerland and West Germany he rapidly made his mark, 
being promoted to the board of Crest in 1973, to operations 
director on the Continent in 1975, thence to managing 
director, Continent of Europe in 1977.
During the 1970fs (a difficult decade for the hotel 
industry in the U.K] he was able, therefore, to play a key 
role in the development of the group and in particular was 
able to consolidate and expand on the 1973 acquisition of 
Esso Motor Hotels.
The 1970's ended on a high note for the group when it
purchased, at a cost of £16M, the 10 properties comprising
the Dutch Clingendael Group in 1979. This made Crest one 
of the largest operators in Holland. It brought the number 
of hotels on the Continent owned by the group to 29 which, 
together with the 53 in the U.K. totalled some 7,700 
bedrooms. [21]
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ACQUISITION OF CORAL GROUP
As the group moved into the 1980's the main board of Bass 
saw clearly the increasing importance of the service 
industries in general and of the leisure sector in 
particular. The board was keen to make a further major 
acquisition in the leisure field and the opportunity 
presented itself in October 1980. The Coral group's core 
activity was off-course bookmaking (600 licensed betting 
offices) supported by casino operations, the holiday camp 
firm Pontin's, diverse entertainment complexes and by an 
hotel group, Centre Hotels, which it had acquired in 1977 
at a cost of £16.7M. Grand Metropolitan's bid for Coral, 
valued at £83M, was referred to the Mergers and Monopolies 
Commission on October 17th, whereupon the chairman of Grand 
Metropolitan, Sir Maxwell Joseph, withdrew the bid thus 
leaving the field open to competitors.
During 1980 Coral was confronted with a number of 
serious problems:
a) profits before tax for the six months to June 1980 were 
£327,000 compared with £5,851,000 for the corresponding 
period in the previous year. [22]
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b) the principal cause of this fall was sharply increased 
interest rates which, taking the annual average of the 
Treasury bill rate, had risen from 8.535% in 1978 to 
12.988% in 1979, and to 15.127% in 1980. For a company 
like Coral with some £55M in loans of various
denominations this had proved little short of
disastrous as the fall in profits shows. [23]
c) following serious irregularities the authorities had 
effectively suspended the gaming licences of three of 
Coral's leading gaming establishments and made the 
remaining five vulnerable. Bass did not wish to 
operate in this field but the recent troubles clearly 
made disposal of such premises more difficult.
[24]
d) substantial capital expenditure had been applied to the 
Pontin's holiday camp business but this had yet to be 
recouped. [25]
Given these problems Coral was clearly vulnerable to 
takeover and from the Bass viewpoint it was the way into 
the holiday camp market, the betting as opposed to the 
gaming market, together with an expansion of its hotel 
interests in both the U.K. and the Continent where Centre 
had properties in Amsterdam. Once the £87M bid was cleared 
by the trade minister John Nott at the beginning of
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December, the Bass board were confident that it would be
accepted, especially carrying as it did the backing of the 
Coral directors who effectively were not capable of solving 
the problems that confronted them.
The Bass offer was on a share exchange basis - for every 13 
Ordinary shares of Coral of lOp, 6 Ordinary shares of 25p 
each in Bass, credited as fully paid. This indicated a 
value of lOOp per Coral share compared with a market value 
of only 60p on August 29th, the day before dealings in 
Coral were suspended following the first bid from Grand 
Metropolitan. Not surprisingly Bass gained control of
Coral by 11th December, the day on which the recommended 
offer closed. It had been a relatively painless exercise 
and, to a certain extent, the Bass board considered
themselves fortunate in that they had been rather surprised 
when the original Grand Metropolitan was referred to the 
Commission. It was a tribute to both them and their 
merchant bankers J. Henry Schroder Wagg & Co. Limited that 
they were able to act swiftly and decisively to secure the 
prize. [26]
It was a major task to successfully integrate all 25 Centre 
Hotels into the Crest network. On the one hand the 
location of the Centre hotels gave Crest entry into the 
London market, and other locations in which they had not
been previously represented. On the other hand a number of
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Centre properties required extensive refurbishment to bring 
them up to Crest standard. Furthermore, the main board of 
Bass were conscious of the deepening recession which 
accelerated early in 1981 and indicated to Crest that it 
might be prudent were the company to reduce, where 
practicable, its hotel portfolio. As a result the 
roomstock was reduced by some 1,500, the bulk of which were 
former Centre properties including the St James, the West 
Centre and the Bedford Corner, all in London. Taking into 
account the subsequent rise in hotel property values it was 
probably a strategic mistake to dispose of these hotels. 
Nevertheless the proceeds of sale provided funds for the 
refurbishment of selected properties formerly belonging to 
Centre. [27]
FURTHER EXPANSION IN THE U.K. AND ON THE CONTINENT OF 
EUROPE
In 1981 Bass acquired the Hollstein group of hotels in West 
Germany which owned and operated properties at Siegen, 
Ludenscheid and Friedrichsdorf together with an hotel under 
the course of construction in Hagen. [28] This was 
followed in 1986 by the purchase of the five star Villa 
Magna in Madrid, Spain. This de luxe property was 
purchased by Bass for £13M - within two years it could have 
been sold for double that amount. During 1981 and 1982 new 
hotels were constructed and brought into operation at
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Gloucester; Bexley, Kent; High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire 
and Rochester, Kent which gave Crest coverage in locations 
where hitherto it had not been represented. It was 
fortuitous that these hotels opened immediately subsequent 
to the recession of 1980/81 and therefore enjoyed 
satisfactory levels of turnover in the early years of 
operation. [29]
As a result of Crest being able to build a group of readily 
identifiable hotels catering for the business traveller, 
the leisure traveller and the short break market, the 
management of Crest were able to follow a clearly defined 
marketing policy which aimed to satisfy the needs of each 
market segment that had been targeted. In turn this led to 
the provision of specific facilities within Crest hotels 
such as the introduction of no-smoking bedrooms, the 
introduction of bedrooms specifically for female 
executives, the "Lady Crest" rooms and executive rooms 
which allowed all major office facilities to be 
incorporated into the accommodation.
As a result of such moves and combined with many programmes 
of substantial refurbishment and upgrading, Crest was able 
to follow an assertive pricing policy with prices each year 
throughout the 1980's rising significantly more than the 
annual rate of inflation. The fact that the company met
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with relatively little price resistance demonstrated that 
it was offering clients value for money and enabled the 
company to report increasing levels of profitability. [30]
As a result of acquisitions both in the U.K. and on the 
Continent of Europe, combined with the construction from 
scratch of properties in the U.K. the company grew to the 
point where, by the end of 1986, it owned and operated 50 
hotels in the U.K., 37 on the Continent of Europe and
employed no fewer than 10,300 staff. [31] Moreover the 
growth pattern had been carefully thought out and 
researched - it did not follow the somewhat haphazard 
pattern of some competing companies. Although the growth 
resulted in Crest becoming one of the four leading hotel 
companies in the U.K. in terms of number of bedrooms, the 
main board of Bass was of the opinion that in order to 
emerge as a major force in the field of leisure and tourism 
it would be necessary in the long term to acquire one of 
the leading worldwide brand names in the hotel business. In 
this respect they had before them the example of Grand 
Metropolitan which had acquired the Intercontinental Hotel 
Corporation from Pan American in 1981. The aim therefore 
was to find a major international company with a well known 
hotel subsidiary which it was prepared to sell. Clearly 
only a very few companies fitted this scenario. Research 
by Bass, however, discovered that the Holiday Corporation,
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the parent company of Holiday Inns, was in financial
difficulty and might be considered, therefore, as a 
possible target.
The Holiday Inn organisation was founded in 1951 by a
U.S.A. businessman by the name of Kemmons Wilson. On 
vacation with his family he found difficulty in obtaining 
reasonably priced overnight accommodation. He perceived 
the absence of such accommodation as a business
opportunity. The first Holiday Inn, which he built in
partnership with a local construction company, was opened 
in his home town of Memphis, Tennessee on August 1st 1952. 
Expansion followed rapidly and the company grew to become 
the largest hotel corporation in the world with some 1750 
properties in 51 countries across six continents.
In 1979 two important acquisitions were made:
a) the Perkins restaurant chain
b) a major hotel/casino operator Harrahs.
Subsequently the corporation undertook a major corporate 
appraisal and arranged its various operations in six 
distinct market segments of which Holiday Inn Hotels was 
one. The name of the parent company was changed to the
- 328 -
Holiday Corporation and a complex scheme of capital 
reconstruction was undertaken which increased the influence 
and protected the position of its principal executives.
As far as Europe was concerned, the corporation 
commissioned hotel consultants Horwath & Horwath to carry 
out a major study of all European properties in an attempt 
to target locations where new properties could be 
developed, and to identify properties which could be sold 
off. Even at this early stage the parent company saw the 
sale of properties outwith the U.S.A. as an important part 
of a defensive strategy aimed at fending off any takeover 
attempt.
Since the successful integration of the Centre hotel group 
acquired as part of the Coral transaction, the main board 
of Bass had been investigating the possibility of a further 
major acquisition in the hotel business based in the U.K. 
and the Continent of Europe. In the course of their quest 
they learned of the various moves being made by the Holiday 
Corporation and realised that negotiations with that 
company could well provide the springboard for expansion 
that they sought. [32]
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It was as a result of these moves that Bass was able to 
purchase in May 1987 four properties from Holiday Inn at a 
cost of £55M. The properties were located in London, 
Heathrow, Birmingham and Leicester, the Leicester property 
being the first opened by Holiday Inns in the U.K. back in 
1969. This transaction was quickly followed in June by the 
acquisition, at a cost of £35M, of four further Holiday Inn 
properties on the Continent of Europe, the locations being 
Paris, Eindhoven in Holland, Ghent in Belgium and Brussels 
airport. It was arranged that these properties would be 
owned by Crest Hotels but that Crest would operate them 
under franchise as Holiday Inn Hotels. [33]
The total cost of £90M was largely offset by the sale to 
Queens Moat Houses of 16 properties, (9 in West Germany, 6 
in Holland and 1 in Belgium) mainly freehold, at a cost of 
£73.75M. This was a good deal for both British groups - it 
enabled Queens Moat Houses to build on their previous 
expansion in Europe and it enabled Bass to get into a 
negotiating position with Holiday Inns for the major 
acquisition of their hotel properties outwith the U.S.A.
During the summer of 1987 Bass and Holiday Corporation 
worked out a deal whereby Bass was to acquire the 
international operations and the exclusive right to the 
Holiday Inn name outwith the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico. The 
international business consisted of 5 leased hotels with
- 330 -
1,833 rooms and 135 hotels with 32,083 rooms operated as 
joint ventures, management contracts or franchise 
agreements. In addition there were a further 13 hotels 
within the U.S.A., mainly in Tennessee, South Carolina and 
Florida. The consideration was U.S. $475M. This was to be 
paid partly in cash and partly by way of loan notes 
repayable over a period of 10 years. [35]
It was also decided that the two companies should form a 
joint venture in order to promote the Holiday Inn brand 
worldwide. The joint venture agreement ensured that Bass 
would have continued use of the Holiday Inn reservation 
system (Holidex); their management development (Holiday Inn 
University) and marketing programmes as well as agreed 
monitoring of standards via established quality control 
procedures. [36]
The net tangible assets acquired by Bass amounted to 
U.S.$215M, thus the balance of U.S.$260M represented 
goodwill. [37] This was not dissimilar to the experience of 
Grand Metropolitan who had acquired Intercontinental at 
U.S.$460M of which U.S.$344M represented goodwill. [38] 
For both companies, however, the deals were sound, and 
for Bass in particular it resulted in a secure foundation 
for further expansion worldwide.
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As an integral part of the agreement it was also decided 
that Bass should subscribe U.S.$100M for subordinated 
convertible debentures in Holiday Corporation which would 
carry rights to convert into Holiday stock at U.S.$38 per 
share. The effect of this was that, when fully converted, 
Bass would hold some 9% of the enlarged capital of Holiday 
Corporation. All the agreements were subsequently ratified 
early in 1988.
The strong cash flow of Bass largely financed the 
transaction, thus avoiding the need for a rights issue. As 
far as Bass was concerned the acquisition represented a 
major coup for the hotel division but did not radically 
alter the nature of the company. From the Holiday 
Corporation viewpoint the agreement was a useful fund 
raising exercise but in the words of the Wall Street 
Journal the strategy of divestiture still had "an awful 
long way to go." [39] There remained over 1,600 hotels in 
the U.S.A. and it was reckoned that Holiday Corporation 
would have to sell approximately 20% of its hotel stock in 
order to adequately strengthen its balance sheet.
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SUMMARY OF HOTEL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN BASS 1968 - 1988
The growth and development of the hotel interests of Bass 
in the period 1968 to 1988 were the result of a coherent 
strategy of . acquisition, cleverly implemented in three 
major steps - Esso, Coral and Holiday Inns. To this was 
added the groundwork executed by Christopher Price and 
Edgar Gerhardt and the building of the formidable 
management team led by Bryan Langton. All of this was 
backed by the management expertise and financial muscle of 
the parent company whose role in the development of the 
hotel division must not be underestimated, particularly the 
efforts of Sir Derek Palmar with regard to acquisitions. 
[40]
The overall result of the combined efforts has been to 
propel Bass to the forefront of the industry, both 
nationally and internationally. It is highly probable that 
Bass will continue to be in the forefront of initiatives 
and developments within the industry thus consolidating its 
position not only as the leading brewer in the U.K. but 
also as an hotel operator of international renown.
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HOTEL INTERESTS OF BASS 1968 - 1988
The development of the hotel interests of Bass represent an 
interesting example of how a major U.K. firm took a 
strategic decision to diversify into the hotel industry, 
and having achieved initial success risked substantial 
additional funds via the purchase first of Esso Motor 
Hotels and latterly of Holiday Inns, to become a major 
international player in the industry.
The success of the company at each stage of development in 
the hotel industry may be mainly attributed to careful 
planning and choice of experienced staff to head up the 
hotel division. The acquisition of Esso Motor Hotels was 
an opportunistic strike as were those of Coral, to include 
Centre hotels, and Holiday Inns. This latter investment 
propelled Bass to becoming the major international player 
in the hotel industry. Nevertheless the main board of Bass 
were able to view such a prospect with equanimity, secure 
in the knowledge that the core businesses of the company 
(beer, wines and spirits) would not be adversely affected 
and that the substantial amount paid for goodwill, 
U.S.$260M, was a fair reflection of the value attributable 
to a global brand name and the goodwill inherent therein.
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Once the hotel division was established Bass ensured that 
the hotel division was amply staffed in sales and marketing 
personnel, and that all markets for hotel products were 
fully exploited. The efforts of the corporate marketing 
staff played a significant part in the profitability of the 
operating units. It is in the areaof sales and marketing 
that the group most clearly exhibits the determinants of 
success in the hotel industry.
Compared with other firms Crest has not, perhaps, had quite 
the struggle or been subjected to as much pressure as other 
companies where hotels were the core business. 
Nevertheless, by a carefully implemented strategy of 
acquisition Bass has built a strong hotel division which 
has become a significant contributor to group 
profitability.
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3. Queens Moat Houses Chairman John Bairstow
FOUNDING OF MOAT HOUSE GROUP
The Moat House group was founded in 1968 by John Bairstow, 
the present chairman of the company. The early years of 
his business career were spent in the field of estate 
agency. Bairstow perceived the need for a simplified 
service to the general public in the field of house 
purchase and sale. In 1955, at the age of 23, he commenced 
business on his own account as an estate agent. Although 
not formally qualified as a chartered surveyor, his 
business prospered and during the 1960's expanded to take 
in some 40 retail outlets. [1]
Bairstow, like other estate agents before him, was drawn to 
the hotel business and during the period 1968 to 1972 
acquired properties at Brentwood, Ingatestone and
Harpenden, each near London, together with one in Woodhall 
Spa, Lincolnshire and another in Powys, Wales. With a 
fledgling group now established he was keen to acquire 
another group in order to consolidate progress and be in a 
position to expand. This was duly achieved by the merger 
of Queens Modern Hotels with the Moat House Group in 
September 1972. [2]
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The origin of this group may be traced to 1952 in which 
year the Queen's Hotel (Torquay) was incorporated. In 1965 
the name of the company was changed to Queens Modern Hotels 
at which time it was controlled by J. F. Nash, an 
accountant and stockbroker from Kettering,
Northampton-shire who was a prominent businessman who held 
directorships in over 100 companies. [3] The year after he 
became chairman the company purchased a small group, 
Marylebone Hotels, with properties in Brixham, Cheltenham, 
Filey and Manchester. [4] During the next two years 
further hotels were acquired in Skegness, Ross-on-Wye, 
Poole and Cromer. By the end of the decade group turnover 
was £1.9M, pre-tax profits £105,686 and post-tax profits 
£63,884. [5] The group was headquartered at Torquay from
1952 until 1968 when it was moved to Kettering.
QUEENS MOAT HOUSES 1972 - 1979
At the time of the merger it was agreed between the 
respective chairmen that Bairstow, in due course, would 
control the combined group. This duly came to pass in 1973 
when Nash resigned, disposing of his interests at a 
substantial profit. The way was thus clear for Bairstow to 
mesh the hotels into a sizeable group and thereafter expand 
as and when suitable opportunities arose.
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It was unfortunate that the merger took place shortly 
before the onset of the recession of 1973 - 1975.
Nevertheless the position of the group was alleviated by a 
strategic decision taken by Bairstow to concentrate on the 
business, rather than the tourist market. [6] As a result 
the group was shielded from the worst effects of the 
downturn during the succeeding two years. In the year
Bairstow took over as chairman the turnover was £4.1M and
- iay
the post^profits £193,000. By the end of the decade this 
had more than doubled to turnover of £11.8M and post tax 
profits of £405,000. [7] This was a period of steady
expansion with the majority of original hotels being sold 
and larger properties purchased in their stead. The only 
difficult year, in common with other firms in the industry, 
was 1975 when the dividend was passed. By the end of the 
decade the group was at the stage where it was poised for 
significant expansion. By now the group had sixteen hotels 
with a roomstock in excess of 1,000. [8]
During the 1970's four men emerged as the principal 
business colleagues of John Bairstow. Martin Marcus, after 
qualifying as a chartered accountant in 1970, joined John 
Bairstow as the accountant for the first hotel, the Moat 
House at Brentford. He was appointed company secretary in 
1973, finance director in 1977, joint managing director 
(with John Bairstow) in 1980, and deputy chairman (at the 
age of 36) in 1984. David Hersey, also a chartered
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accountant, subsequent to positions as chief accountant and 
company secretary, was appointed finance director in 1980. 
Gerry Bell, having joined the group in 1973, was later 
appointed director in charge of developments and in 1981 
combined this role with that of director of operations. The 
principal non-executive director was E.R. Earey who, until 
Martin Marcus' appointment in 1984, was deputy chairman. 
Amongst them the directors held some 4% of the issued 
ordinary shares of the company, John Bairstow's holding 
being 2.5%. [9]
A further and significant advantage lay in the group having 
a clearly defined business policy. The stated intentions 
were
1. to concentrate on high quality, commercially situated 
hotels offering modern facilities thereby obtaining 
all-year-round revenue without dependence on seasonal 
tourist trade;
2. to accord a high priority to the businessman's need for 
first-class conference, exhibition and banqueting 
facilities, as well as accommodation;
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3. to continue the search for suitable hotels for 
acquisition on a nationwide basis and to extend and 
upgrade facilities at our existing hotels with a view 
to enhancing the value of the Group by increasing the 
assets and earnings in the short and medium term;
4. to provide as much financial flexibility as possible by
ensuring that expansion and development is at least 
partly financed by the issue of futher ordinary shares 
or loan stock and by medium and long term loans from 
joint stock banks or their subsidiaries;
5. to keep shareholders fully informed of the real worth
of the Group by annual professional valuations of all
hotel and catering properties and equipment. [10]
The foregoing represents a concise statement of the desired 
objectives of an expanding hotel company. Particular 
attention was placed not only upon the specific locations 
of group hotels but also the market segment at which they 
are aimed. Attention was also focussed upon the need for 
expansion by acquisition. In the case of Queens Moat 
Houses the property dealing attributes and contacts of John 
Bairstow were of especial importance. The ultimate 
criterion of a successful dealer is not only that suitable 
properties are duly acquired but that they are acquired at 
prices which enhance the competitive advantage enjoyed by
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the firm, and moreover are financed in such a way as to 
benefit, wherever possible, existing shareholders. Annual 
professional valuations draw attention to the underlying 
asset value of the equity of a company and indicate to 
potential vendors the likely price their properties might 
fetch.
THE EVENTS OF THE 1980's
During 1980 six additional hotels were acquired, bringing 
the roomstock to 1,437, 94% of which had private bathrooms. 
To help pay for these acquisitions and to provide 
additional finance for expansion, the company arranged a 
10.5% Convertible Unsecured Loan Stock Issue to the value 
of E2.7M.
Towards the end of 1981 John Bairstow approached Sir 
Maxwell Joseph whom he knew well, both having originally 
trained as estate agents, and as a result an outline
agreement was reached that would allow Grand Metropolitan 
to dispose of its 26 county hotels to Queens Moat Houses 
for a price of approximately £30M. [11] The agreement was
subsequently ratified on 19th April 1982. This acquisition 
was a critical development in the expansion of Queens Moat 
Houses. At a stroke it more than doubled the capacity of 
the group, making it the largest independent provincial 
hotel group in the U.K. with 51 hotels representing a
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roomstock of 3,466. The consideration was £26M cash 
together with Grand Metropolitan taking a 12.5% stake in 
the equity of the company. The deal was financed via a 
rights issue of £14M, additional convertible unsecured loan 
stock of £3M and £10M in medium term bank loans. [12]
The timing of the deal suited both companies. On the one 
hand Grand Metropolitan wished to withdraw substantially 
from the U.K. market in order to concentrate on its 
Intercontinental acquisition. On the other the U.K was 
just emerging from a period of recession and this was 
reflected in the price of the deal that was arranged by the 
respective chairmen. It was in fact the last major deal 
struck by Sir Maxwell Joseph before his death in September 
1982.
Immediately subsequent to the acquisition of the County 
group, Queens Moat Houses had 49 hotels together with 6 
inns and restaurants. All but 5 of the hotels were located 
south of a line between Derby and Birmingham with almost 
half within a 30 mile radius of London. The integration of 
the two groups proceeded rapidly, aided by the fact that 
nearly all the County hotels meshed, judged by the criteria 
of location, accessibility to intended markets and by the 
competence of the County managers who were quick to 
recognise the opportunities offered by the Queens Moat 
House incentive management scheme.
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This scheme, originally formulated to combat periods of 
recession, is aimed at giving much greater autonomy to 
managers than is normally found within group operations 
throughout the industry. It applies in particular to the 
smaller hotels within the group. Its implementation 
results in the company being assured of a certain level of 
profit from each hotel where the scheme operates. This 
level of profit is predetermined in consultation with the 
manager and given to the company - conversely all profits 
in excess of the agreed amount are retained by the manager. 
This arrangement acts as a powerful stimulus to managers 
who effectively run their own business with the group 
acting in a manner not dissimilar to a franchisor. A 
further advantage is that such an arrangement minimises the 
role of the corporate head office which (mid 1987) employs 
only 25 staff. [13]
In addition to the hotels in the County group Queens Moat 
Houses also acquired from Grand Metropolitan, in March 
1983, the 129 room Drury Lane Hotel in Holborn, London WC2. 
This was the first London property purchased by the group 
but in view of the size of the hotel the cost was not 
disproportionate to similar acquisitions of the period such 
as the 249 room Hilton property at Stratford-upon Avon, 
Warwickshire purchased from the Lex Service Group for £5.7M 
cash. Towards the end of that year the Saxon Inn group of 
five hotels was acquired from the shipping concern Furness
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Withy. These acquisitions brought the total number of 
hotels to 56 and with the U.K. economy growing strongly the 
company was poised for significant expansion. [14]
The following year saw further acquisitions in the U.K.
when four additional properties were bought. Furthermore, 
considerable capital investment was made in the
refurbishing of selected properties, in the creation of 
health and leisure facilities and in the construction of 
specialised conference and banqueting suites. All this was 
central to the overall company policy of providing high
quality, good value facilities for the business community.
In a number of ways 1985 marked the high point of the 
current business cycle for the hotel industry in the U.K. 
During that year Queens Moat Houses acquired a further 13 
properties taking the total number of hotels to 70 and the 
total number of bedrooms to 6,120. [15] Early in the year
the group purchased the Holiday Inns at Dover and and 
Bucksburn, Aberdeen. Through their association with the
Telford Development Corporation, the group purchased the 
lease of the Telford Hotel, Golf and Country Club to 
complement the 100-bedroomed Telford Moat House which was 
opened in July 1986. Moving North, Queens Moat Houses then 
acquired two privately owned hotels in Barnsley and 
Rotherham. A third was built near Doncaster and opened in 
March 1987. A 49.9% interest in the equity of the
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Harrogate International Hotel, originally opened in 1984, 
was acquired between October 1985 and April 1986, with the 
option to acquire the remainder in 1989, the development 
having taken place via the Business Expansion Scheme. These 
purchases resulted in the group having 600 rooms in 
Yorkshire.
The start of the following year saw the acquisition, at a 
cost of £6.8M, of the Dean Park Group with hotels in 
Watford, Stevenage and Renfrew near Glasgow, in which city 
the Kelvin Park Lorne was also acquired. The Liverpool 
Holiday Inn with the 264 rooms and the Royal Hotel in 
Nottingham with 210 rooms came into the group in March. 
Later in the year the group acquired a majority holding in 
the company which owned the freehold of the Bedford Moat 
House.
Finance for this expansion was provided via a rights issue 
of Convertible Preference Shares which raised £25M and a 
placing of £35M debenture stock carrying a coupon of 
101/4%. The successful raising of finance has been an 
important feature of the growth of the group. This success 
is essentially a function of the experience and reputation 
of John Bairstow and his long term association with the 
major joint stock banks. The combination of favourable
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trading conditions and these major acquisitions resulted in 
pre tax profits moving from £6.6M in 1984 to £10.5M in 1985 
and £14.9M in 1986. [16]
EXPANSION UPON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE
It has already been noted that in a number of ways 1985 
marked the high point in the current business cycle for the 
hotel industry in the U.K. This fact was not lost on John 
Bairstow and his fellow directors. Whilst they were still 
keen to expand in the U.K., opportunistic strikes were by 
now few and far between and when properties did come to the 
market the asking prices usually reflected high levels of 
turnover and profitability. Consequently they became less 
attractive to potential purchasers, who saw clearly that 
such acquisitions would carry not only a degree of 
commercial risk but also would call for a lengthy pay back 
period to recoup the initial capital investment.
As acquisition costs and construction from scratch costs 
within the U.K. began to exceed £50,000 to £60,000 per 
bedroom throughout the provinces, the board of Queens Moat 
Houses decided to expand abroad. Subsequent to several 
reconnaissance visits by the development and operations 
director Gerry Bell, who previously had advocated that such 
a move might be strategically worthwhile, the board decided 
that the optimum area for expansion should be North West
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Continental Europe. In this region, densely populated and 
with a standard of living generally higher than in the U.K. 
hotel property prices nevertheless were much more 
reasonable. Historically U.K. companies had enjoyed mixed 
success with Continental acquisitions, but Queens Moat 
Houses pursued their objective of aiming for hotel groups 
which catered for the business rather than the tourist 
market.
Their first acquisition came in November 1986 when they 
purchased the entire share capital of the holding company 
of the independent Bilderberg group, the largest in 
Holland. This group comprised 6 restaurants and 12 hotels 
with a total of 912 bedrooms, but having space to add 
bedrooms in some of the locations. [17] All the hotels and 
restaurants were within one hour's drive of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and The Hague. The total cost of acquisition of 
the Bilderberg Group was Dutch Florins 50.6M equivalent to 
£15.5M, the consideration being satisfied by £1.66M cash 
and the balance by the issue to the vendor of £22.5M new 
ordinary shares in QMH which were placed via their main 
brokers Capel-Cure Myers. [18]
The acquisition came about in a typically interesting 
fashion. The Bilderberg Group enjoyed an enviable 
reputation in Holland, offering as it did a premium service 
in the business conference, business travel and domestic
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leisure markets. Seven of the properties were freehold 
with the remaining two being held on long lease. The 
group, however, was burdened with a high level of debt and 
the principal shareholder decided to sell. He instructed 
merchant bankers Goldman Sachs to find a buyer but initial 
discussions in the U.S.A. came to naught. Almost by chance 
John Bairstow, whilst attending a race meeting a*t Ascot, 
was introduced to the bank and fruitful discussion ensued. 
[19]
At the time of acquisition the book value of the properties 
of the Bilderberg Group were £38.5M, although QMH valued 
them at a significantly higher figure. Nevertheless the 
Bilderberg Group had outstanding loans of £27M denominated 
in Dutch Florins and carrying interest above the then 
current market rate. Consequently QMH was able to structure 
a refinancing package in which the interest rate was cut 
from 10% to 7% thus saving some £810,000 per annum. [20]
In the spring of 1987, expansion continued with the 
purchase of two further Holiday Inns, one in Kassel, West 
Germany and the other in Liege, Belgium. These were 
followed in May by the purchase of the Hotel De 
Keizerskroon in Apeldoorn and the 5 star Maastricht Hotel 
which, together with the management contract for another 
hotel in Maastricht, brought the total number of hotels in
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Holland to 15. To these important acquisitions was added 
in July the Hotel Admiral in Switzerland bringing the total 
number of bedrooms on the Continent to 1,800. [21]
In September 1987 the group commenced the acquisition of 
two further groups on the Continent of Europe:
a) the Globana Group which comprised seven international
city centre and airport hotels and one provincial
hotel, all in West Germany. These hotels were
previously managed by companies within the Holiday Inns 
group under management contracts which were terminated 
upon completion. Each of the hotels was of four star
standard and the total number of rooms was 1,706. The
total purchase consideration for these properties was 
E73.83M. [22]
b) the Crest Group which constituted part of Crest Hotels,
a subsidiary of the Bass brewing group based in the 
U.K. of the properties acquired 9 were in West Germany, 
6 in Holland and 1 in Belgium. The hotels were all of 
a three or four star standard and the majority were 
freehold. In this case the purchase consideration was 
£73.75M. [23]
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In each case the purchase price reflected an open market 
valuation of the properties carried out by Weatherall, 
Green & Smith, Chartered Surveyors to the company. These 
two major acquisitions brought the number of hotels within 
the group to 116 with a room stock of 11,730. The 
acquisition made Queens Moat Houses the largest U.K. 
operator on the Continent of Europe with 36% of its hotels 
and no less than 43% of its bedrooms now located across the 
channel. [24]
There was strong commercial logic in these acquisitions as 
each of the Continental Groups had been built on the 
business as opposed to the tourist market. The properties 
were all situated in vibrant commercial centres where the 
expertise of Queens Moat Houses could be rapidly applied to 
any situation where profits were not optimal.
The acquisitions were financed partly via a rights issue of 
£86M, 95.1% of which was taken up by existing shareholders 
with the balance being sold during September 1987 at a 
premium of more than 2Op per share in the market. The 
balance was financed via a £300M multi European currency 
loan at interest rates significantly lower than those 
prevailing in the U.K. [25] Moreover it allowed the company 
to match its assets on the Continent of Europe with 
borrowings in local currencies.
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It is worth noting that the origins of these two important 
deals lay in a global strategic appraisal by the Holiday 
Corporation (the parent company of Holiday Inns). 
Subsequent to a major report by hotel consultants Horwath & 
Horwath, strategic decisions were taken to sell off many 
Holiday Inn properties outwith the U.S.A. as a defensive 
measure against a possible unwelcome take over approach. 
Consequently the brewing group Bass significantly 
strengthened its position in the hotel industry via a £300M 
purchase of Holiday Inn properties throughout Europe and in 
turn decided to relinquish control of the sixteen hotels 
mentioned above. Some of these had been held by Bass since 
its first foray into the hotel industry when in 1973 it 
purchased, for £27M, hotels owned and operated by the oil 
company Esso. [26]
ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS OF QUEENS MOAT HOUSES
On detailed examination six reasons can be advanced for the 
continuing success of the company. To a significant extent 
they rest with the ability of the top management to bet 
successfully against the crowd.
1. concentration on business market
2. composition of sales mix
3. avoidance of London market
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4. expansion on Continent of Europe
5. autonomy for unit general managers
6. timing and content of property deals.
1. The early decision of John Bairstow to concentrate on 
the business as opposed to the tourist market. This was 
taken at a time when many of the larger groups were moving 
in the opposite direction. The decision was vindicated not 
only by the recession of 1973 to 1975, but by subsequent 
events which have resulted in many of the hotels becoming 
focal points within local communities. Linked to the 
management incentive scheme this has resulted in an 
extraordinary small turnover of unit general managers. In 
the words of one of the main board directors the aim of the 
company is for the local community to perceive the unit 
general manager as "the local vicar." Where, in matters 
secular, this can be achieved, the rewards both to the 
company and the manager involved are considerable. [27]
2. An interesting knock-on effect of this strategy has 
been that the sales mix in the U.K. provincial hotels shows 
a higher than average turnover of food and beverage. Whilst 
these areas of hotel operation carry a smaller profit 
margin than accommodation, the fact that volume in these 
areas has been higher than average has resulted in greater 
than average contributions to overall unit operating
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profit. Furthermore it has resulted in improved occupancy 
percentage as a proportion of food and beverage clients 
invariably constitute a market segment for accommodation.
3. The decision to steer clear of the London hotel market 
with its very high entry costs and its reliance on the 
tourist market. To date the company has only the
relatively small Drury Lane hotel in its portfolio. This
property was purchased towards the end of the Grand 
Metropolitan rationalization at, by London standards, the 
modest cost of E2.25M. The purchase price was
substantially less than subsequent individual purchases in 
the provinces and on the Continent of Europe.
4. The decision, subsequent to the near saturation of the 
U.K. market, to focus growth on the Continent of Europe as 
opposed to the U.S.A. To date U.K. firms have had but 
mixed success across the Atlantic - Imperial made a 
disastrous foray with the purchase of the Howard Johnson 
chain of restaurants and suffered considerable capital 
losses on its ultimate disposal, whilst the
Intercontinental acquisition by Grand Metropolitan in 1981 
was never fully vindicated in profit terms.
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5. The early decision to grant greater than customary 
autonomy to individual hotel managers. This has resulted 
not only in increased levels of operating profit but has 
had the welcome additional benefit of helping to keep head 
office staffing levels and costs to a minimum. Furthermore, 
as has already been mentioned, it has resulted in very low 
levels of staff turnover at unit manager level, with 
consequent cost savings.
6. The principal reason, however, for the success of the 
group, which stems essentially from the many years of 
experience in property dealing of John Bairstow, has been 
the ability to identify properties which have been acquired 
at realistic prices and subsequently have been capable both 
of extension and of being rapidly meshed into the expanding 
group. Allied to this has been John Bairstow*s ability to 
raise finance which he modestly describes as "knowing my 
way round the city". [28] The best example of this was the 
timing of the rights issue of £86M and the parallel 
multi-currency loan of £300M, both of which were finalized 
just before the stock market crash of October 19th 1987. 
Whilst it is fair to say that there was an element of luck 
about the timing of these transactions, it is equally true 
to say that there is almost always a very strong 
correlation between luck and competence. The enduring 
relationship the company enjoys with the major joint stock 
banks is indicative of the competence and reputation of the
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board of directors. In fact, it is fair to say that, in 
the post-war period in the U.K. John Bairstow may be ranked 
second only to Sir Maxwell Joseph as a dealer in hotel 
property.
A further point of interest is that the top management of 
the group consists essentially of Bairstow, a property 
dealer, two chartered accountants and an operations 
director whose background was in the field of architecture 
and interior design. None are or have been practising 
hoteliers. The company thus represents a further example 
of a group of professionals directing and encouraging 
individual hoteliers in the arts of business.
There can be little doubt that for all concerned with the 
company, Queens Moat Houses has been an outstanding 
financial success. Shareholders lucky enough to have 
acquired shares in the early days of the company when, for 
example, they could have been bought for 3p, have seen the 
value of such shares rise steadily to the point where, at 
the end of 1988 they were valued at 97p. [29]
In this time the value of freehold and leasehold property, 
spurred by the sharp acceleration of the property prices in 
general in the period 1985 to 1988, has risen to more than 
£1 billion. [30] The billion pound barrier was broken 
consequent to the 1988 revaluation of properties which
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disclosed a surplus of £170 million. This underpins the 
shares value making it all but invulnerable to any short 
term trading downturn. The company is capitalized at £62 0 
million representing a continuous growth trend in both 
turnover, which moved from £59 million in 1984 to £234 
million in 1988, and pre-tax profit which, in the same 
period moved from £6.6 million to £42 million. [31] A high 
level of retentions, £23.7 million in 1988, ensures that 
profits are ploughed back into the business, primarily to 
maintain and upgrade the standard of property, plant and 
equipment. The company now (1989) operate 82 hotels in the 
U.K. with a further 55 on the Continent of Europe. [32] 
This balance between U.K. and Continental operations is a 
further advantage enjoyed by the group compared with those 
competitors who have no overseas properties.
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4. Trusthouse Forte PLC
Chairman Lord Forte of Ripley
ORIGINS OF TRUST HOUSES
The history of Trust Houses can be traced to the beginning 
of this century. At that time inns and inn-keeping in 
England were in a poor way. The standard of hospitality 
offered was generally low and drunkenness rife. In the 
light of these adverse social conditions the fourth Earl 
Grey, a public figure of influence and standing, later to 
become Governor-General of Canada, resolved to improve the 
role of the English inn, and at the same time campaigned to 
reduce the level of alcohol consumption throughout the 
population. [1]
Earl Grey conceived the idea that each county in England 
should form a Public House Trust Company to acquire the 
leases of inns as they fell due for renewal and then to 
reform these establishments by installing managers who 
would be paid a salary together with commission on the sale 
of accommodation, food and non-alcoholic drink. The sale of 
alcohol would not be forbidden but it would not be 
encouraged. [2]
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The time was ripe for the redevelopment of the English inn. 
The advent of the motor car was to launch a massive upsurge 
in private and commercial travel. As a consequence of the 
efforts of Earl Grey, several public house trust companies 
were incorporated. One of the first was the Hertfordshire 
Public House Trust Company which was formed in 1904. [3]
The first property to come under its control was The Waggon 
and Horses, Ridge Hill, at St Albans in Hertfordshire. This 
was to be the forerunner of the established Trust Houses as 
we know them today. The second was a property at Elstree 
and the third, The Rose and Crown at Tring (each in 
Hertfordshire), which was built by Lord Rothschild and 
leased to the company. [4]
From a commercial viewpoint the early years were not easy 
and six years passed before the first modest dividend of 
2.5% was paid. [5] Nevertheless this vein of altruism was 
indicative of the nature of the company and this policy 
persisted until after World War 2. [6] The company grew
steadily and by 1919 operated some 100 inns and hotels 
throughout England and Wales and in addition acquired 
offices in High Holborn, London as headquarters. In that 
year the company Trust Houses was formed and the heraldic 
sign of a stag rampant (from the hart couchant of the old 
Hertfordshire Public House Trust Company) against a
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background of sun and star, to denote day and night 
service, with a garland of wild clematis, or traveller's 
joy, underneath, was adopted. [7]
The inter-wajr years were marked by a determination of the 
part of the company to constantly improve and modernise its 
properties in a pro-active manner to anticipate the needs 
and demands of the travelling public. This trend was 
accelerated subsequent to World War 2 when it became clear 
that rising standards of living, allied to the high level 
of hotel operation on the Continent of Europe and in the 
United States of America, would result in higher standards 
of service and facilities being demanded by hotel customers 
throughout the U.K. [8] By 1949 the company owned and 
operated some 200 properties, in many ways remaining 
faithful to the original spirit of the trust, a vein of 
altruism running parallel with the aim to operate 
profitably.
In 1958 Sir Geoffrey Crowther (later Lord Crowther) became 
Chairman of the company. He brought to the office a 
distinguished career extending over the previous thirty 
years - President of the Cambridge Union in 1928, for 
nearly twenty years the editor and latterly the chairman of 
The Economist, an important role in wartime government 
service, holder of several blue-chip directorships and in 
1957 awarded a knighthood. [9] He thus added the qualities
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of leadership and influence to the experienced management 
of the company, which at that time was effectively run by 
three general managers, Messrs Matthews, Tregonning and 
Breen.
The contribution made by Lord Crowther can best be seen in 
the many redevelopments and reconstructions of traditional 
Trust House properties which he initiated, and in the
implementation of the first wave of Post Houses which were 
to serve the travelling public from the mid-sixties. These 
were shrewdly located usually at or near to motorway 
junctions. The first one was constructed at Hemel
Hempstead near the Ml motorway and was opened in 1965, 
others following in rapid succession. In addition, steps 
were taken to increase the roomstock within central London. 
The Hertford Hotel in Bayswater with 77 rooms, all with 
private bathroom, was opened in 1961 and the St Georgefs 
Hotel in Langham Place W.l. was opened in 1963. This 
occupied the top six floors of a fifteen story block and 
thus afforded a panoramic view over the metropolis. [10]
During this decade Trust Houses also expanded via
acquisition adding Grosvenor House in Park Lane, London 
W.l. in 1964 at a cost of £9M, and Queen Anne's properties 
in 1965. In 1968 the company acquired all the remaining 
shares in Gardner Merchant (in which it had held a 
controlling interest for some time), the largest industrial
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catering company in the country, with vending and other 
catering interests together with a total of some fifteen 
hundred catering contracts. During the twelve years in 
which Lord Crowther was chairman (1958-1970) the annual 
pre-tax profits of the company advanced from less than £1M 
to more than £4M. Subsequent to the amalgamation with Forte 
Holdings Limited the pre-tax profit of the company advanced 
to more than £11.6M by 1971. This was due to the 
additional £4M profits from Forte Holdings plus improved 
margins and economies following the amalgamation which, in 
the first year, resulted in an increase of £3.6M. [11]
FORTE: THE EARLY YEARS
The history of the Forte family is centred on the remote 
Italian village of Mortale, set on a rocky promontory some 
2,500 feet above sea level, south of Rome and north of 
Naples, overlooking the picturesque Valle di Comino. Here 
the Fortes have lived for at least five centuries, the most 
numerous and, in times of peace, the most prosperous family 
in the locality. [12] This comfortable existence was 
shattered, however, in 1870 when a member of the Forte 
family was kidnapped by brigands who demanded a large 
ransom for his release. The result of raising the required 
sum was that the entire family was impoverished and many
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subsequently sought their living outwith Italy, remitting 
savings home in order to help clear the family 
indebtedness. [13]
One such Forte was Pacifico, a second or third cousin of
Charles Forte's grandfather. He made his way to Scotland,
having been told by an Englishman travelling in Italy that 
Scotland might afford opportunities to young men who wished 
to pursue a career in either the grocery or catering 
trades. Pacifico opened a tiny shop in Kincardine-on-Forth 
and having made that succeed, took on larger premises first 
in Dundee and then in Loanhead and Biggar, both to the
south of Edinburgh and both run by Alfonso Forte, an uncle 
of Charles Forte. The success of these members of the clan 
affected Rocco Forte, the father of Charles Forte. He saw 
that whilst the tranquil life at Mortale (or Monforte as it 
is now officially known) had certain attractions, the 
economic prospects for his children were not encouraging. 
Consequently he determined to go to Scotland himself with 
the intention that his wife and children would follow him 
should he meet with success similar to his relatives. In 
fact this is what transpired and, just one year after 
leaving Italy, Rocco Forte wrote to his wife Maria Luiga 
asking her to come to Scotland. It was thus in 1913 that
Charles Forte, aged four, arrived at the Waverley station 
Edinburgh. [14]
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Charles Forte lived with his parents in Scotland until he 
was twelve and a half, first attending a private 
kindergarten in Alloa, then Alloa Academy and, for a short 
time St Joseph's College, Dumfries. There he was not happy 
and his father arranged for him to attend a leading 
boarding school in Italy where he completed his formal 
education. [15]
On his return to Scotland, Charles Forte worked for a while 
in the Savoy Cafe in Alloa, part of his father's catering 
business. Then it was arranged that he should work with 
Dominic Forte, a second cousin of his father, who, in 
partnership with him, owned and operated cafes in the 
south west of England centred on Weston-Super-Mare. He 
worked with Dominic Forte for eighteen months. [16] At 
that time his father decided to sell up his Scottish 
business ventures and concentrate on the South coast of 
England where he purchased premises first in Bournemouth, 
and then in Weymouth and Brighton where Charles Forte, at 
the age of twenty-two, was given his first management 
appointment in charge of the Venetian lounge.
Eager and ambitious to set up in business on his own 
account, Charles Forte set about investigating the 
possibilities of operating milk bars which were the coming 
thing in London during the 1930's The result of these 
investigations led him to open The Meadow Milk Bar in Upper
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Regent Street close to the headquarters of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. The opening took place in 1935 
when Charles Forte was twenty-six. [17] The capital outlay 
was between £3,000 and £4,000 of which Charles Forte 
subscribed £.500, his father Rocco £1,000 with the balance 
made up by family friends and business acquaintances. The 
venture was an immediate success and further units were 
added, so that by 1939 at the outbreak of World War 2 
Charles Forte operated six such bars in central London and 
had taken into partnership Eric Hartwell who had joined 
him, aged, 20, to open the most palatial of the bars, 
located in Leicester Square. Much later Eric Hartwell was 
to become joint chief executive of Trusthouse Forte. [18]
Charles Forte was able to operate, albeit on a restricted 
scale, all of the milk bars throughout the war. For a 
short time he himself was interned as an alien on the Isle 
of Man but this incident did not, in the long term, 
diminish his affection for the U.K. By the end of 1946 
when Eric Hartwell was able to rejoin him, Charles Forte 
was eager to expand on all fronts. [19] In the period 1945 
to 1955 Charles Forte acquired the Rainbow Corner in 
Shaftsbury Avenue for £35,000 in 1948, won the catering 
contract for The Festival of Britain in 1951, acquired the 
Criterion Building on the south side of Piccadilly Circus 
for £800,000 in 1953, and The Cafe Royal in Regent Street
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for £240,000 in 1954. [20] These acquisitions resulted in
Charles Forte becoming one of the principal players on the 
post-war catering scene in London.
The next business venture was to prove crucial to the 
career of Charles Forte - the acquisition of his first 
hotel, in 1958. This was the Waldorf Hotel in the Aldwych 
at the eastern end of the Strand, less than one quarter of 
a mile from the illustrious Savoy Hotel. The Waldorf was a 
freehold site and the hotel was part of Frederick Hotels 
Ltd., of which Sir Stuart Goodwin was chairman. Because of 
various other business interests he determined to sell the 
hotel. Although he did not know Forte he decided to let 
him have the opportunity to purchase the Waldorf ahead of 
other interested buyers for the very reasonable price of 
£600,000. It was a great opportunity and Forte swiftly 
concluded the deal. Charles Forte financed the bulk of the 
purchase price by selling the headlease on the Cafe Monico 
site for £500,000 and implementing a major refurbishment 
scheme at the Waldorf through a sale and leaseback 
arrangement with the Prudential Assurance Company, whereby 
the freehold passed to the Assurance Company in return for 
which he was granted a ninety-nine year lease. [21] This 
was altogether a most satisfactory arrangement and launched 
the now forty-nine year old Charles Forte on his second 
career as an hotelier.
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The operation, management and administration of large
hotels is essentially different to the business of catering 
and Charles Forte was quick to perceive this. He engaged a 
former general manager of the Dorchester to oversee the
Waldorf, and he readily acknowledged the debt he owed John 
Lee who introduced him to the intricacies of the hotel
business and who ensured the success of the Waldorf. [22]
Further diversification in catering took place during the 
1950's. A Forte company was awarded the first catering
concession at Heathrow Airport and this marked the
beginning of the important and profitable airline catering 
division of the company. Forte also won the first motorway
catering concession in the U.K. and the first motorway
service station was opened at Newport Pagnall,
Buckinghamshire in 1959. [23] By the end of the decade
Charles Forte had not only consolidated his original core 
business of milk bars, but had successfully diversified
into the fields of large scale catering and what was to be 
of greater importance in the long term - hotels.
The following decade was one of continued expansion. The 
company went public in 1962, the Offer for Sale being 
oversubscribed forty-three times. [24] In that year 
pre-tax profits were £603,400 but rose in the following 
year to £1,342,800. [25] The entire Frederick Hotel Group
was acquired through the good offices of Sir Stuart Goodwin
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and the beginning of an international division was made 
through the purchase of three major Paris hotels - The 
George V, The Plaza Athenee and The Tremoille. [26] These 
were acquired from Madame Dupre, the widow of the former 
proprietor, and were a notable coup for Charles Forte as 
they were obtained in competition with his great rival 
Maxwell Joseph of Grand Metropolitan. In addition, joint 
ventures were entered into in partnership with British 
Airways, at that time divided into British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAC) and British European Airways 
(BEA), while overseas hotel developments took place in the 
Mediterranean and the Caribbean. [27]
Less successful was diversification into other fields, the 
most notable of these being the acquisition of the ice 
cream firm Mr Whippy. This was subsequently sold at a loss 
of £500,000. [28] Such mistakes were rare, but in general
diversification outwith the by now traditional fields of 
hotel and catering tended to meet with less success than 
was originally anticipated. In some cases such as the
chocolate firm of Joseph Terry & Sons of York, which was
acquired in 1963 at a cost of £4.3M, the company was
retained for a number of years eventually being sold in the
mid 1970's for £19M. [29] In other cases like the travel
firms of Hickie Borman, Milbanke Travel and Swan's, there
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was a shorter time span between acquisition and disposal, 
as Charles Forte soon realised the lack of synergy between 
such firms and his core businesses.
MERGER OF TRUST HOUSES AND FORTE HOLDINGS - TRUSTHOUSE 
FORTE 1970 - 1988.
By the end of the 1960's it was becoming clear to 
professional commentators that a merger between Trust 
Houses and Forte Holdings was a real possibility. Trust 
Houses had established itself over a long period as a 
significant force in the hotel and catering industry, as 
had Fortes in a much shorter time. As shown in Table 4 - 4  
each company was of a broadly similar size although, as 
was to be expected, Fortes displayed a significantly 
higher degree of gearing. The interests of the companies 
were similar yet they were in direct competition in 
surprisingly few locations. Both companies saw that a 
merger would produce advantages from the deployment of 
general management, from the build up of marketing systems 
both within the U.K and overseas, and from the recruitment 
of suitable staff. Both chairmen perceived it as a merger 
that would "provide a base on which a truly world-wide 
company can be built, operating in one of the world's most 
rapidly expanding industries". [30] The future, therefore 
looked bright for both partners.
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TABLE 4 - 4
TRUST HOUSES LIMITED 
Consolidated Balance Sheet (Abridged) at 31st October 1969
CAPITAL EMPLOYED
Fixed Assets 52,304,000
Investments 6.663.000
Current Assets 14,646,000
Current Liabilities 13,588,000 1.058.000
£ 60.025.000
FINANCED BY
Ordinary and Trust Shareholders
Investment 34,040,000
Preference Shareholders 1,618,000
Minority Interest 69,000
Provision for Rationalisation Costs 1,514,000
Loan Capital 22.784.000
£ 60.025.000
FORTE HOLDINGS LIMITED
Consolidated Balance Sheet (Abridged) at 1st February 1970
CAPITAL EMPLOYED
Fixed Assets 57,056,000
Premiums on Consolidation of
Subsidiaries (Goodwill) 11,429,000
Investments 3.082.000
£ 71,567,000
Current Assets 20,715,000
Current Liabilities 19,299,000 1.416.000
£ 72.983.000
FINANCED BY
Ordinary Shareholders Investment 27,533,000
Preference Shareholders 4,718,000
Taxation Equalisation 1,356,000
Minority Interest 3,709,000
Loan Capital 35.667,000
£ 72,983,000
Source: Merger Documents, Trust Houses Ltd and Forte Holdings Ltd 1970
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Even at this early stage, however, a perceptive observer 
might have discerned potential problems as far as the 
overall direction of the combined group was concerned. 
Fortes were in a position whereby the optimum route to 
expansion lay in further acquisitions and Trust Houses was 
an excellent vehicle to achieve this end, having as it did 
a wealth of fine freehold properties and a recent history 
of substantial capital projects which would ultimately 
improve the overall profitability of the group. The 
original agreement provided that after the merger the board 
of the new company - Trust House Forte Limited - was to 
consist initially of an equal number of directors from each 
existing board. Lord Crowther was to remain chairman of 
the combined company until May 1972 when, having attained 
the age of 65, he was to be succeeded by Charles Forte, 
(knighted in 1970) who in the interim was to serve as 
Deputy Chairman. Sir Oliver Chesterton of Trust Houses and 
Sir Leslie Joseph of Fortes were to be Vice-Chairmen. [31] 
Mr Michael Pickard of Trust Houses was to be Group Managing 
Director and Mr Dennis Hearn of Fortes was to be Deputy 
Group Managing Director. [32]
As in many mergers and takeovers, from what to the outside 
world was a gentlemanly agreement inferring equal 
partnerships in the new venture, there emerged a power 
struggle with Lord Crowther declaring his intention of 
going back on the definite agreement to resign as Chairman,
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in direct contradiction to a legal agreement between the 
two parties. In due course, however, the majority of the 
directors voted in favour of Sir Charles and most of the 
original Trust House directors resigned, leaving Sir
Charles as the key boardroom personality.
In the period subsequent to the merger, which was formally
ratified by each board in May 1970, one of the main
subsidiaries of the new group under the chairmanship of 
Lord Crowther was to be responsible for the operation of 
the U.K hotels. Another subsidiary, under the chairmanship 
of Sir Charles Forte, was to be responsible for the various 
catering operations within the U.K. Sir Charles was also 
to be responsible for the direction of Gardner Merchant 
(formerly a Trust Houses Company). It soon became clear 
that in this climate of rivalry, indeed hostility, a new 
element was introduced through the approach by Allied 
Breweries to Lord Crowther suggesting a merger.
Displaying an excellent sense of timing, Allied Breweries 
chairman Sir Gerald Thorley together with two of his
directors, Keith Showering and Bernard Carfoot, approached 
Lord Crowther at the latter's High Holborn office on 18th 
October 1971 with a view to negotiating a merger - this a 
mere sixteen months after the Trust Houses/Forte marriage. 
The proposed merger put a price tag of E127M on THF.
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By this time the boardroom clashes within THF were the 
subject of widespread press comment. [33] Personality 
differences surfaced, the main one involving Michael 
Pickard, the first Group Managing Director. Subsequent to 
criticism of him in a Board of Trade report, not connected 
with THF, he resigned both his executive responsibilities 
and his directorship. Ironically he was latterly 
exonerated from the Board of Trade criticism. In 
retrospect this was a stroke of luck for Sir Charles and a 
severe blow to Lord Crowther, widely regarded as Pickard's 
mentor.
A further development then took place which was to have a 
critical effect on the outcome of the bid and which was 
advantageous to Sir Charles and disadvantageous to Lord 
Crowther. This was the appointment at the instigation of 
Sir Charles of a new group chairman, Lord Thorneycroft, on 
November 24th 1971. [34] A former Chancellor of the
Exchequer in Harold MacMillan's administration he was a 
person of considerable influence and reputation. 
Nevertheless Sir Charles now faced a battle on two fronts - 
on the one hand the board was split between Lord Crowther 
and himself, on the other Allied Breweries now wished to 
take over the entire company, thereby jeopardising both 
his own future and that of his supporters. One tactical 
move which he was able to implement between the time of the 
initial offer and the formal bid made to the shareholders
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was to increase his personal stake in the company by some 
5M shares. His largest single purchase, made with 
borrowed money, was on December 15th 1971 when he secured
1,905,000 shares at an average cost of 178.3p per share.
[35]
In the run up period to the formal offer all parties had
been hard at work. December 3rd was a significant day for
both sides. Allied Breweries announced that the Council of 
Trustees of THF which held a special block of shares would 
not stand in the way of a bidder for the company. It is
not known to what extent the council approved of the way in
which the power struggle was proceeding within THF. The 
fact that the Council took no action suggests that they 
knew full well the implications behind the power struggle 
and the original agreement which Lord Crowther proposed to 
break.
Lord Thorneycroft advised the shareholders to take no 
action until such time as the company met with its
financial advisers, merchant bankers S. G. Warburg & Co. 
Ltd. Allied Breweries were being advised by N. M.
Rothschild & Sons.
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The formal bid from Allied Breweries was sent to THF 
shareholders on 17th December 1971. According to Allied 
Breweries a successful bid would create a company of 
"outstanding potential, on a world scale". The reason for 
the delay in the bid was that THF had rejected the informal 
overtures of Allied Breweries. In the meantime press 
comment surrounding THF was adverse to the extent that 
there were suggestions that the company was to be 
dismembered, presumably in an attempt to thwart any bidder.
[36]
The THF response to the bid was sent to shareholders on 
20th December. It was made clear that the THF board saw 
the offer as totally inadequate. By ascribing a price 
earnings multiple of 20 it valued its own shares at 300p. 
as against the bid price of 18lp. In retrospect this was 
valuing THF shares somewhat optimistically according to 
Lord Crowther, who, in fact, very much favoured the bid 
against the interest of his own shareholders. THF did in 
fact subsequently meet its hotly contested profit forecast 
(again contested by the Crowther faction) for the year to 
October 1972 - proving that the merger was working well 
under new management, doubling profits in less than two 
years. Furthermore Sir Charles had made it clear that 
30Op. was the minimum price at which he would recommend, 
however reluctantly, THF shareholders to accept the Allied 
Breweries bid. [37]
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The reconstituted board of THF set out its reasons for 
rejection of the bid in a more detailed statement sent to 
shareholders on 30th December.
By the early New Year Lord Thorneycroft was in optimistic 
mood when he wrote to shareholders on January 4th 1972. He 
indicated that he was of the opinion that, unless 
substantially raised, the offer from Allied Breweries must 
surely fail. At the same time he disposed of criticism 
that had been made by Lord Crowther regarding profit 
forecasts which, as mentioned previously, were not only 
achieved but exceeded. Lord Thorneycroft reiterated his 
earlier advice to shareholders to ignore the Allied 
Breweries bid. [38]
FINAL APPEAL IN SUPPORT OF BID BY LORD CROWTHER
On the same day Lord Crowther, with the backing of six 
other directors made his counter appeal. It is a somewhat 
curious document and on careful reading one has the feeling 
that it was written in a tone of pique - that the writer 
and his supporters had been outmanoeuvred - as indeed they 
had. [39] In retrospect one can see that, from a personal 
standpoint, Lord Crowther made a serious strategic error 
when he first agreed to the merger between Trust Houses and 
Forte Holdings. From that time on his own position was made 
increasingly vulnerable.
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FINAL APPEAL BY ALLIED BREWERIES
On the following day, January 5th, Allied Breweries sent 
out what was to be its final major appeal to THF 
shareholders. This indicated that the Allied Breweries 
offer was now worth 188p. [40] per share as against 125p.
immediately prior to the bid. Were the bid to fail
informed opinion suggested that the share price would fall 
back to around 150p. [41] THF shareholders had only days
to accept as the offer was due to lapse on January 10th. 
Allied Breweries pointed out, incorrectly, that under the 
chairmanship of Lord Crowther, pre-tax profits of Trust
House had advanced over a twelve year period from £645,000 
to £11,000,000. [42] (The profits, in fact, had advanced
from £645,000 to £4,000,000.) Against this, they indicated 
that Lord Thorneycroft (by applying a p/e ratio of 20) had 
valued THF shares at 300p. as against the current stock 
market valuation of 175p. Allied Breweries went on to make 
the further point that it was apparent that the rifts at 
board level in THF were irreconcilable and that the best 
outcome for shareholders lay in Allied Breweries taking 
control. [43]
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FINAL APPEAL BY LORD THORNEYCROFT AND SIR CHARLES FORTE
On the same day Lord Thorneycroft and Sir Charles issued 
their final appeal to their shareholders. Sir Charles 
indicated that, in his opinion Allied Breweries were trying 
to get THF "on the cheap" thereby discounting the growth 
potential of the shares. He went on to say that in the six 
weeks immediately prior to the letter he and his friends 
had purchased E7M worth of THF stock in order to ward off 
the Allied bid. [44] This could be construed as a neat 
example of "putting your money where your mouth is". Sir 
Charles also made the telling point that, as at that date
January 6th, there were only two executive directors - Lord
Crowther and M. R. Matthews - in the opposing camp.
REPULSE OF BID
By January 10th, the day on which the offer was due to 
lapse, Allied Breweries had secured only slightly more than 
9% of the THF shares. The bid thus failed. On 13th 
January Lord Thorneycroft and Sir Charles wrote to THF 
shareholders informing them of the outcome and thanking the 
majority who had displayed allegiance to the group. 
Ominously for Lord Crowther it was stated that the 
uncertainty surrounding his position and those directors 
who had sided with Allied Breweries was to be resolved as
soon as possible. [45]
- 381 -
Allied Breweries retained its holding in THF until August 
1978. For sometime after the bid it nurtured hopes that a 
merger might be feasible but Sir Charles remained 
implacably opposed to any such notion. Over the years it 
was not a particularly good investment for Allied 
Breweries. Also there were a number of informed observers 
who, from the outset, had disputed the logic behind an 
Allied/THF merger. In particular they pointed to the 
ability of the top management of Allied Breweries who might 
have been unable to successfully assimilate THF and to the 
fact that two dynasties in one boardroom - the Fortes and 
the Showerings - was at least one too many.
So the battle was over. It was at times acrimonious but 
such were the stakes that losing was no small matter, 
especially for Charles Forte whose family had a significant 
shareholding in the company. Within a year both Lord 
Crowther and the chairman of the THF council, The Rt. Hon. 
The Lord Hacking, were dead. Relationships between THF and 
Allied were strained in the extreme, and the motivation 
behind Allied Breweries continuing stake in the company is 
difficult to vindicate on purely commercial grounds.
The successful repulse of the bid was undoubtedly a 
watershed in the history of the company. Freed from 
external constraints the new board rapidly established the
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strategy for the 1970's which success is best illustrated 
by the profit statement and consolidated balance sheets 
shown in Tables 4 - 5  and 6.
It was fortunate for THF and for Sir Charles in particular 
that the repulse of the Allied Breweries bid happened when 
it did. It allowed the company during 1972 to largely 
complete the first wave of Post Houses which had been the 
main modernising thrust of Trust Houses and which had been 
implemented by Lord Crowther. The Post House strategy had 
received a major boost via the Hotel Development Incentives 
Scheme (HDIS) under the Development of Tourism Act 1969 
which made available government grants of up to £1,000 per 
bedroom for new projects commenced before April 1971 and 
completed before April 1973. [46]
Close to the latter date the recession of 1973 to 1975 was 
sparked by the quadrupling of oil prices following the 
Israeli/Arab conflict. Hotel companies were badly hit by 
the recession and THF was no exception. Pre-tax profits 
suffered to the extent that in the financial year to 
October 1975 the ordinary dividend to shareholders had to 
be partially met out of reserves. [47] Once the recession
was over THF continued to expand both in the U.K. , on the
Continent of Europe where several de luxe hotels such as 
the Ritz in Madrid were acquired, in the Middle East, in
the United States of America and in Australasia. [48]
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The U.K. hotel division was significantly enlarged in 1977 
via the acquisition from J. Lyons & Company Limited of 
three hotel groups
a) Strand Group of Hotels
b) Falcon Inns Group Hotels
c) Royal Hibernian group Hotels 
TOTAL 
[49]
The background to this acquisition lay in various problems 
confronting Lyons as a result of considerable capital 
investment in their food manufacturing capacity which had 
been financed in foreign currency. The value of sterling, 
in the meantime had dropped, the investments had not yet 
realised their potential and even a £10.5M rights issue in 
the previous year had been insufficient to stem the adverse 
financial position. As a way out of their problems the 
Lyons directors resolved to dispose of those parts of their 
business that were not central to their long term strategy 
of food manufacturing. Their significant portfolio of 
hotels which, for operational purposes, was divided into 
three divisions afforded them an optimal solution and their 
initial offer to THF was taken up with enthusiasm. [50]
14 hotels 
19 hotels 
2 hotels 
35 hotels
4735 rooms 
1517 rooms 
186 rooms 
6438 rooms
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As a result of the acquisition the position of THF in 
London was considerably strengthened by the addition of The 
Regent Palace with 1,140 rooms, The Strand Palace with 786 
rooms and The Cumberland at Marble Arch with 910 rooms. 
Furthermore, in the provinces the Albany hotels in 
Birmingham, Nottingham and Glasgow gave THF three modern 
properties with a combined roomstock of 660 bedrooms. The 
remaining hotels were of varying size and age - the 
majority were melded into the regional structure of THF 
whilst a minority which proved unsuitable were sold. (These 
were mainly situated in remote parts of the U.K. such as 
Ardnamurchan in the Highlands of Scotland and 
Gatehouse-of-Fleet in Kirkcudbrightshire.) The major London 
hotels and the three Albany hotels were held on long 
leaseholds while the majority of the remainder were 
freehold. [51]
A further advantage lay in the timing of the deal which was 
finalised in January 1977. That being Jubilee Year room 
occupancies, especially in London, were markedly above 
average with the result that the new owners were given a 
flying start and the number of redundancies was kept to a 
minimum.
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From a financial viewpoint the total consideration for the 
35 hotels was £27.9M which approximated to a cost per 
bedroom of £4,300. By any standard this was a financial 
coup for THF, as to have built from scratch at that time 
would have cost in excess of £20,000 per room. The 
consideration was satisfied by an initial payment of £7,2M 
on completion, with the balance via promissory notes of £5M 
payable on 31st December 1978, £5M payable on 31st December 
1980, £5M payable on 31st December 1982 and the balance of
£5.7M payable on 31st December 1984, with each of the notes 
bearing interest at 5%. [52]
The principal Lyons' directors Geoffrey and Neil Salmon had 
originally valued their hotels at £35M and it was this sum 
that they initially mooted with THF. It is a measure of 
their need to dispose of the properties and the corporate 
strength of THF that the final figure was not only reduced 
to £27M, but that it was paid in instalments, the final 
payment being made nearly eight years subsequent to 
completion.
Although the acquisition of the hotels of J. Lyons gave THF 
a pre-eminent place in the U.K. hotel industry there was 
one particular group to which Sir Charles had long been 
attracted and which he wished, for a number of reasons, to 
control. This, of course, was the Savoy Group which 
comprised not only The Savoy but also the equally
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prestigious Claridges together with The Connaught in Carlos 
Place, London W.l. and The Berkeley in Knightsbridge, 
London SW.1.
Whilst the Savoy may have a reasonable claim to a special
place in the affections of the British public and its
international clientele it has never actively sought to 
maximise the rate of return on its invested capital and 
consequently has on many occasions been vulnerable to the 
takeover predator. In post war times the best known of 
these was Harold Samuel via his company Land Securities 
which bid for the Savoy Group in 1953. This attack was 
thwarted only after intricate defensive manoeuvres which 
were highly criticised by the subsequent Board of Trade 
report produced by Milner Holland Q.C. [53]
During the recession of 1979/1981 the profitability of the
Savoy Group was severely diminished to the extent that the 
group lost £837,000 in the first half of 1980. Knowing that 
it was highly unlikely that the second half performance 
would eradicate such losses, Sir Charles, ably advised by
S. G. Warburg & Co. Ltd., launched his initial bid for 
the Savoy Group in March 1981, a month before the Savoy 
results for the preceding year were due to be announced. 
The bid was worth £58.4M.
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The defence of the Savoy was entwined with its voting 
structure (deemed by most observers to be archaic) which 
gave four times as many votes to the "B" class of shares as 
to the much more numerous "A” shares.
One of the major problems facing the Savoy lay in the open 
market valuation of its own shares. Were it to suggest 
that a reasonable bid should be, say at least £75M, it 
should then have been able to back that with an adequate 
rate of return on that amount via its pre-tax profits. 
This, of course, it was unable to do.
Much of the defence, and some of the attack, was taken up 
in personalised slanging matches between Sir Charles and 
his son Rocco on the one side and Sir Hugh Wontner and his 
managing director Giles Shepard on the other. This really 
did nothing for the respective share prices but merely 
resulted in additional column inches in the press. Indeed 
up until the sale of one third of the Savoy accommodation 
to Ladbroke who redeveloped the area for office space, Sir 
Charles and Sir Hugh had enjoyed a genuine, albeit low 
profile, personal friendship. [54] However, the sale of 
part of the Savoy property (considered by many in the 
industry as sacrilege but depicted by the Savoy Management 
as a move in defence of the hotel), spurred Charles Forte 
to make what can be considered as a "hostile bid".
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In June 1985 THF increased the value of its bid for the 
Savoy. The improved terms were 19Op for each "A" share or 
126 THF shares for every 100 Savoy "A" shares together with 
£22.46M or 15 THF shares for every 2 "B" shares. The 
Kuwait Investment Office accepted this offer as did a 
number of private individuals and institutions, the result 
being that THF currently control approximately 70% of the 
Savoy equity but only some 42% of the votes - owing to the 
voting structure surrounding the "A" and the "B" shares and 
various trusts.
Significant blocks of "B" shares are controlled by two 
Savoy trusts:
a) The Savoy Educational Trust, established as a charity 
by the Savoy directors, has nearly 250,000 shares with 
a current (mid 1987) value in excess of £3M. Were this 
to be invested it would produce an annual income of at 
least £250,000. In 1985 the income was a mere £6,000.
b) The D'Oyly-Carte Charitable Trust also controlled by 
directors of the Savoy holds some 324,500 shares with a 
current (mid 1987) value of between £4M and £5M. 
Whilst this might be expected to produce investment 
income close to £.5M, in 1985 the actual income was a 
mere £8,000. [55]
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At the time of writing the overall position remains 
uncertain. Voting control of 5% of the "B" shares is 
vested in these two trusts. As may be seen, in neither 
case does the income represent a reasonable return in 
relation to the capital value. It is likely that sooner 
rather than later the Savoy directors will have to adopt a 
more realistic attitude towards the operation of each of 
the trusts which currently serve to frustrate the efforts 
of THF to gain control of the Savoy Hotel Company.
Certainly as each layer of the Savoy defence has been 
stripped away, latterly via court action, the position of 
both the Savoy group and its intractable directors is 
becoming increasingly vulnerable. Assuming that THF do 
eventually gain control it will then be up to Lord Forte 
and his successors to vindicate their claim that they can 
significantly improve the profits of the Savoy group, 
whilst simultaneously preserving its high standards of 
service and unique ambiance - as they have successfully 
achieved in other notable purchases including the three 
luxury hotels in Paris and the Ritz in Madrid.
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTHOUSE FORTE
Outwith the U.K. Trusthouse Forte have a significant number 
of hotels on the Continent of Europe together with three in 
the Middle. East and extensive interests throughout the 
United States of America. In addition there are seven 
properties in the Caribbean and Bermuda.
Trusthouse Forte commenced serious expansion on the 
Continent of Europe in the late 1960fs when, subsequent to 
Maxwell Joseph being unable to persuade the widow of the 
proprietor Francois Dupre to sell, Charles Forte engineered 
the acquisition of three of the best known hotels in Paris 
- the George V, the Plaza Athenee and the Tremoille. 
Further acquisitions followed in the 1970*s and 1980's, 
the most notable being that of the Ritz Hotel in Madrid in 
1981. By the end of the decade the 22 hotels on the 
Continent of Europe had 3,968 bedrooms, generated £130M 
turnover and £17M operating profit. Seven of these were 
incorporated into the Exclusive group of THF hotels whilst 
the remainder were essentially resort hotels. The European 
hotels gave the company a distinctive presence on the 
Continent but their geographical dispersion did not allow 
the economies of scale that it enjoyed in the U.K. and to a 
lesser extent in the U.S.A.
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The origin of the company's involvement in the United 
States of America may be traced to 1967 in which year Trust 
Houses, along with various other operators, acquired 
TraveLodge International of San Diego, California who 
operated a chain of 438 motels and motor hotels in the 
U.S.A., Canada and Mexico. Subsequent to the 1970 merger 
Trusthouse Forte increased its shareholding to 95.5%, 
simultaneously selling Travelodge, Australia which had been 
the vehicle for Trust Houses original investment in the 
Travelodge operation. [56]
Initially the TraveLodge operation was very downmarket. 
Some 250 of the outlets were joint ventures with individual 
operators, Trusthouse Forte providing the land and the 
centralised reservation service. A further 160 TraveLodges 
were franchised and the remaining few operated via a 
management contract. For some 10 years Trusthouse Forte 
adopted a hands-off approach to the TraveLodge operation. 
Performance and profitability remained poor, however, so 
during the 1980's THF assumed a hands-on approach, 
overhauling the operation, raising standards and generally 
moving the operation gently up-market. Of the 473 units 
operated in 1988, 403 were basically rooming operations and 
68 provided in addition full food and beverage facilities.
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The geographical dispersion of TraveLodge covered 44 states 
with a strong concentration in the west, California alone 
having 159 lodges. TraveLodge is the fourth largest 
operation of its kind in the U.S.A. with 37,980 rooms, but 
even with this number it is less than half the size of the 
market leader Day Inns/Lodges. The profit performance of 
TraveLodge is mainly restricted by the fact that still 
nearly half the operations are joint ventures, and for 
these THF receives only a franchise fee together with 
royalties extending to 3% of gross room revenue. [57]
In addition THF operates five Exclusive hotels totalling 
1512 rooms, the largest of which is the 442 room Plaza of 
the Americas in Dallas, Texas. The third THF operation in 
the United States of America is the Viscount chain of 14 
hotels with 3897 rooms. These rooms are mainly of four 
star standard but face considerable competition from larger 
better known brands such as Marriott, Hilton and Sheraton.
By the end of the 1980's THF hotels in the U.S.A. 
generated some £250M turnover and £18m operating profit. 
Whilst these are significant figures they are small in 
relation to total company turnover and operating profit and 
small in proportion to the number of properties they 
represent. [58]
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THE COMPANY PHILOSOPHY
The company philosophy was formulated during the early
1970's and clearly reflects the commitment of the company
to both customers and staff. [59]
1. To increase profitability and earnings per share each 
year in order to encourage investment and to improve 
and expand the business.
2. To give complete customer satisfaction by efficient and 
courteous service, with value for money.
3. To support managers and their staff in using personal 
initiative to improve the profit and quality of their 
operations whilst observing the Company's policies.
4. To provide good working conditions and to maintain 
effective communications at all levels to develop 
better understanding and assist decision making.
5. To ensure no discrimination against sex, race, colour 
or creed and to train, develop and encourage promotion 
within the Company based on merit and ability.
6. To act with integrity at all times and to maintain a 
proper sense of responsibility towards the public.
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7. To recognise the importance of each and every employee 
who contributes towards these aims.
The implementation of the philosophy has been executed at 
all levels in the company. By adherence to such a 
philosophy the company demonstrated its professionalism and 
commitment towards both customers and clients. In being 
the first major company to adopt such a philosophy it did 
the industry a notable service, displaying an increasing 
degree of maturity in an industry which had often been 
rebuffed by commentators who had contemptuously dismissed 
hotels and catering as a "candy floss" industry. 
Subsequently other major groups in the industry published 
philosophies not dissimilar to that of THF.
RECENT PERFORMANCE OF TRUSTHOUSE FORTE
Since the recession of the early 1980's THF has made 
impressive strides as indicated in Table. By 1984 sales 
were in excess of £1 billion and pre-tax profits exceeded 
£100M. Sir Charles (who was made a Life Peer in 1982, 
taking the title of Lord Forte of Ripley in the county of 
Surrey) handed over the role of chief executive to his son 
Rocco in May 1983. Rocco Forte qualified as chartered 
accountant after taking a degree in modern languages at 
Oxford and has considerable practical experience of the
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hotel and catering industry. In his own words his aim has 
been "to create a structure and a team" capable of leading 
what is now a major international concern. [60]
Until recently THF was perceived as having a weakness 
insofar as it did not have a global brand image in the 
hotel business as compared with Hilton, Sheraton and 
Holiday Inns. Rather its hotels, to a certain extent, were 
perceived as individual properties, many of which were in 
the de luxe category but lacking uniformity. Of late, 
however, this weakness is of minimal concern as, 
internationally, discerning hotel guests are now showing 
evidence of preferring individualistic properties rather 
than ones which are uniformly similar as a result of 
belonging to a chain operation.
FACTORS PRESENT IN SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTHOUSE 
FORTE
The successful development of Trusthouse Forte exhibits 
many of the determinants of success in the hotel industry. 
From a corporate viewpoint the ability to grow through 
acquisition and acquisition at competitive prices have been 
major factors. Linked to these has been the invaluable 
range of professional advice enjoyed by the company,
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especially with regard to the repulse of the Allied 
Breweries bid and the long running battle with the Savoy 
Group.
The entrepreneurial style of Lord Forte was of major 
importance in the early years of Forte Holdings Ltd and 
played an important part in the post merger thinking of the 
combined board. The best example of this is demonstrated
in the successful negotiations for the Strand group of
hotels from J. Lyons. The statement of company philosophy 
which directed efforts towards improving profitability and 
serving customers represented a clear aim or corporate
mission which was executed at all levels in the company.
It is relevant that competing organisations in the hotel 
and catering industry were quick to follow the lead set by 
Trusthouse Forte in this respect.
Subsequent to the 1970 merger Trusthouse Forte rapidly 
built and maintained a sophisticated marketing department 
which was latterly expanded on an international basis to 
cover all their properties worldwide. The marketing effort 
is such that the company can guarantee that once an hotel 
is acquired by THF the occupancies can be raised by as much 
as 10%, as a result of the sophistication of the 
international reservations systems that have been
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installed. It has already been explained that much of the 
incremental income so generated will filter through as 
operating profit.
It has to be noted that Trusthouse Forte have adopted a 
different approach to branding as compared with Hilton, 
Sheraton or Holiday Inns. Because their hotel properties 
are so diverse it is difficult to portray any commonality 
between them. Consequently THF has categorised its hotels 
e.g. the Post House group, the London Hotels and the 
exclusive international hotels each with its own marketing 
and advertising function.
From an operational viewpoint perhaps the principal factor 
in the successful development of THF has been the 
considerable annual expenditure on training and personnel 
programmes designed to improve the skills of operative and 
supervisory staff. The benefits of such programmes are 
twofold - they result in higher standards of service to 
customers and enable staff to achieve job satisfaction and 
high morale. In turn this can, in many cases, result in 
promotion to management positions.
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FINANCIAL COMMENTARY
A financial evaluation of the performance of Trusthouse 
Forte reveals a company producing increasing levels of 
sales and pre-tax profits year on year, backed by a high 
quality portfolio of property assets whose value has risen 
dramatically in recent years and in particular during the 
period 1985-1988 as shown in Table 4 - 7  and 8. Since the 
merger between Trust Houses and Forte Holdings shareholders 
have seen their funds grow from £54M in 1970 to £300M by 
the end of that decade; by 1985 they had reached £916M and 
by 1988, mainly as a result of hefty revaluation 
surpluses, to £2.2 billion. These figures are indicative 
of the asset backing enjoyed by the company, £1.5 billion 
of which is invested in freehold property.
Profits and earnings display a similar trend. Although 
pre-tax profits in 1970 were only £9.4M these grew to £38M 
by 1977 (Jubilee Year). In the 1980's pre-tax profits
advanced from £52.3M in 1981 through £129.6M in 1985 to 
£132M in 1988. Earnings per share rose from 9.8p in 1984 
to 22.Op in 1988. Evidence of the increasing strength of 
the company may be seen also by the rising trend in 
dividend cover - 2.0 in 1985, 2.1 in 1986, 2.3 in 1987 and
2.6 in 1988.
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PLC 
AND 
SUBSIDIARIES
TABLE 4 - 8
Trusthouse Forte PLC and Subsidiaries
FIVE YEAR RECORD 1984-1988
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
%
Growth
Sales £m 1,131 1,245 1,477 1,778 2,044 16
Trading profit before 
interest £m 115 142 158 197 240 22
Profit before taxation £m 109 130 136 180 232 23
Profit attributable to 
shareholders £m 77 87 97 128 172 22
Earnings per share (net) pence 9.8 11.1 12.4 16.3 22.0 22
Dividends per share pence 4.74 5.45 6.00 7.10 8.40 15
Dividend cover times 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.6 -
Total assets less 
current liabilities £m 1,126 1,193 1,568 2,017 3,027 28
Shareholders' Investment 
- total £m 829 916 1,100 1,580 2,245 29
Shareholders' Investment 
- per share £ 1.06 1.17 1.41 2.02 2.87 28
Net borrowings £m 270 265 515 436 860 —
Net borrowings ratio to 
shareholders' Investment
ratio 0.33:1 0.29:1 0.47:1 0.28: 1 0.38: 1 -
Notes: 1. The above figures have been restated where necessary to 
reflect the current accounting policies of the Group.
2. Profit attibutable to shareholders and earnings per share 
are before extraordinary items.
3. The percentage growth column above reflects compound growth 
over a five year period from 1983.
Source: THF Annual Report 1988.
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the principal source of trading profit remains hotels 
which, in 1988, on sales of £759M generated £153M out of a 
total of £240M. This was followed by public catering with 
sales of £484M generating £58M, and contract catering 
where sales of £741M produced operating profits of £30M. 
Contract catering is an especially competitive field where 
margins are relatively small. On a geographical basis the 
U.K. produced sales of £1.5 billion out of a total of £2.0 
billion with the remainder split roughly 50:50 between the 
Continent of Europe and the United States of America.
Over the years borrowings have tended to be lower than 
average for the industry, and certainly lower than some of 
their major competitors such as Norfolk Capital, Mount 
Charlotte and Grand Metropolitan. At the end of 1988 net 
borrowings stood at E860M compared with shareholders funds 
of £2.2 billion. A gearing ratio of 38% is very reasonable 
for such a strongly based company and places no undue 
pressure on the level of operating profits. Overall it is 
fair to say that Trusthouse Forte has made impressive 
strides since the merger of 1970. Not only is it now one 
of the leading hotel companies internationally but it also 
has the financial strength and standing, should it decide 
to make further major acquisitions both on the Continent of 
Europe and more especially in the United States of America.
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COMMENTARY ON AND EVALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL GROUPS
From the case studies it may be seen that each group grew 
and developed in a different manner. It can fairly by 
argued that, to a large extent, each group grew and 
developed independent of the state of the economy in
general. Whilst the senior management of each group was
broadly aware of economic trends within the economy the 
nature and methods of acquisition employed owed more to 
opportunistic decision making rather than a response to the
economic circumstances of the economy as a whole. This was
particularly the case with Grand Metropolitan whose modus 
operandi was to buy as and when the opportunity presented 
itself. For THF, of course, the principal deal was the 
merger of Trust Houses and Forte Holdings - the subsequent 
acquisition of Strand Hotels from J Lyons, and other lesser 
deals, were essentially opportunistic purchases. Likewise 
within the UK, Queens Moat Houses acquired a large number 
of properties during the 1980's without an overall 
acquisition strategy being clearly in evidence. What was in 
evidence was the method of financing - initially via short 
term debt and in the longer term by a series of successful 
rights issues.
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Also it can be fairly argued that the only company to be 
managed in a genuinely strategic fashion, at least until 
the 1980's, was Bass. [61] The formation and expansion of 
Crest, the acquisition of Esso Motor Hotels and latterly 
the purchase of Coral, once the Grand Metropolitan bid had 
been ruled out of court, all bear the hallmarks of 
underlying strategic direction.
An evaluation of the performance of those companies which 
operated on an international basis may be linked to the 
determinants of success in the hotel industry. In 
particular, to a greater or lesser extent each of the 
companies portrayed perceived the dual nature of the 
industry as both a property and a retail business, and 
cap italised upon this perception.
In the case of Grand Metropolitan, for example, it was the 
application of this perception allied to advanced sales and 
marketing methods that resulted in the company coming to 
the forefront of the U.K. hotel industry, and being 
acknowledged as the leader in management techniques 
applicable to the industry during the 1960's. A similar 
perception of the industry was formed by Queens Moat 
Houses. This was not surprising, as the respective 
chairmen were close friends. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
suggest that, over the years, John Bairstow of Queens Moat 
Houses acquired considerable knowledge of the intricacies
- 410 -
of hotel property deals from Sir Maxwell Joseph, the 
chairman of Grand Metropolitan - Bairstow was a full twenty 
years younger than Joseph.
These two companies, it could be argued, adopted the notion 
of the dual perception of the industry to a greater extent 
than did either Bass or THF. All four companies, however, 
would attest to the importance of the timing and cost of 
their acquisitions, as these played a major part in their 
successful development.
This determinant of success was particularly evident in the 
cases of Grand Metropolitan and Queens Moat Houses plus, to 
a lesser extent, THF. Each company owed its initial rapid 
development to the property expertise of its founder Joseph 
Bairstow and, to a lesser extent, Forte. For Grand 
Metropolitan in the period 1955 to 1968, and Queens Moat 
in the period 1975 to 1985, the acquisition of property at 
prices keener than their competitors laid the foundations 
for their relative superior profitability. In the case of 
THF the acquisition of the hotels of J. Lyons consolidated 
the position of the company in the U.K. in general and 
London in particular.
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It should not be forgotten that the location of the hotels 
acquired by the international groups was a prerequisite for 
their success. A superior location for any property is the 
springboard for the successful retailing of accommodation, 
food, liquor and leisure. If the location is inferior, 
even the most efficient retailing operation cannot overcome 
the drawbacks which result.
A further factor which is worthy of mention in the 
evaluation of international groups is the quality of 
professional advice. Although this is something which 
tends to be overlooked by many commentators, it was of 
significant importance in each of the four cases described. 
Without the services of the merchant banking firm of S. G. 
Warburg & Co. Ltd., Grand Metropolitan would not have been 
able to pull off the spectacular series of acquisitions in 
the period 1966 to 1972, and in particular the vital bids 
for Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in 1971, and for Watney in 
1972. Likewise, S. G. Warburg was to the fore in the 
successful repulse of the Allied Breweries bid for 
Trusthouse Forte in 1971/2. Bass and Queens Moat Houses 
have been well served by Schroders and Charterhouse 
respectively.
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It could be argued that Bass is the U.K. company where 
strategic management skills have been most in evidence in 
the period under review. It is certainly fair to say that 
the formation of Crest Hotels in 1969, the acquisition of 
Esso Motor hotels in 1972, Coral in 1980 and Holiday Inn in 
1987 were all strategically conceived and implemented. As 
previously indicated the Holiday Inn acquisition allowed 
Bass to become the largest hotel operator worldwide. In 
contrast the growth of Grand Metropolitan, Trusthouse Forte 
and Queens Moat Houses - certainly in the period 1960 to 
1980 - owed more to opportunistic decision making than to 
formal systems of strategic thinking and strategic 
planning.
Having identified the factors that led to the success of 
these international groups, an attempt will be made in the 
latter stages of the thesis to relate them to the factors 
present in the earlier case studies, so that a series of 
factors common to all may be evaluated.
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CHAPTER 5 EVALUATION OF CASE STUDIES AND CONCLUSIONS
THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR
The three sectors presented in the case studies - The 
Independent, The U.K. and the International represent the 
main elements of continuity and change in the industry 
since 1945, and delineate the main stages in the growth of 
the industry. As was shown in Chapter 1, the hotel 
industry has long been characterised and dominated by the 
very large number of small independent enterprises. 
Currently (1993) this sector represents approximately 90% 
of all hotels but only 67% of the bedstock in the industry. 
This sector, and the group of case studies, consequently 
represents both the foundations of the industry and its 
most enduring features, even although it has suffered major 
contraction under pressure of competition from inter alia 
low cost package holidays, overseas travel by U.K. 
residents, and significant rising costs of operation.
A further consequence is that the case studies in this 
sector demonstrate the qualities, tactics and strategies of 
men who not only survived but succeeded in a very difficult 
market environment. The case studies demonstrate that, 
traditionally, the small independent hotelier catered 
mainly for the local market in food and drink. Thus Arthur 
Neil built a market for The Open Arms at Dirleton, East
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Lothian by identifying the demand for food and drink in the 
immediate area and in the environs of Edinburgh, some 20 
miles distant. Having succeeded in this respect he was 
then able to gradually build the accommodation side of the 
business which produced additional food and drink revenue. 
In turn this contributed to profit in two ways; on the one 
hand accommodation carried a higher margin and the 
additional food and drink income, in general, attracted 
only material cost, labour and overheads to a large extent 
being fixed (Chapter 2).
For some there was a second element of business customers. 
Ih the case of George Goring, in addition to a significant 
and steady stream of overseas customers, particularly from 
the U.S.A., there were many business clients from central 
London, some of them high spending. The Goring carried 
another advantage by virtue of its proximity to Buckingham 
Palace which resulted in yet another market segment in the 
form of visiting royalty and members of the diplomatic 
service (Chapter 2). The balance between the two was 
determined essentially by the capacity of the individual 
hotel.
Lastly most small hoteliers also derived some of their 
sales from a highly seasonal, and erratic, holiday 
market. The obvious example in this regard is the 
Metropole where David Baird-Murray had to contend with
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erratic volumes of business derived mainly from coach 
parties which did little more than cover fixed costs and 
thus made but a minimal contribution to profit (Chapter 2). 
The extent to which Arthur Neil developed the outside 
catering division of The Open Arms was much greater than 
that normally encountered in small hotels. His success in 
this area stemmed both from the power and influence of his 
personality and his early recognition of the potential of 
this market segment.
Notwithstanding the great changes in this industry outlined 
in Chapter 1, it is clear that many small independent 
hotels still survive on this type of sales mix, but the 
more successful in this sector have moved ahead by 
developing niche marketing, specialised advertising 
(usually through the medium of consortia) and specialised 
catering facilities. As shown in Chapter 2, Douglas 
Barrington built the reputation and profitability of The 
Lygon Arms at Broadway by his sales and marketing forays 
overseas, mainly to the U.S.A. but also to continental 
Europe and Australia. Without such efforts, The Lygon Arms
r: 0 i C.
would have become just another country hotel. As it was,
\
the foresight, determination and professionalism of Douglas 
Barrington enabled it to secure a unique niche in the 
market.
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David Baird-Murray of The Metropole was one of the founders 
of Best Western which grew to become the largest consortium 
for middle market independent hotels in the U.K. In a 
similar vein Douglas Barrington of The Lygon Arms not only 
was a founder member of Prestige, a consortium embracing 
some 30 upmarket properties in the U.K. but also 
participated in the international consortium Relais & 
Chateaux which allowed only 17 U.K. members. Such efforts 
exemplify the foresight and business acumen displayed by 
the proprietors profiled in the case studies.
These three elements, food and drink; business customers 
and holiday customers, independent of location, have been 
exploited by the respective proprietors and are 
demonstrated in different ways by the representative case 
studies.
Behind this group of strategies, . however, lies an 
unquantifiable and highly subjective element - the 
personalities and professionalism of proprietors who have 
succeeded in making a commercial virtue of a personalised 
'mine host' service, creating for clients an individual and 
personal style served in a world increasingly dominated by 
standard methods of operation. To a certain extent their 
success may be attributed to a reaction against uniformity 
and standardisation. For people who are willing and who 
have the means to pay for a highly personalised style and
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level of service the rewards both for the customer and the 
hotelier can be considerable; for the former in terms of 
comfort and satisfaction both physiological and
psychological, for the hotelier in terms of incremental 
sales and profit.
Furthermore, the professionalism of the hotelier will be 
evident insofar as he will not, unlike his less experienced 
competitors, underestimate the spending power of his 
customers. Indeed, they may well spend more than they 
intended but will still be satisfied and feel they have 
received good value for money in terms of accommodation, 
food and drink consumed together with services rendered.
It is clear that success in this sector is hard won, but 
that the rewards in lifestyle generally have been regarded, 
certainly by the hoteliers themselves, as more significant 
and important than pure financial return.
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THE U.K. SECTOR
In contrast, the case studies of the U.K. operators 
present a quite different set of characteristics. As 
income and leisure opportunities expanded for the British 
people in the 1960's, market opportunities beyond that of 
local areas began to be more attractive, thus encouraging 
efforts to create and promote nationally based hotel 
groups. In the formative stage these groups were 
particularly attracted to developing services to exploit 
two trends, namely the rapid growth of the business market, 
and the segmentation of the traditional undifferentiated 
hotel market into more specialised cost and profit centres 
based on the provision of accommodation, food and drink. 
Each had its own customer base in addition to the 
combination afforded traditional hoteliers.
The development of different market segments created, in 
turn, opportunities for diversification by horizontal 
acquisition. A specific and highly influential aspect of 
this trend was the movement of the brewery groups into the 
hotel sector thereby seeking to develop retail outlets for 
their liquor while adding to their market share and 
turnover. Moreover, and more important, it simultaneously 
enabled them to diversify into the potentially more 
profitable provision of accommodation.
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In a similar vein Bass (Chapter 4) formed Crest Hotels in 
1969 and, from a group of small country hotels, developed 
new properties during the 1970's aimed specifically at the 
business traveller. In turn the acquisition of the Coral 
group in 1980 brought additional hotels in London and 
extended group coverage within the U.K.
It is also clear from the case studies that the speed and 
success of the emergence of these U.K. groups was much 
enhanced by the skills of a small group of men who took 
advantage of rising property values to combine property 
acquisition (and in some cases a degree of speculation) 
with the creation of national group hotel facilities. In 
this respect the example of Centre/Comfort/Friendly is the 
most revealing, showing as it does how the Chairman, Henry 
Edwards and his management team were able to carve out a 
middle market niche based on:
a) stringent control of costs - not only those related to 
development and construction but also to operations;
b) marketing techniques aimed at securing not only optimum 
room and bed occupancy but also high volume food and 
beverage turnover by way of conference and banqueting 
business;
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c) package deals for both the tourist and buisness market 
which offered better value for money, in respect of the 
range of services provided, than their immediate 
competitors.
In common with the independent group the power of 
personality is highly significant. In contrast to the 
independents, where personality was directed to creating 
the ambience of individual service, in the emergence of the 
U.K. groups personality was directed to creating individual 
empires usually accompanied by strong autocratic leadership 
of groups that were property led rather than hotel services 
dominated. These circumstances applied both to Robert Peel 
and the development of Mount Charlotte and to Henry Edwards 
with regard to Centre/Comfort/Friendly.
It is with the development of this group of hoteliers and 
hotels that the management of the industry began to develop 
a more professional character. Indications of this emerged 
from the late 1960's onwards as corporate management 
developed national groups of properties by a combined 
strategy of new build blended with acquisitions followed by 
refurbishments to group standards. This latter syndrome 
was much in evidence in the development of the Norfolk 
Capital Group where the property expertise of Peter Eyles 
meshed with the merchant banking talents of Anthony 
Richmond-Watson.
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These groups combined property strategies and business 
values with traditional accommodation and food services, 
but did so in such a way as to create brand images as part 
of their identity and market appeal. Thus Peter Tyrie was 
able to translate the worldwide appeal of the Gleneagles 
Hotel to both the Caledonian in Edinburgh and the 
Piccadilly in London.
Finally, the strategies were directed not only at 
capturing and increasing market share but by moving 
upmarket, creating specific market areas together with 
appropriate qualities and standards of provision of a wider 
range of services than before. Groups who succeeded to a 
significant extent in this were Mount Charlotte and Norfolk 
Capital. The former achieved this by adding value to their 
acquisitions via refurbishment and upgrading, thus enabling 
higher prices to be charged which benefited profitability. 
The latter pursued a similar policy.with acquisitions in 
London and by moving their home counties and provincial 
properties upmarket subsequent to acquisition.
These case studies clearly demonstrate a combination of 
features, more complex, and quite distinct from the 
independent sector, designed to ensure national market 
objectives linked to operational standards of income and
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costs resulting in levels of profit at unit and corporate 
level sufficient to produce satisfactory streams of 
dividends and retentions.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR
The growing maturity of the U.K. hotel industry, linked as 
it was to a swelling tide of international users, business 
and holiday, who demanded international standards of 
provision, triggered the third phase of development in the
industry, namely the launch of international hotel groups
from a U.K. base and the simultaneous penetration of the
U.K. market by groups based in the U.S.A.
Thus new groups of international operators did not develop 
independently of earlier trends. Two elements developed in 
the U.K. group phase of development combined to launch the 
international sector groups. One was the ambition of large 
U.K. brewery companies to gain international exposure; 
the other was the property acquisition and financial skills 
developed in the shaping of the U.K. groups. In embarking 
on an international strategy the case studies make clear 
that access to skilled professional advice from merchant 
bankers, accountants and valuation surveyors was
effectively linked to the deployment of well developed 
property acquisition skills and financial expertise.
In the 1970's Bass expanded in continental Europe through 
the acquisition of Esso Motor Hotels. Further acquisitions 
enabled the company to acquire properties in West Germany, 
Austria, Holland, France and Belgium. By the 1980's,
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subsequent to the U.K. acquisition of Coral and Centre, 
Bass aspired to global coverage and this was achieved 
initially by the acquisition of the international 
operations of Holiday Corporation in 1987 and latterly by 
the further acquisition of Holiday Corporation properties 
in the U.S.A, Canada and Mexico. Grand Metropolitan, having 
started out as a property driven hotel company, was 
generally perceived, consequent to the acquisition of 
Truman in 1971 and Watney in 1972, as a brewery company. 
The acquisition of Intercontinental in 1980, however, 
enabled it, at a stroke, to become a global player in the 
hotel industry. In each of these illustrations professional 
advice, particularly from merchant bankers (Schroders in 
the case of Bass and S. G. Warburg in the case of Grand 
Metropolitan) played an important part in helping each 
company achieve its objective.
The European expansion of Queens Moat Houses was very much 
property driven, in a manner not dissimilar to its previous 
expansion in the U.K. Not having a globally respected and 
recognisable brand name was one of the reasons for the link 
with properties owned or operated by Holiday Inns, the 
result being that by the end of the 1980's Queens Moat 
Houses emerged as the largest Holiday Inn franchisee in 
continental Europe. By contrast it was noted in Chapter 4 
that the overseas expansion of Trusthouse Forte reflected 
more of a piecemeal approach. Not having secured a major
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overseas group during the 1980's was one of the reasons why 
Trusthouse Forte latterly embarked on a comprehensive 
rebranding exercise and change of corporate name.
In the international sector, even more than in the U.K. 
sector, a major factor was that strategy was built upon the 
assumption of potential capital gain on the properties in 
addition to dividend and retention streams. This was much 
in evidence when, in 1987, Grand Metropolitan sold 
Intercontinental at a profit in excess of £500M after all 
costs and charges. A further example was the sale, by 
Scottish & Newcastle Breweries of its Thistle hotel group 
to Mount Charlotte for £645M in 1989. This represented a 
strategic withdrawal by the brewery company from the U.K. 
hotel industry. Simultaneously, the purchase made Mount 
Charlotte the biggest U.K. operator apart from Trusthouse 
Forte.
Furthermore, there is the credible contention that the 
power of personality, so much in evidence in the creation 
of the U.K. sector, was less significant and was replaced 
to an extent by institutional managerialism in the creation 
of these international groups. This was particularly the 
case with Bass, Ladbroke and Grand Metropolitan. The 
respective hotel divisions, Holiday Inns, Hilton 
International and Intercontinental were headed up by 
executives who were main board directors together with
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other divisional heads and functional specialists. As main 
board directors they had considerable power and influence 
but not as much as those who headed up companies whose only 
or main activity was hotels. Examples of the latter were 
Lord Forte of Trusthouse Forte and John Bairstow of Queens 
Moat Houses.
In total, each of the case study groups identifies 
significant features on which survival, growth and success 
come to depend in quite different market environments. In 
the independents the focus is on personality linked to 
intuitive niche markets and specialised, indeed,
personalised service. In the U.K. groups, market 
segmentation, managerial professionalism, diversification 
and property acquisition driven by powerful personalities 
shaped and influenced the national structure of the hotel 
industry. Lastly, with the emergence of the
internationals, institutional managerialism and
professional advice meshed with a potential capital gain 
property acquisition strategy to create large groups with 
diversified interests. In the international group 
strategies of hotel management and the development of 
potential and, in some cases, realised capital gains 
strategies appear to operate in virtually unique spheres. 
This gives a quite unique character to the hotel industry 
at this level.
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In turn this clearly identifies the dual nature of the 
hotel business. On the one hand it represents a multi 
product retail operation with differing margins on each 
product; it is labour intensive with high break even 
levels above which incremental revenues, especially with 
regard to accommodation, mostly filter through as 
incremental operating profit. On the other, it represents 
investment in property with potential capital gain 
determined by the cost of initial acquisition together with 
the profitability of the retail operation. It is this 
duality that makes the hotel industry different from others 
and from which the industry derives its uniqueness.
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CONCLUSIONS
Having now examined and evaluated selected companies in the 
independent, property and international sectors of the U.K. 
hotel industry, it is possible to discern certain factors 
which have been at the core of their successful growth and 
development. The growth and development of major firms have 
been influenced by their ability to perceive the dual 
nature of the industry as both an investment in property 
assets which, in the period under review, appreciated in 
value, and a retail operation with inherent added value 
characteristics. The criteria for success, and the lack of 
it, can be distinguished within this essential duality on 
the property side, by the importance of location and the 
techniques associated with successful acquisition. 
Furthermore, the quality of professional advice enjoyed by 
certain of the major firms has been crucial to their 
success.
From the retail perspective the successful implementation 
of management techniques associated with marketing, the 
maintenance of standards and the control of operating costs 
have been crucial in optimizing profitability.
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1. DUALITY OF INDUSTRY AS PROPERTY INVESTMENT 
AND RETAIL OPERATION
The evaluation of the twelve case studies reveals that an 
important contributory factor to the success of any company 
has been the ability of the hotel operator to recognize, 
adopt and exploit a dual perception of the business. It is 
via the expert matching of the inherent and potential value 
of the property in terms of environment, location and size 
to the retailing of accommodation, food, liquor and 
leisure that the potential capital gain attributable to the
property may be realised. Indeed, this syndrome has
applied to the industry in general throughout the period 
under review and was particularly relevant to the period
1981 to 1988, during which there was a marked upsurge in 
property prices at all levels throughout the industry.
The post war period in general and the 1980's in particular 
were marked by an increasing awareness by companies large 
and small of the techniques available to specialist 
retailers. In this context, mention should be made of
Peter Tyrie, who spearheaded the retailing of health and 
leisure facilities in the Gleneagles group which was formed 
in 1981, and the major brewing groups, of which Bass is 
perhaps the best example, who pursued sophisticated
retailing policies by means of the implementation of strong 
brand names for both accommodation through Crest, which
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name they adopted in 1969, and the Holiday Inn acquisition 
of 1987, together with food and beverages through the 
medium of the Toby restaurant chain.
2. location:
The importance of location in the hotel industry has been 
stressed by many writers, commentators and operators, none 
better known than Conrad Hilton whose dictum regarding 
potential hotel profitability was "site, site and site". 
This dictum was adapted slightly by Lord Forte who, in his 
autobiography, wrote of "site, site and management". (1)
Each of the case studies demonstrates to a greater or 
lesser degree the importance of location. In the 
independent sector the location of The Goring Hotel, 
equidistant from Buckingham Palace and Victoria Station, 
has been, since its opening in 1910, the underlying factor 
in its continuing success. By contrast, the location of 
The Metropole in Llandridod Wells with a population of 
4,200 and only 20,000 people within a radius of 25 miles, 
has been the underlying factor and largely explains the 
relatively poor profitability of that hotel throughout the 
post war era.
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Country, as opposed to urban locations can only be 
profitable when they have the backing either of a natural 
tourist destination as is the case with The Lygon Arms, 
Broadway, Worcestershire or where they have the backing of 
an internationally known name as in the case of Gleneagles. 
Clearly the better the site in an urban location the more 
expensive the property will be to acquire. It is in this 
field that the property skills of such men as Sir Maxwell 
Joseph and John Bairstow laid the foundations for their 
respective hotel empires.
The importance of location is evident in other studies 
though perhaps not to quite to the same extent. Certainly 
many of the purchases made, for example, by Henry Edwards, 
(Green Park Hotel, Mayfair) Robert Peel, (Kingsley Hotel, 
Holborn, London) and Peter Tyrie, (Piccadilly Hotel, 
London) were the result of careful research, expert advice 
enhanced by intuitive recognition for above average value 
for money, combined with development potential. The 
acquisition of Celebrated Country Hotels, engineered by 
Peter Eyles, represented an important stage in the 
development of the Norfolk Capital Group. It gained the 
company a clutch a four country properties set in extensive 
grounds in sought after locations. Moreover, the timing of 
the deal was such that within a year one hotel could have 
been sold at the price paid for all four. Robert Peel's
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acquisition of the Mount Royal and the Kennedy in London 
from Grand Metropolitan are good examples of the skilful 
development of Mount Charlotte Investments.
It is clear that where the location of a property is sound 
the potential for profit and capital appreciation is 
considerable, whereas even the most efficient standard of 
operation cannot overcome the inherent disadvantage of an 
inferior location.
3. TECHNIQUES AND TIMING OF ACQUISITION
It is a truism that no business can remain the same size 
for long; it will either lose ground to its competitors and 
diminish, or it will build its market share and grow by a 
variety of methods according to circumstances. Within the 
hotel industry it is true to say that the majority of the 
major firms have grown from modest beginnings since the end 
of the Second World War. To a large extent this is also 
the case internationally where such firms as Hilton, 
Sheraton, Intercontinental and Holiday Corporation are all 
essentially post war creations.
To a significant extent expansion by acquisition may be 
perceived as one of the principal themes of the thesis. 
Indeed without the expansion of what are now the major 
firms within the industry the thesis could not have been
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written in its present form. What the development of the 
industry displayed was the ability of such men as Bairstow, 
Forte, Joseph and Peel to build large firms from very 
modest beginnings. In the case of Bairstow the first hotel 
was his own house suitably enlarged and converted.
Successful expansion for each of the major companies called 
for a broad range of top management skills. Prominent 
amongst these is intuition, which applied to the four 
hoteliers mentioned above, though not in equal measure. It 
was an attribute Joseph enjoyed in abundance; Forte's 
acquisitions owed much to his being in the right place at 
the right time; Bairstow's empire grew essentially as a 
result of a series of opportunistic strikes whilst there is 
much of the "wheeler dealer" in Peel's personality. The 
importance of intuition may be illustrated clearly by 
reference to the quotation of George Steiner and John 
Miner.
"It is our view that the apparently "intuitive flash" is 
more the result of digestion of masses of information 
blended with experience, insight and an intellectual 
capability of a manager to sift through the irrelevant and 
focus quickly on the critical. There is no superior 
approach to superb strategy identification than a brilliant 
intuitive mind." (2.)
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The cost of acquisition is of prime importance to any 
operator whether the property be short lease, long lease or 
freehold. The price paid must be such that the operator 
can finance any loan element of the consideration without 
undue pressure being put on the operating profit of the 
hotel. Should too high a price be paid the operator will 
have great difficulty in obtaining a satisfactory rate of 
return on capital invested. Indeed if he is highly geared 
from the outset and pays an excessive price for his 
property any downturn in business may well have the effect 
of reducing operating profits (as a result of the high 
incidence of fixed costs) to the extent that there is 
insufficient to meet financing costs. Should such a 
situation persist bankruptcy will loom large. The hotel 
industry is strewn with examples of properties where the 
original capital investment linked to the capital structure 
was such that liquidation inevitably followed. One can cite 
a trail of examples from the Piccadilly, London, opened in 
1908 and bankrupt within eighteen months, to the Harrogate 
International Hotel in which, within two years of opening, 
a controlling interest was acquired by Queens Moat Houses 
in 1987.
Conversely, the acquisition of property at less than full 
price will be highly beneficial. For an operator starting 
out in business it should help him through the early 
critical years; for established operators competitive
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purchases should help ensure that satisfactory rates of 
return on capital invested are earned and that any short 
term downturn in sales volume can be borne without critical 
impact on post interest profit margins. Such was the case 
in the early years of Grand Metropolitan where, between 
1956-1962, Sir Maxwell Joseph's skill as a valuer enabled 
him to acquire a series of properties at prices which laid 
the foundations for the profitability of the rapidly 
expanding group.
The costs of acquisition are inextricably linked to the 
timing of all transactions. Clearly large and established 
companies will be in a position to drive hard bargains when 
sales are forced upon reluctant sellers. Conversely, in a 
seller's market even large and established companies have 
been forced to pay "over the odds" for particularly 
desirable properties. In this context mention should be 
made of the acquisition of Gosforth Park Hotel North of 
Newcastle by Swallow Hotels (a subsidiary of Vaux the 
brewer) from Mount Charlotte Investments for £27M in 1989 
and the purchase of the Caledonian Hotel in Edinburgh by 
the Norfolk Capital Group from Guinness for £18.5M in 1986. 
It will be recalled that the Caledonian had been valued on 
an open market basis by Christie's only five years earlier 
in 1981 for just £2.3M.
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The case studies present many examples of acquisition at 
less than full price. In the independent sector the 
purchase by Arthur Neil of The Howard Hotel in 1970 for 
£46,000 may usefully be cited. In a slightly different vein 
it will be recalled that the initial open market valuation 
of Gleneagles, The Caledonian and The North British, 
carried out by Christie & Co. in 1981, was £12,730,000. 
Owing to the then weakness in hotel property prices the 
purchase agreement with British Transport Hotels was for 
£10,350,000 - a discount of 18%. No more than five years 
later the three hotels were collectively worth some £75M - 
a sevenfold increase. The overall result, was that, as 
indicated in the text, the Guinness group, by their 
disposals of other properties at a significant profit, 
effectively acquired the Gleneagles Hotel itself for 
nothing.
In all cases notable acquisitions have been made with due 
regard to careful timing. The most striking example of 
this in the 1970's was the acquisition of the hotel 
interests of J. Lyons by Trusthouse Forte. In this 
instance over 6,000 rooms were acquired at an average cost 
of £4,300 - less than 20% of the cost of construction from 
scratch. It was the ability of Trusthouse Forte to move 
rapidly and decisively once it was known that the hotels 
were on the market that made the coup possible.
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In the 1980's the best examples concern Grand Metropolitan 
and Ladbroke. The acquisition of Intercontinental by Grand 
Metropolitan in 1981 was the result of patient research and 
planning followed by an opportunistic strike that resulted 
in negotiations lasting less than one week. The timing was 
such that the defending company was left isolated and 
vulnerable whilst other would be bidders were left at the 
starting gate. In the case of Ladbroke the acquisition of 
Hilton International, masterminded by Ladbroke chairman 
Cyril Stein, was rightly acknowledged the deal of the 
decade. The properties that Ladbroke purchased in 1987 for 
£645 were worth at least twice as much by the end of the 
decade. Again it was the timing of the bid that paved the 
way for success.
From the perspective of raising finance there is a classic 
contrast between the success of Queens Moat Houses timing a 
rights issue just before the crash of October 1987, and the 
failure of Norfolk Capital Group to complete a similar 
exercise just a few weeks later with the result that 85% of 
the issue was left with the underwriters.
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4. PROFESSIONAL ADVICE
As the major firms within the industry grew it became clear 
to the founder directors that in addition to building 
management structures appropriate to the size of their 
companies that they would have to rely on a variety of 
professional advisers, prominent amongst whom were merchant 
bankers, lawyers, chartered accountants and chartered 
surveyors.
The outstanding example of the importance of professional 
advice and the contribution it has made to the development 
of the U.K. hotel industry in the post war era may be seen 
by reference to the London merchant banking firm of S. G. 
Warburg & Co. Ltd. They were advisers to Sir Maxwell 
Joseph of Grand Metropolitan and were instrumental in 
helping him achieve his series of successful take over bids 
both in the period 1966 to 1972 during which major 
international firms were acquired - viz Liggett (J & B) , 
International, Heublein (Smirnoff) and Pillsbury. Indeed, 
without their particular expertise it is highly unlikely 
that he would have been successful in acquiring Watney in 
1972. At that time it was the largest take over bid in 
U.K. business history. During the same period S. G. 
Warburg & Co Ltd. were also advisers to Trusthouse Forte 
and played an important and possibly vital contribution to 
the successful repulse of the attempted take over by Allied
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Breweries in the period October 1971 to January 1972. 
Subsequent to these events both Grand Metropolitan and 
Trusthouse Forte acknowledged privately and publicly the 
debt which they owed to S. G. Warburg & Co. Ltd.
Other merchant banking firms have played a prominent part 
in the development of such firms as Norfolk Capital Group 
where the chairman of the company, Anthony Richmond-Watson, 
was a deputy chairman of Morgan Grenfell whose expertise 
paved the way for the rapid expansion of that company. All 
major hotel companies retain merchant banks to act for them 
and the special skills of these firms have played an 
important part in the growth and development of the 
industry particularly of those firms which have expanded 
principally by acquisition.
Reference has already been made both to the perception of 
the hotel industry as a property business and to the 
importance of location. It follows, therefore, that the 
skills of chartered surveyors are much in demand by hotel 
companies, particularly those bent on acquisition of 
existing properties. In this field the firms of Knight, 
Frank and Rut ley on the one hand and Weatherall Green & 
Smith on the other are generally reckoned to be 
pre-eminent.
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In the evaluation of successful companies the role of 
professional advisers is rarely mentioned. It is fair to 
say, however, that in the case of the hotel industry the 
major firms owe a significant debt to the collective and 
combined efforts of the professional expertise outlined 
above.
5. TECHNIQUES OF MANAGEMENT
Throughout the case studies examples of specific management 
techniques were discussed. The most important of these 
related to marketing, standards and cost control.
In the period under review the two companies that excelled 
in marketing were Grand Metropolitan in the 1960's and 
Bass/Crest Hotels in the 1980's. The marketing ability 
of the former helped the company make the most of its 
streamlined retailing operation and with all aspects of the 
property side covered, the profitability of Grand 
Metropolitan Hotels was second to none in that decade. The 
marketing skills of Bass/Crest helped bring that company to 
the forefront of the U.K. hotel industry and this position 
was consolidated by its Holiday Corporation purchases of 
1987 and 1989, which resulted in Bass becoming the largest 
hotel operator worldwide.
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The link between marketing and standards is closely bound 
up with branding. Once companies can consistently produce 
standards of accommodation, food and drink that satisfy a 
particular market the strength of the brand name can be 
consolidated and goodwill built. It was relevant that each 
of the major companies operated at several levels in the 
market, producing standards according to price, brand and 
market niche.
From the perspective of cost control it was suggested that 
Mount Charlotte Investment hotels were perhaps the most 
adept of the major firms in controlling costs. It was 
noted that this was a major area of difficulty for all 
groups and the higher the standard of operation the more 
this was so, because of the increased number of cost 
centres.
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The evidence presented in this thesis has demonstrated the 
nature of and reasons for the growth and development of the 
U.K. hotel industry in the period 1945-1989. This has been 
shown in the independent sector, the sector geared to the 
U.K. market and the sector where growth and development 
has been on an international scale.
The most important factor has been the dual nature of the 
industry as both a property business and a specialised 
retail business. Within this duality, however, it is 
crucial to recognize that the property aspects are the more 
important. In cases where the property aspects are sound, 
profitability can be ensured by competent management of the 
retail side. The reverse, however, does not apply. Even 
the most competently managed retail operation cannot bring 
about optimum profitability unless all the necessary 
property aspects are initially in place.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Interview Lord Forte of Ripley 1/4/87.
2. George A. Steiner and John B. Miner Management Policy
and Strategy Text. Readings and Cases. (1977,
MacMillan).
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APPENDIX I
NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS
In order to investigate each company thoroughly it was 
judged essential to conduct face to face interviews with 
chairmen and managing directors. In all interviews the 
optimum degree of informality was arranged; likewise there 
were no lists of pre-arranged questions or conditioned 
responses. Rather the interviews, which ranged from 30 
minutes to 2 hours, sought to explore the personality and 
motivation of the subject, to probe the management style of 
each operation and to evaluate the performance of each 
company relative to its experience, resources and record of 
growth. In chronological order the principal interviews 
were as follows:
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Date Company Interviewee Position
1985 November The Open Arms, Arthur Neil Managing 
Dirleton Director
1986 March The Goring Hotel George Goring Managing
Director
March The Lygon Arms Douglas
Barrington
Managing
Director
March The Metropole David Baird- 
Murray
Managing
Director
1986 October Gleneagles
1987 April Hotels
Sir Alan Smith Chairman
Ian Q. Jones Director
Ian F. Brown Director
John Tee Director
Sir Alexander Director
Glen
1987 April
June
Trusthouse Forte Lord Forte 
PLC of Ripley
Dennis Hearn
Chairman
Deputy
Chief
Executive
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1987
1987
1988
1988
April Grand Edward S.
Metropolitan Trippe
June Intercontinental Sir Stanley
Hotel Grinstead
Corporation
June
Nov
Queens Moat 
Houses
John Bairstow
Martin Marcus
Gerry Bell 
David Hersey
March Centre Hotels 
Comfort Hotels
Henry Edwards 
Henry Edwards
Friendly Hotels Henry Edwards
March Norfolk Capital A. Richmond-
Watson 
Peter Eyles
Director
Chairman
Chairman
Deputy
Chairman
Operations
Director
Finance
Director
Chairman
Chairman
Chairman
Chairman
Managing
Director
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1988 May Bass PLC
Crest Hotels Pugh Phillips Managing
Director
Sept. Brian Langton Chairman
1988 Oct. Mount Charlotte Kenneth Pawson Director/
Investments Company
Secretary
In addition video recordings, which are available for use, 
were made in 1985 with Peter Tyrie, Managing Director of 
Gleneagles Hotels PLC and in 1986 with Arthur Neil of The 
Open Arms, Dirleton, East Lothian.
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Arthur Neil (2/11/1929) trained at The Central Hotel, 
Glasgow and The Scottish Hotel School. After a period of 
National Service he worked in London and on the Continent 
of Europe. He was engaged as assistant manager at The Open 
Arms Dirleton in 1954. He became the proprietor and 
subsequently purchased The Howard Hotel in Edinburgh in 
1970 for £46,000. He sold it in 1989 for E1.25M in order 
to concentrate on the extension and upgrading of The Open 
Arms.
George Goring (19/5/1938) is a third generation hotelier. 
Trained at the prestigious Lausanne Hotel School. 
Proprietor of The Goring Hotel, London, SW1 and The Spa 
Hotel, Tunbridge Wells, Kent. Over the years has made The 
Goring one of the best run and most popular hotels in 
London aimed specifically at the discerning individual 
traveller.
Douglas Barrington (9/10/1920) was an Australian naval 
gunnery officer in World War 2. Immediately upon 
demobilisation he was offered the job of manager The Lygon 
Arms in Broadway at the time a little known Cotswold 
village. Subsequent to marketing trips to the U.S.A. the 
hotel, which he acquired outright, became very well known 
and was awarded the Queen's Export Award to Industry, the
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first time such an award had been bestowed upon an hotel. 
Douglas Barrington sold the hotel to The Savoy Hotel 
Company in 1986 for E4.75M.
David Baird-Murrav (21/3/1931) is a fourth generation 
hotelier who took over the family property The Metropole in 
Llandrindod Wells, Powys, Wales at the age of 23. Against 
the odds he slowly built a sound business. It was not 
until the construction of a health and leisure centre at 
the hotel in 1986/87 that the financial future of the 
business could be called stable. Over the years David
Baird-Murray has been prominent in hotel marketing circles 
and in the promotion of tourism in Wales.
Peter Tvrie (3/4/1946) trained at the Westminster Hotel
r
School in London. After a period in London and the far 
east he was appointed, at the age of 34, as managing
director of Gleneagles Hotels PLC in 1981. He remained in 
this position until the company was first of all taken over 
by Bells, the whisky group and then by Guinness the
brewers. He then returned to the far east as managing
director of the exclusive Mandarin Group.
Lord Forte of Riplev (26/11/1908) Charles Forte was brought 
to the UK in 1913 at the age of four. After education in 
Scotland and Italy he entered the family catering business 
in the south west of England. He went into business on his
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own at the age of twenty six setting up a string of milk
bars in central London. His catering career expanded 
rapidly after the war and in 1957 he entered the hotel 
business when he purchased the Waldorf Hotel in London. In 
1970 his firm merged with Trust Houses. He then fought off 
a takeover bid from Allied breweries. This action resulted 
in his becoming the dominant personality in the THF 
boardroom. The firm went from strength to strength in the
following years with Lord Forte's son, Rocco succeeding him
as chief executive.
Sir Maxwell Joseph (31/5/1910) Born the son of an London 
east end tailor Maxwell Joseph went into business as an
estate agent on his own account at the age of nineteen. 
After world war two he started to invest in hotels. With 
the aid of Fred Kobler and Henry Edwards he created Grand 
Hotels (Mayfair) which he merged in 1962 with Mount Royal 
(Marble Arch) to form Grand Metropolitan Hotels. This was 
to become the most profitable hotel company in the UK in 
the nineteen sixties. Throughout this period Joseph was 
unsurpassed as a property dealer and his skill paved the 
way for a spectacular series of takeover bids culminating 
in 1971 and 1972 with the acquisition of the brewery 
companies Truman and Watney. These were followed in 1980 
and 1981 by acquisitions in the U.S.A. Joseph died aged 72 
in September 1982.
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Sir Stanley Grinstead (17.6.1924) After war service as a 
pilot in the fleet air arm Grinstead qualified as a 
chartered accountant and spent some years in the 
profession. He joined Maxwell Joseph's organisation in 
1957. As managing director of Grand Metropolitan he shaped 
the direction of the company subsequent to successive 
acquisitions. He co-ordinated the acquisition of Liggett 
in 1980 and Intercontinental the following year. On the 
death of Sir Maxwell Joseph he became chairman, a post he 
retained until his retirement in 1987. His last major act 
was the acquisition of Heublein which brought with it the 
production, manufacturing and brand name of Smirnoff vodka.
John Bairstow (25/8/1930) Subsequent to building a
successful chain of estate agents in south east England 
John Bairstow entered the hotel industry when he converted 
his own house in Brentwood, Essex into an hotel in 1968. 
Over the next twenty years the company grew strongly by 
acquisition first throughout the UK. and then on 
Continental Europe. By 1989 the company owned and operated 
over 140 hotels with a combined valuation of some £1.4 
billion. Queens Moat Houses is reckoned to be the 
outstanding success story of the UK hotel industry in the 
nineteen-eighties.
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Henrv Edwards (Circa 1924) was brought to the UK as a 
teenager in the late nineteen-thirties. In the mid 
nineteen-fifties he joined Fred Kobler and Maxwell Joseph 
in the formation of Grand Hotels (Mayfair) where he became 
general manager. At the end of 1964 he left to form first 
Centre Hotels and when that company was taken over by Coral 
in 1977, Comfort Hotels. This firm grew rapidly but 
attracted the attention of Ladbroke who acquired it in 
1984. Nothing daunted Edwards founded a third company 
Friendly Hotels and established it as a sound middle market 
group.
Anthony Richmond-Watson (8/4/1941) Educated at Edinburgh 
University B. Com. Anthony Richmond-Watson joined Morgan 
Grenfell becoming deputy chairman in 1989. His main 
experience was to lead for the bank in the successful 
takeover of Bells by Guinness. Morgan Grenfell had also 
advised Norfolk Capital and the chairman of the hotel group 
Lady Eileen Joseph, widow of Sir Maxwell, invited Richmond 
Watson to become chairman in 1984. As a result of the 
financial muscle of Morgan Grenfell, Norfolk Capital was 
able to mount a series of acquisitions which initially were 
successful but latterly were acquired at more than a full 
price. Subsequent to an unluckily time rights issue in 
1987 Norfolk Capital Group became vulnerable to the 
attention of predators.
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Peter Evles (22/4/1946) Trained in marketing Peter Eyles 
married one of Lady Eileen Joseph's daughters. The 
marriage ended in divorce. In 1981 Sir Maxwell Joseph 
appointed him managing director of Norfolk Capital. In the 
period 1982 to 1987 the group enjoyed considerable success 
but latterly Eyles was criticised for paying too high a 
price for properties especially the St James clubs 
purchased from Peter de Savary. The position of Eyles 
became vulnerable subsequent to the 1987 rights issue.
Brian Lanaton (6/12/1936) After training at the hotel
schools of Westminster and Lausanne Brian Langton played a 
notable part in the rise of Bass/Crest hotels of which he 
is chairman. He co-ordinated the purchase of Holiday Inns 
on the continent of Europe and latterly, in conjunction 
with Bass chairman Ian Prosser, saw Bass become the largest 
hotel operator worldwide with the acquisition first of 
Holiday Inns International in 1988 and then the Holiday
Corporation itself in 1989.
Kenneth Pawson (24/9/1923) Kenneth Pawson has been 
associated with the rapid growth and development of Mount 
Charlotte Investments. Acting as deputy to Robert Peel the 
pair have been responsible for taking Mount Charlotte from 
an obscure company which owned a string of run down
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properties to the second largest hotel company in the UK. 
The acquisitions culminated in 1989 with the £645M 
acquisition of the Thistle chain from Scottish & Newcastle 
in 1989.
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NEWSPAPERS
As indicated in the acknowledgements a principal source for 
this thesis was the Business Information Division of The 
Financial Times, Bracken House, London. The manager of the 
division, Anthony Northeast generously made available 
individual company files stretching back to 1945. The 
majority of press cuttings in these files were drawn from 
the following newspapers.
The Times
The Financial Times 
The Independent 
The Daily Telegraph 
The Daily Mail 
The Glasgow Herald
In addition the files contained numerous commentaries from 
a very wide cross section of stockbrokers' reports which 
proved most useful.
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